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Brooks' rights when charged with a misdemeanor criminal offense-a situation with which he was familiar-including his options with regard to the entry of a plea; the possible punishments and sentences; and his right to assistance of counsel, which included that ‘[y]ou also have the right to represent yourself in connection with the charge and waive your right to be represented by a lawyer. You should be aware, however, that representing yourself, particularly at a trial, has dangers and risks.’ The form instructed Brooks that ‘[y]ou should read this form very carefully and ask questions about anything that you do not understand.’ Brooks read the form himself. A handwritten notation on the face of the form was made and initialed by Ben Kirbo, Solicitor General of Decatur County State Courts. The Solicitor General asserted on the form, filed as a matter of record, that Brooks read the form; Brooks understood the form; and Brooks had no questions about the contents.” Brooks also signed a waiver form in connection with a proposed guilty plea, again reciting rights he was waiving; but then withdrew the guilty plea and proceeded to trial. At trial, defendant was first represented by counsel, but represented himself after jury selection. The record doesn’t disclose the circumstances under which counsel withdrew, but “it is not simply speculation to assume that Lambert did not just ‘disappear’ from this case, as the dissent suggests. There is a presumption of regularity with regard to court proceedings. Vaughan v. Buice, 253 Ga. 540, 322 S.E.2d 282 (1984).” Accord, McDaniel (June 20, 2014), above (express finding of voluntary waiver on record not required). 2. In any event, defendant failed to show harm from his lack of representation at trial. “The transcript shows that the trial of this case was straightforward. The State's case against Brooks consisted of the testimony of the victim, Brooks' ex-girlfriend, stating her version of events. The defense consisted of Brooks' denial of the victim's story and Brooks' recitation of his adaptation. Thereafter, Brooks was subjected to an 11-question cross-examination by the Solicitor that simply allowed him to reiterate that he did nothing wrong, e.g., ‘[Q:] You didn't shove her down in the chair? [A:] No, I didn't.’ The only other State's witness was the police officer called to the scene who, during the 13 questions that comprised his direct examination, testified that he had no personal knowledge of what occurred, did not remember the incident, and was only relating what the victim had told him. He testified that the victim had marks on her neck that she claimed had been made when Brooks choked her. The only other defense witness testified that the marks on the victim's neck were ‘passion’ marks that he had seen on her the day before the incident. In toto, the trial comprised 40 pages of transcript, including opening, closing, the charge of the court, and the verdict. The jury believed the victim. As much as we may value our profession, there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that, if Brooks had been represented by a lawyer, the outcome would have been affected. Thus, the record does not show harm.” Barnes and Phipps dissent. Compare McDaniel (June 20, 2014), above (defendant’s failures to object when appropriate, presentation of a defense described as “crazy” by a State’s witness, and making of damaging admissions showed harm from defendant’s self-representation). Raines v. State, 242 Ga.App. 727, 531 S.E.2d 158 (March 13, 2000). Robbery conviction reversed; trial court erred in finding that defendant made a knowing waiver of counsel. 1. “‘To be valid, the waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter.’ (Citation omitted.) McDowell v. State, 239 Ga.App. 667, 669(1), 522 S.E.2d 44 (1999). In this instance, the trial court did little more than tell Raines that because he was unfamiliar with law and procedure, he ran the risk of going to jail if he chose to proceed without a lawyer. … Nothing in the record reflects that the trial court sought to determine that Raines was aware of any of the factors necessary to make a knowing waiver, including the nature of the charge (other than it was serious), any lesser included offenses, the potential punishment, or any possible defenses or mitigating circumstances.” 2. Trial court erred in “in failing to conduct an inquiry as to his indigence and thus whether he was entitled to appointed counsel. While we are aware that a trial court's determination regarding a defendant's indigent status is not subject to review, we may inquire into whether the trial court followed the proper procedure in making that determination. Hawkins v. State, 222 Ga.App. 461, 462(1), 474 S.E.2d 666 (1996). When Raines appeared at trial without counsel, the court was required to determine three issues on the record: ‘(1) whether [he] was eligible to have appointed counsel represent him, and if not, (2) whether [he] exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to retain trial counsel and (3) whether the absence of trial counsel was attributable to reasons beyond [his] control. [Cits.]’ Martin v. State, [240 Ga.App. 246, 248(2), 523 S.E.2d 84 (1999)]. In this instance, the trial court simply adopted the findings of the county's indigent defense office that Raines was not indigent. But the record contains no evidence of how the county's indigent defense office arrived at that conclusion. Although the office apparently reported to the trial court on the issue, the record does not contain any transcript of that report or any written documentation addressing Raines' financial affairs. [fn] From the record before us, therefore, it appears that the trial court improperly ‘delegated ... [the] nondelegable duty to inquire about the facts of indigence.’ Id. See also McQueen v. State, 228 Ga.App. 732, 733(2), 492 S.E.2d 720 (1997).” McDowell v. State, 239 Ga.App. 667, 522 S.E.2d 44 (August 18, 1999). Record supported trial court’s finding that defendant’s waiver of counsel at trial was voluntary and intelligent, despite defendant’s claim of mental