☢ test - Í

retardation. “McDowell argues specifically that because his history of mental retardation was not mentioned until well into the presentation of evidence at trial, the trial court could not have taken this factor into consideration in determining that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. … But the record reflects that whatever developmental problems existed, they did not prevent McDowell from questioning the State's witnesses cogently.” Denson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 752, 516 S.E.2d 797 (April 23, 1999). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute reversed; “[t]he record in this case does not show that the trial court informed Denson of either his right to counsel or the dangers of proceeding pro se. Waiver is never presumed from a silent record. Keith v. State, 218 Ga.App. 729, 730(1), 463 S.E.2d 51 (1995).” Trial court here denied defendant’s request for continuance of trial in order to hire counsel, “after finding that at arraignment and certain pretrial proceedings (all unreported), Denson stated he wished to proceed pro se and would hire an attorney if he should choose to be represented by one.” Deren v. State, 237 Ga.App. 387, 515 S.E.2d 191 (March 30, 1999), overruled on other grounds, Barnes (September 23, 2002), above . Defendant’s conviction for speeding in City of Atlanta Traffic Court reversed; record failed to show “knowing and intelligent waiver” of the right to private counsel. “‘A criminal defendant [has] a constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own selection whenever he is willing and able to employ such counsel.’ Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 35(1), 257 S.E.2d 543 (1979). A criminal defendant may forfeit his right to counsel by a knowing and intelligent waiver. Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82, 316 S.E.2d 749 (1984); Smith v. State, [230 Ga.App. 151, 495 S.E.2d 624 (1998)]. ‘[S]ince [Deren] pled not guilty and went to trial, the state must also prove that the decision to proceed pro se was made knowingly and intelligently.’ Jones, supra at 83, 316 S.E.2d 749. The record here is devoid of any evidence that Deren intelligently and knowingly waived his right to assistance of counsel. Deren signed a form affidavit prior to entering his plea which stated, in part, ‘I understand that by entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) I waive ... [m]y right to the assistance of counsel during trial [and] [m]y right to be represented by a private attorney or by a public defender if I am eligible.’ The affidavit addresses the defendant’s right to counsel and the waiver thereof in the context of a guilty or nolo contendere plea. It does not address the waiver of his right to counsel at trial where a not guilty plea is entered. Since Deren pled not guilty, the affidavit does not waive his right to the assistance of counsel at trial, and the State did not otherwise meet its burden. There is no evidence that Deren knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the assistance of counsel of his own choosing at trial. The proceedings in the trial court were not recorded, and ‘“when the record is silent, waiver is never presumed.”’ Smith, supra. The judgment must be reversed.” Heard v. State, 236 Ga.App. 625, 513 S.E.2d 35 (February 23, 1999). Defendant’s felony drug conviction reversed; “the trial court erred in going forward with the trial at which he proceeded pro se without determining whether he voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel.” “‘When waiver of the right to counsel rests upon the defendant’s election of his alternative right of self-representation, “the record should reflect a finding on the part of the trial court that the defendant has validly chosen to proceed pro se. The record should also show that this choice was made after the defendant was made aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of proceeding without counsel.” Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 197, 275 S.E.2d 49 (1981).’ (Emphasis omitted.) Burnett [ v. State, 182 Ga.App. 539, 540, 356 S.E.2d 231 (1987)]. ‘When the record is silent, waiver is never presumed and the burden is on the state to present evidence of a valid waiver.’ Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82, 83, 316 S.E.2d 749 (1984); Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga.App. 356, 357-358, 414 S.E.2d 502 (1991). Since the record contains nothing showing that Heard was made aware of his right to counsel or of the dangers of proceeding without counsel, we are unable to conclude that Heard validly chose to proceed pro se after voluntarily and knowingly waiving his right to counsel.” Here, at the call of the case to trial, “Heard announced to the trial court that he was unrepresented by counsel. The trial court noted on the record that Heard had informed the court [14 months earlier] that he would hire his own counsel, that since that time he had failed to hire counsel, and that he had failed to apply for court-appointed counsel. The trial court further stated that, because Heard had entered a pro se demand for a speedy trial and indicated to the court that he was going to represent himself, the trial would go forward with Heard proceeding pro se. Heard states on appeal that he indicated prior to trial that his intention was to proceed without counsel, and the State does not contest this assertion.” Woods v. State, 235 Ga.App. 894, 510 S.E.2d 848 (January 6, 1999). Record insufficient to show that defendant “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel,” despite his discharge of appointed counsel. “Here, the record shows that the trial court only informed Woods of the statutory offenses and the range of allowable punishments. It does not indicate why Woods discharged his appointed attorney. Compare Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga.App. 744, 745(2), 501 S.E.2d 10 (1998). Nor does it show that he was warned of the dangers of self-representation. McCall v. State, 232 Ga.App. 684, 685(1), 503 S.E.2d 578 (1998). Woods’ possible defenses and any circumstances in