☢ test - Í

Young v. State, 245 Ga.App. 799, 538 S.E.2d 487 (August 18, 2000). Physical precedent only. Aggravated assault conviction affirmed. State wasn’t required to show voluntary waiver of counsel by defendant where standby counsel was appointed and then conducted the entire trial except opening statement. Clowers v. Sikes, 272 Ga. 463, 532 S.E.2d 98 (June 12, 2000). Habeas court erred by denying petition; record fails to establish knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel when defendant pled guilty to robbery by sudden snatching. DA presented evidence that he reviewed a waiver form with the defendant prior to plea entry, but failed to show that this explanation “took place in the presence of the court in order for the court to be able to ascertain that Clowers understood what constitutional rights he was foregoing by his plea of guilty. Nor did the colloquy between the court and Clowers establish a valid waiver.” “This inquiry included the trial court telling Clowers that, ‘you have the right to have a trial by a jury, and you have the right to have an attorney appointed to represent you, but you give up these rights if you plead guilty here now.’” “No inquiry was made to ascertain whether Clowers wanted an attorney or whether he was entering his plea freely and voluntarily, with knowledge of the rights he was thereby waiving.” Holt v. State , 244 Ga.App. 341, 535 S.E.2d 514 (June 7, 2000). Rape and related convictions affirmed; defendant validly waived right to counsel when he dismissed public defender at beginning of trial over trial court’s cautions. Trial court repeatedly urged defendant to accept representation. “The trial court explained … that the public defender had worked on the case for some time, knew what was to be expected, had access to the prosecutor's entire file, and had training. After the public defender submitted charges on Holt's behalf, the trial court explained to Holt his need to make decisions about trial strategy and his need to know about the law. The trial court again reminded Holt that self-representation was ‘pretty risky,’ and allowed him to consider overnight whether to continue representing himself. The next morning, Holt again chose to represent himself. The public defender remained available to assist Holt, and the trial court reminded Holt that the rules of evidence would apply and suggested that he confer with the public defender about questioning witnesses. In addition to conferring with Holt, the public defender also subpoenaed witnesses for him. … In addition to the trial court's repeated efforts to persuade Holt to allow the public defender to try the case, Holt received the court's assistance during the trial, e.g., in prompting Holt to qualify a witness as an expert and later explaining the scope of closing argument. Further, the public defender conferred with Holt throughout the trial, and on occasion argued on Holt's behalf.” “In this case, the trial court repeatedly urged Holt to take advantage of the services of the public defender and repeatedly advised him of the dangers of proceeding pro se. Thus, considering the full record on appeal, we are satisfied that Holt validly elected to proceed without counsel.” Brown v. State , 244 Ga.App. 206, 535 S.E.2d 281 (May 26, 2000). Aggravated battery conviction affirmed; trial court properly found that defendant waived right to counsel when he discharged both appointed and retained counsel. Trial court reviewed with defendant possible sentence and lesser-included offenses. Defendant reiterated his desire to represent himself, “stated that he had adequate time to prepare for trial and that appointed counsel had been available for consultation.” Both defendant and his standby counsel filed numerous motions, defendant was provided funds for experts to review and test State’s evidence, and standby counsel “was present throughout the trial to confer with Brown.” Brooks v. State , 243 Ga.App. 246, 532 S.E.2d 763 (March 29, 2000). Simple battery conviction affirmed; trial court properly determined that defendant “knowingly waived his right to legal representation, with an understanding of the consequences of such waiver, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 196-197, 275 S.E.2d 49 (1981).” 1. Trial court wasn’t required to make express finding on the record “ that a defendant knowingly waived his right to counsel. … [W]hile such specific finding is preferable, its omission is not error when the record as a whole demonstrates a defendant's knowing waiver.” “‘[W]e find the Supreme Court has decided against specific guidelines outlining information that must be provided to defendants in order to demonstrate that they were adequately advised of the dangers of proceeding pro se. Instead, the analysis of whether a defendant has been sufficiently warned about the dangers of self-representation will turn on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.’ Simpson v. State , [238 Ga.App. 109, 112, 517 S.E.2d 830 (1999)]. See also Wayne v. State, [269 Ga. 36, 38, 495 S.E.2d 34 (1998)]; McDowell v. State, 239 Ga.App. 667, 669, 522 S.E.2d 44 (1999). This analysis includes ‘the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Davenport v. State, 216 Ga.App. 259, 454 S.E.2d 536 (1995).” Significant here that the defendant was “an ‘experienced’ criminal defendant who, at the time of trial, had two prior felony convictions and one prior simple battery conviction, the same offense for which he was convicted in the instant case. Consequently, Brooks is familiar with the criminal legal process, with legal representation, and with the consequences of conviction. He chose from the outset of this case to represent himself. Brooks was given a ‘Rights and Information Form’ used for state court misdemeanor cases. This form outlined