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sentencing phase had to go forward but that as a defendant he was in control of his defense, see Morrison v. State, 258 Ga. 683, 686(3) (373 S.E.2d 506) (1988) (‘Even if he is represented by an attorney, the attorney “is still only an assistant to the defendant and not the master of the defense.” [Cit.]’), Rivera had no desire to represent himself, either alone or as co- counsel, but only wished to have his counsel represent his interests as he perceived them to be. See Colwell v. State, 273 Ga. 634, 639(3)(b) (544 S.E.2d 120) (2001) (addressing defendant’s right to control basic approach to his defense). … However, upon reviewing the trial transcript, we conclude that Rivera acted ‘merely as an involved client who wished to have his own views made known to the jury. By ensuring that counsel respected [Rivera’s] wishes, the trial court did not transform counsel into co -counsel, rather, it ensured that counsel served as [ Rivera’s ] counsel .’ Colwell, supra at 639(3)(b). Because Rivera did not waive his constitutional right to representation, the trial court was not required to explain Rivera’s rights to him or to make inquires concerning his decision about his representation and whether that decision was freely and voluntarily made. See Colwell, supra at 638(3)(b).” Granville v. State, 281 Ga.App. 465, 636 S.E.2d 173 (September 6, 2006). Defendant’s waiver of counsel was not “knowing, voluntary and intelligent,” as “the court made no inquiry of Granville’s background or experience and failed to warn Granville of the dangers of proceeding without counsel, only warning Granville of the difficulty in representing himself.” “Any error here, however, was harmless because stand-by counsel ‘provided assistance regarding procedural matters during trial, so that the defendant did not stand trial alone with no assistance or protection of his rights.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Davis v. State, 257 Ga.App. 500, 502(1) (571 S.E.2d 497) (2002). … Moreover, the record reveals that not only did the State present strong evidence against Granville (see Rutledge [ v. State, 224 Ga.App. 666 (3) (482 S.E.2d 403) (1997),] but that Granville understood the nature of the charges against him, filing numerous pro se motions prior to trial (including two motions to quash the indictment), and that he represented himself in a credible fashion. He made opening and closing argument and conducted a thorough and sifting cross- examination of the State’s witnesses. He even challenged the credibility of the victim (by eliciting the victim’s admission that the prosecutor had threatened the victim with jail if he did not testify), and he questioned why the officers did not activate their patrol cars’ video cameras. Granville successfully moved to exclude two potential jurors and to sequester the witnesses. He also properly objected to the State’s attempt to lead a witness, which resulted in the State being cautioned by the trial court, and to the State’s attempt to enter into evidence an estimate of the damages to the police car rather than the actual amount paid for repair. Finally, Granville successfully objected to a hearsay statement made by one of the witnesses. As the record reveals that Granville ‘was well prepared to defend himself and did so in a credible fashion,’ we ‘conclude that it is unlikely that [his] convictions were attributable to his decision to represent himself.’ Rutledge v. State, supra, 224 Ga.App. at 671(3). We further conclude that the record presents no evidence that Granville was not mentally competent to represent himself. This enumeration therefore presents no ground for reversal.” Accord, Farley v. State , 317 Ga.App. 628, 732 S.E.2d 131 (September 14, 2012) (provision of standby counsel gave some assistance to defendant, who validly waived right to counsel at trial). Davis v. State, 279 Ga.App. 628, 631 S.E.2d 815 (June 5, 2006). Defendant requested different appointed counsel after his trial attorney made no objection to prosecutor’s request that defendant be shackled and handcuffed at trial. Defendant denied that he wanted to represent himself, but said he didn’t think his attorney had adequately prepared and said he was firing the attorney. Trial court forced defendant to proceed to trial and directed appointed counsel to remain at the table “as a resource.” “But the trial court never informed Davis of any of the dangers of proceeding without counsel. [Cit.] He never informed Davis of the nature of the charge against him, the punishments he might receive, the possible defenses to the charge or potentially mitigating circumstances. Nor is there any evidence in the record that Davis understood the consequences, dangers and permanency of waiving his right to counsel at the time he sought dismissal of his court- appointed attorney. [Cit.] Under the circumstances, the state has failed to meet its burden of proving a valid waiver and the trial court erred by allowing Davis to proceed without counsel. [Cits.]” “‘Because we cannot conclude that [Davis]’s conviction was independent of his decision to represent himself,’ [cits.] we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.” Smith v. State, 274 Ga.App. 568, 618 S.E.2d 182 (July 26, 2005). “In Fortson v. State, 272 Ga. 457 (532 S.E.2d 102) (2000), the Georgia Supreme Court recognized that a plea withdrawal proceeding is a ‘critical stage’ of a criminal prosecution entitling the prisoner to counsel. Id. at 459. But that court has also recognized that ‘[t]he essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee effective assistance of counsel, not to guarantee a defendant preferred counsel or counsel with whom a ‘meaningful relationship’ can be established.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 884, 886(2) (536 S.E.2d 511) (2000). Even after Smith had tried the patience of all concerned by alternately rejecting and accepting appointed counsel throughout the pendency of these proceedings, the trial court appointed new counsel to represent him on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. It is obvious from Smith’s conduct that he rejected this