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mitigation were not addressed. Hamilton [ v. State, 233 Ga.App. 463, 466(1), 504 S.E.2d 236 (1998)]. Although he signed a waiver, the adequacy of the form used was questioned in Hamilton, 233 Ga.App. at 464, n. 1, 504 S.E.2d 236. Woods never affirmatively stated that he wished to proceed without counsel and represent himself. [fn: Woods informed the trial court that he initialed the statement in the waiver form indicating that he decided to represent himself at the assistant district attorney’s direction. ] Compare Prater v. State, 220 Ga.App. 506, 508, 469 S.E.2d 780 (1996). On the contrary, throughout the trial Woods continued to express his desire for representation.” Conviction reversed. N. SELF-REPRESENTATION Seminal case: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 1. AT TRIAL Owens v. State, S16A0058, ___ Ga. ___, 783 S.E.2d 611, 2016 WL 856826 (March 7, 2016). Felony murder conviction affirmed; no err in denying defendant’s mid-trial request “to fire her attorney mid-trial and proceed pro se.” “Requests to proceed pro se during trial … are treated differently (from pretrial requests). In Thaxton [ v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 390 S.E.2d 841 (1990)] , the defendant waited until the State had finished with several witnesses prior to making a request to proceed pro se. We held: ‘[A] request made after the testimony of the State’s third witness[ ] cannot serve as the basis for reversal since a defendant “cannot frivolously change his mind in midstream” by asserting his right to self-representation in the middle of his trial. Preston v. State, 257 Ga. 42(3), 354 S.E.2d 135 (1987),’ Id. at 142(2), 390 S.E.2d 841 (1990).” Here, Owens was allowed pretrial to go from appointed counsel to self-representation and back to appointed counsel. “Well into the second day of trial, after the State had called many witnesses, Owens began acting unruly in the courtroom, especially when pictures, testimony, and a recorded interview regarding her appearance and behavior at the time of the murder were introduced. Owens eventually expressed her displeasure with the evidence and stated that she would take no part in the trial. In addition, she expressed a desire to have trial counsel dismissed. After considering Owens’s outburst, the trial court decided that it would allow Owens to monitor the trial from a holding cell with a walkie-talkie, but it denied her request to proceed without any representation at all. One witness later, Owens requested that she be allowed to return to the courtroom, and, once there, she apologized for her behavior and stated that she had been acting inappropriately. Later, she confirmed that she had not been thinking clearly and that she wanted and needed the assistance of trial counsel. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in its decision to (1) deny Owens’s request to fire her counsel and (2) grant her request to absent herself from the courtroom. The trial court indicated that it did so in order to protect Owens’s ‘best interests.’ Given Owens’s pre-trial equivocation, her outbursts during trial, and her own statements indicating that she never truly wished to finish the trial without the assistance of trial counsel, Owens’s decision to change her mind about counsel midstream was, at best, a frivolous response to the introduction of evidence which disturbed her. As such, the trial court did not violate Owens’s right to proceed pro se under the circumstances presented here. Thaxton, supra.” Wiggins v. State, 298 Ga. 366, 782 S.E.2d 31 (January 19, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by denying defendant’s right to dismiss appointed counsel and represent himself. 1. Defendant twice wrote to the court requesting to be heard on his request, but the court took no action on the request. “If a defendant makes a pre-trial, unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, the request must be followed by a hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the ‘traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel’ and understands the ‘disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open,’” quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562) (1975); also citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Pars. XII, XIV; Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501, 502 (238 S.E.2d 52) (1977) (“A state may not force a lawyer upon an appellant when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. [Cit.]”). 2. The request was not waived by failure to renew it at trial. “[B]y proceeding to trial without holding a Faretta hearing, the trial court gave no consideration to its responsibilities following appellant’s assertion of his constitutional right. When a defendant asserts the right to self-representation, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to ensure that the decision to dismiss counsel and proceed pro se has been knowingly and intelligently made and that the defendant has made the choice to proceed without the benefit of counsel with ‘eyes open.’ See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 197 (275 S.E.2d 49) (1981) (‘the record should reflect a finding on the part of the trial court that the defendant has validly chosen to proceed pro se’ and ‘that this choice was made after the defendant was made aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of proceeding without counsel.’).” … [T]he the trial court’s finding that appellant failed to re-assert his right to self-representation at the start of trial was insufficient, by itself, to establish a proper waiver. … Under these circumstances, and especially because there was no affirmative evidence that appellant wavered or equivocated in his desire to proceed pro se, we find that appellant’s mere silence was insufficient to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of his already invoked right to self-representation.” Distinguishing “ McDonald v. State,