☢ test - Í

attorney as well. We have no hesitation in finding that Smith knowingly and intelligently made a valid waiver of his right to counsel. See id.” Defendant effectively rejected counsel by filing bar complaints against two appointed attorneys in succession, and by then proceeding pro se without seeking further appointment of counsel. Bollinger v. State, 272 Ga.App. 688, 613 S.E.2d 209 (April 8, 2005). “Generally, in order to validly waive the right to counsel, the defendant should understand: (1) the nature of the charges; (2) any statutory lesser included offenses; (3) the range of possible punishments, including a jail sentence; (3) possible defenses; (5) mitigating circumstances; (6) that the rules of evidence will be enforced against him; (7) that he must make strategic decisions about testifying, calling witnesses, conducting voir dire, and striking jurors; and (8) that issues must be preserved and transcribed in order to make them on appeal. Bush v. State, 268 Ga.App. 200, 202(2) (601 S.E.2d 511) (2004). However, our Supreme Court has emphasized ‘that it is not incumbent upon the trial court to make each of these inquiries .’ Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 884, 886(2) (536 S.E.2d 511) (2000). Instead, ‘[t]he record need only reflect that the accused was made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Thus, ‘[c]ontrary to the implication in some appellate decisions, the warnings required to meet constitutional muster need not take any rigid form, and specific questions need not be asked on the record. ’ Hightower v. State, 252 Ga.App. 811 (557 S.E.2d 434) (2001).” Accord, Joyner v. State , 278 Ga.App. 60, 628 S.E.2d 186 (March 7, 2006); Annaswamy v. State , 284 Ga.App. 6, 642 S.E.2d 917 (March 7, 2007); Farley v. State , 317 Ga.App. 628, 732 S.E.2d 131 (September 14, 2012). Mondragon v. State, 270 Ga.App. 780, 607 S.E.2d 914 (December 6, 2004). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed. “‘The record reveals that [Mondragon] knew of his right to counsel, that he understood that if he refused to proceed with the appointed attorney, he would go to trial without representation, and that he received ample warning about the dangers of self-representation. Under the circumstances of this case, [Mondragon] knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel,’” quoting Hickey v. State , 259 Ga.App. 240, 244(2)(a), 576 S.E.2d 628 (2003). Accord, Allen v. State , 273 Ga.App. 227, 614 S.E.2d 857 (May 10, 2005). Winston v. State, 270 Ga.App. 664, 607 S.E.2d 147 (October 29, 2004). Reckless driving and related convictions affirmed; record showed valid waiver of right to counsel. “When a defendant wishes to proceed pro se, the trial court has a duty to investigate ‘“as long and as thoroughly”’ as necessary to determine that the defendant understands ‘“the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter.”’ [Cit.] In making this determination, the court is not required to use any ‘“magic language”’ or to ask any particular questions. [Cit.] On appeal, the state bears the burden of demonstrating a valid waiver, and it may carry this burden by pointing to the trial transcript or other evidence in the record. [Cit.]” Where defendant made knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel at trial, court was not “obligated to educate her about” rules of evidence. Wolcott v. State, 278 Ga. 664, 604 S.E.2d 478 (October 25, 2004). “A guilty plea obtained in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used ‘either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense....’ Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319) (1967). However, that constitutional right does not apply in revocation proceedings. Vaughn v. Rutledge, 265 Ga. 773, 774(1) (462 S.E.2d 132) (1995). Thus, the fact that Wolcott was not represented by an attorney in the prior revocation proceedings does not affect the admissibility of the orders entered therein. Therefore, the trial court did not err in considering evidence of the previous revocation of Wolcott’s probationary status.” Dellinger v. State, 269 Ga.App. 878, 605 S.E.2d 632 (October 4, 2004). Trial court’s thorough waiver form, plus colloquy with court, showed defendant “made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right counsel” as to his prosecution for failure to yield. Collins v. State, 269 Ga.App. 164, 603 S.E.2d 523 (August 17, 2004). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in denying continuance. Trial court could find that defendant had waived right of counsel when he fired retained counsel 10 days before trial. Upon firing counsel, “Collins acknowledged that he did not want the services of counsel, that he understood the motion to suppress and the trial would go forward as scheduled, that he was responsible for handling all preparation for trial, and that he would have to represent himself at the hearing on the motion to suppress if he wished to go forward with the motion. Asked if ‘[y]ou understand and accept all those risks and still wish this court to disengage [counsel] from representing you at this time?’ Collins responded, ‘Yes.’ At the trial court’s request, counsel also reviewed with Collins the potential penalties for the offense with which he was charged and that he would be