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(3) the range of allowable punishments for the charges, (4) possible defenses to the charges, (5) circumstances in mitigation thereof, and (6) all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter.” Record failed to show that defendant made a knowing, voluntary waiver of right to counsel. “Although trial court told jury at one point that it had ‘questioned [defendant] at length and [was] satisfied that he knows what he’s doing and that he’s capable of conducting his defense the best he can,’ no one ever warned defendant about dangers of proceeding pro se or explained to him nature of charges against him, potential penalties he faced, and possible defenses or mitigating circumstances, and court never found that defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing, informed, and intelligent .” Strong evidence of a pro se defendant’s guilt does not mean that the trial court’s failure to establish a valid waiver of counsel was harmless error. Defendant failed to present any coherent defense and trial court emphasized hazards of self-representation to jury, gave no jury charges explaining his defense, and made repeated improper comments; defendant failed to object to introduction of his statement to police, allegedly given while intoxicated, defendant’s cross-examination of admitted principal actor in burglary was confusing and ineffective, defendant’s “accessory after the fact” defense was offered only during his closing argument, and defendant neither testified nor offered any other evidence to support his defense. Distinguishes Brooks v. State , 243 Ga.App. 246, 532 S.E.2d 763 (March 29, 2000). Horne v. State, 254 Ga.App. 207, 561 S.E.2d 491 (March 12, 2002). After close of state’s evidence, Defendant’s attorney expressed Defendant’s desire to change his plea to guilty. Trial judge on the record made inquiry into voluntariness of the plea, accepted it, and sentenced Defendant. Defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court held two lengthy hearings on the motion, at which Defendant was unrepresented by counsel. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and Defendant appealed pro se. At the hearings, Defendant was not notified of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Held, because no inquiries or findings were made by the trial judge as to Defendant’s right to or waiver of counsel, the case must be remanded to the trial court for a re-hearing on Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, to be conducted according to the guidelines of Fortson ( June 12, 2000 , see above under Attorneys – Appointment of Counsel – Appeals/Post-Conviction Relief ). Although the hearings at issue here occurred several months before the ruling in Fortson and the trial court’s responsibilities with respect to Defendant’s right to counsel at plea withdrawal hearings were unclear, new rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions must be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct appeal or not yet final. Hightower v. State, 252 Ga.App. 811, 557 S.E.2d 434 (December 6, 2001). DUI conviction reversed; trial court’s record failed to show that Defendant knowingly elected self-representation after being warned of the dangers. “Hightower’s statement that he cannot qualify for appointed counsel because he ‘make[s] too much money,’” coupled with the trial court’s reference that such conversational road has been traveled before, does not even begin to meet the State’s burden to show that Hightower decided to proceed pro se after being warned of the risks attendant upon such choice.” Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 884, 536 S.E.2d 511 (October 10, 2000). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly found that defendant validly waived right to counsel. “After Jones expressed dissatisfaction with the public defender appointed to represent him, the trial court released her but refused to appoint another attorney. Thereafter, the public defender and Jones reconciled, but Jones again became dissatisfied, and the trial court required that Jones either accept representation by the public defender or represent himself. Jones chose to act as his own attorney but contend[ed] on appeal that he did not validly waive his right to counsel.” The trial court need not review each of the Raines factors on the record to show a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. “‘The record need only reflect that the accused was made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver.’ Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 38(2), 495 S.E.2d 34 (1998). The trial court was authorized to find that Jones set forth no justifiable basis for dissatisfaction with the public defender and, therefore, that he ‘was attempting to use the discharge and [appointment] of other counsel as a dilatory tactic, which was “the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel.” ’ Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 616, 617(2), 491 S.E.2d 320 (1997). See also Hobson v. State, 266 Ga. 638(2), 469 S.E.2d 188 (1996). ‘“ The essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee effective assistance of counsel, not to guarantee a defendant preferred counsel or counsel with whom a ‘meaningful relationship’ can be established.” ’ Battle v. State, 234 Ga.App. 143, 144(2), 505 S.E.2d 573 (1998). Furthermore, the public defender testified that she made Jones fully aware of the nature of the charge, the possible sentences, and the dangers of self-representation. According to Jones’ own testimony, he completely understood that, if he rejected appointed counsel, he would have to represent himself. The trial court endeavored to convince Jones to accept the public defender, informing him and his mother about his right to counsel and the qualifications of the public defender. Under all the circumstances, we conclude that Jones knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel after he was made aware of the dangers of self-representation.” Accord, Bush v. State, 268 Ga.App. 200, 601 S.E.2d 511 (June 29, 2004); Joyner v. State , 278 Ga.App. 60, 628 S.E.2d 186 (March 7, 2006); Nguyen (March 2, 2015), above.