☢ test - Í

Hickey v. State, 259 Ga.App. 240, 576 S.E.2d 628 (January 16, 2003). At call of case for trial, defendant expressed dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and asked to be allowed to represent himself. “He stated, ‘I’ve been locked up six months. I’ve seen [the attorney] three times and only briefly, never to discuss my case, what motion or defense we’re going to present in a trial.’ He complained that ‘[his attorney] ha[d] stated that he [did not] believe he [could] do anything with my case.’ The attorney reported that he had engaged in discovery and had advised Hickey that the State’s evidence was overwhelming.” “An indigent defendant is entitled to reasonably effective assistance of counsel, not counsel of his own choosing. If a defendant does not show good cause for discharging his appointed attorney, the trial court does not err in requiring him to choose between representation by that attorney and proceeding pro se…. At the motion for new trial hearing, however, the attorney testified that he had discussed Hickey’s case with him. The court was authorized to disbelieve Hickey. Further, an attorney’s representation is not deficient merely because of the number of visits with his client; rather, each situation must be judged upon its own circumstances and degree of complexity.” No right to pretrial hearing on counsel’s effectiveness. Query: but then how does the Court know whether good cause has been shown for discharging appointed counsel? Accord, Daguilar v. State , 275 Ga.App. 756, 621 S.E.2d 846 (October 6, 2005) (Trial court did not err in refusing defendant’s request to replace appointed counsel absent good reason articulated by defendant; defendant had several opportunities pre-trial to discuss issue. Trial court each time reminded defendant of his right to hire his own counsel.) McAdams v. State, 258 Ga.App. 250, 573 S.E.2d 501 (November 1, 2002). DUI conviction reversed. “Although the trial judge stated at the hearing on McAdams’s motion for new trial that McAdams insisted upon representing himself despite strenuous efforts by the judge to appoint an attorney to represent him, the judge gave no indication that he provided McAdams with the information which a criminal defendant must be given to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel,” citing Tucci (May 21, 2002) , below, and Spears v. State , 247 Ga.App. 626, 545 S.E.2d 36 (2001). Jackson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 715, 572 S.E.2d 60 (October 3, 2002). Trial court did not have to establish on the record defendant’s knowing waiver of right to counsel because defendant was only fined. “Only a sentence of actual imprisonment or a suspended or probated sentence to imprisonment triggers the constitutional right to counsel. The underlying concept is that only trials that end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty require that the accused ‘receive the guiding hand of counsel so necessary where one’s liberty is in jeopardy.’ (Punctuation and citations omitted.) A court that ends up only fining a defendant has not placed that liberty in jeopardy and was therefore not required to appoint counsel for that defendant, even though the defendant was charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction was authorized.” Query: per the Georgia Supreme Court in Geng v. State, 276 Ga. 428, 578 S.E.2d 115 (March 10, 2003), this same analysis cannot be used to take away the right to trial by jury. Is the right to counsel less sacred? Barnes v. State, 275 Ga. 499, 570 S.E.2d 277 (September 23, 2002). Reverses Barnes v. State , 250 Ga.App. 276, 549 S.E.2d 495 (May 23, 2001), and defendant’s pro se conviction for driving on revoked license; record failed to show defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of rights to counsel and to appointed counsel. Court of Appeals, pre- Shelton , ruled that Barnes had no such rights given that she was sentenced only to probation and a fine, not imprisonment. “In addition to an indigent defendant’s right to court-appointed counsel, Georgia precedent recognizes an independent and broader ‘constitutional right to be defended by counsel of [one’s] own selection whenever [one] is willing and able to employ such counsel.” Deren, [March 30, 1999, below]. The right to private counsel attaches in all criminal prosecutions – not merely those resulting in imprisonment or a fine – and is firmly rooted in our State Constitution. Ga. Const. (1983) Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV (‘Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel’). Whether that right to counsel has been waived is an independent and separate inquiry from whether the right to court-appointed counsel exists. Deren, supra.” Overrules Deren “to the extent that [it] and other decisions [ See e.g., Parks v. McClung, [271 Ga. 795, 524 S.E.2d 718 (1999)]; State v. Smith, 264 Ga. 634, 452 S.E.2d 90 (1994); Brawner v. State, [250 Ga. 125, 296 S.E.2d 551 (1982)]; Johnston v. State, 236 Ga. 370, 223 S.E.2d 808 (1976); Romano v. State, [220 Ga.App. 322, 469 S.E.2d 726 (1996)]; Capelli v. State, 203 Ga.App. 79, 416 S.E.2d 136 (1992) ] hold that a criminal defendant is only entitled to court-appointed counsel if sentenced to a term of actual imprisonment,” based on Alabama v. Shelton , (May 20, 2002), below. “To the extent that Parks v. McClung, supra, holds that a probated or suspended sentence of imprisonment does not trigger the right to appointed counsel and that a probationer’s claim of an invalid waiver of the right to appointed counsel need not be addressed until probation is revoked and imprisonment is imminent, that case conflicts with Shelton and also is overruled.”