☢ test - Í

Davis v. State, 257 Ga.App. 500, 571 S.E.2d 497 (September 19, 2002). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; record showed that defendant made a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Trial court was not required to go over each and every one of the factors set forth in Hamilton v. State , 233 Ga.App. 463, 504 S.E.2d 236 (1998). “Certainly, it would be helpful if the record showed inquiry into each of the foregoing matters; however, there is no requirement for the same…. Rather, the record must show that ‘the accused was made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’” Helmer v. State, 256 Ga.App. 717, 569 S.E.2d 606 (July 25, 2002). Defendant’s speeding conviction reversed because record did not affirmatively show knowing and voluntary waiver of right to counsel. Such waiver may not be presumed from a silent record. Judge’s affidavit that waiver was knowing and voluntary, attached to state’s brief on appeal, doesn’t help – but would if made part of the official record transmitted by the clerk. Opinion doesn’t reveal whether defendant was actually sentenced to incarceration or probation. Accord, Ham v. State , 307 Ga.App. 485, 705 S.E.2d 301 (December 17, 2010). Godlewski v. State, 256 Ga.App. 35, 567 S.E.2d 704 (June 20, 2002). Defendant was convicted of speeding and sentenced to pay a fine only. Held, because defendant’s sentence did not impose incarceration or the threat of it, he was not entitled to appointed counsel; however, conviction was reversed because the record did not show that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Miller-Roy v. State, 255 Ga.App. 575, 565 S.E.2d 899 (May 30, 2002). Defendant tried in state court’s traffic violation bureau, convicted and sentenced to pay only a fine, not probation or incarceration, is not entitled to counsel. Tucci v. State, 255 Ga.App. 474, 565 S.E.2d 831 (May 21, 2002). Conviction for leaving scene of accident reversed. “In order for the State to use a pretrial waiver form to show that a defendant has intelligently elected to represent himself [at trial] after being advised of his right to counsel and the ‘dangers’ of waiver, the form should outline those pertinent dangers: such as (1) the possibility of a jail sentence; (2) the rules of evidence will be enforced; (3) strategic decisions with regard to voir dire and the striking of jurors must be made by defendant; (4) strategic decisions as to the calling of witnesses and/or the right to testify must be made by defendant; and (5) issues must be properly preserved and transcribed in order to raise them on appeal. [In other words,] a proper waiver form should contain the warnings, themselves, not just conclusions. Also, ideally, the form should be signed by the defendant and by the trial court. In addition, a simple statement of possible defenses, i.e., justification, alibi, misidentification, and reliance on the presumption of innocence, should be included.” Defendant’s signing plea form stating that she was willing to proceed without an attorney met only half of state’s burden here: it proved that her waiver of counsel was voluntary , but not knowing . Conviction for leaving scene of accident reversed. Accord, Banks (April 21, 2015), above. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (May 20, 2002). Pro se defendant, not offered appointed counsel but warned of the dangers of self-representation, was convicted of misdemeanor assault, sentenced to 30 days in jail, suspended, and two years’ unsupervised probation. Held, “[a] suspended sentence that may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty’ may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded ‘the guiding hand of counsel’ in the prosecution for the crime charged.” Waiting to appoint counsel at the time probation is revoked and incarceration actually imposed is not sufficient. “[T]he Sixth Amendment inquiry trains on the stage of proceedings corresponding to [defendant's] trial, where his guilt was adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment established, and prison sentence determined.” Supports Parks v. McClung , 271 Ga. 795, 524 S.E.2d 718 (November 23, 1999), and McCants v. State (April 18, 2002) , below. See also Barnes v. State (September 23, 2002) , above. Accord, Alford v. State , 287 Ga. 105, 695 S.E.2d 1 (April 19, 2010) (Habeas court erred in denying defendant’s petition for relief from his convictions for DUI and unaderage alcohol possession; Shelton applied retroactively to defendant’s prosecution, as he was unrepresented by counsel and sentenced to probation. Carley dissents, would apply Shelton prospectively only.) McCants v. State, 255 Ga.App. 133, 564 S.E.2d 532 (April 18, 2002). Convictions for drag racing reversed because, with no transcript and no written waiver, State could not carry its burden of proving knowing and intentional waiver of right to counsel by pro se defendants sentenced to probation. Accord, Dempsey v. State , 267 Ga.App. 661, 600 S.E.2d 735 (June 3, 2004). Middleton v. State, 254 Ga.App. 648, 563 S.E.2d 543 (March 29, 2002). “The constitution guarantees the right to counsel to an accused in any prosecution that could result in imprisonment. Although the accused may waive this right, the waiver is valid only if it is made with an understanding of (1) the nature of the charges, (2) any statutory lesser included offenses,