☢ test - Í

296 Ga. 643, 648–649(3) (770 S.E.2d 6) (2015) (holding that defendant abandoned request to represent himself where counsel confirmed on record and in defendant’s presence that defendant wished to proceed with counsel).” Smith v. State, 332 Ga.App. 849, 775 S.E.2d 211 (July 8, 2015). Convictions for forgery and related offenses reversed; trial court erred when it “deprived [defendant] of his constitutional right to self-representation by not allowing him to represent himself at trial.” Defendant first had appointed counsel, but moved to dismiss counsel and represent himself. The motion was granted after an evaluation found him competent to self-represent, and the case was scheduled for trial. However, on the eve of trial defendant moved for appointed counsel. Counsel was appointed and trial was delayed for six months. On the call of the case for trial, counsel announced that he was ready for trial, but defendant declared his desire to discharge counsel and represent himself, and requested a continuance. “Smith then reiterated several times to the trial court that he wished to represent himself and did not want his appointed counsel to try the case on his behalf.” But “the trial court did not conduct a Faretta hearing and apprise Smith of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Instead, the court summarily denied Smith's request to represent himself after concluding that the request was a dilatory tactic. But the motives of a defendant are irrelevant in determining whether to honor a defendant's pretrial, unequivocal request to represent himself; rather, the proper test is whether the defendant ‘knowingly and intelligently waives his or her right to counsel.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.),” quoting Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 153(1)(b) (598 S.E.2d 488) (2004). Distinguishing Williams v. State, 183 Ga.App. 373 (358 S.E.2d 914) (1987) (trial court could summarily deny dilatory request to discharge counsel and self-represent, made after trial had commenced). Herrington v. State, 332 Ga.App. 828, 775 S.E.2d 195 (July 8, 2015). Convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and related offenses affirmed; no denial of right to self-representation, as defendant “‘did not make an unequivocal assertion of his right to represent himself prior to the commencement of his trial. [To the extent some of] his remarks may be construed as an expression of dissatisfaction with his attorney, they cannot be construed as an assertion, much less an unequivocal assertion, of his right to represent himself,’” quoting Thaxton v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 142(2) (390 S.E.2d 841) (1990). “To the extent Herrington expressed at the beginning of the colloquy a desire to represent himself, he thereafter ‘apparently had a change of heart[, and] abandoned his request to represent himself.’ McDonald v. State, 296 Ga. 643, 649(3) (770 S.E.2d 6) (2015). Accordingly, his contention is without merit. See Danenberg v. State, 291 Ga. 439, 440–441(2) (729 S.E.2d 315) (2012) (trial court did not wrongfully deny appellant's right to represent himself at trial, because appellant's request on the morning of trial to dismiss his trial counsel and replace them with retained counsel, a public defender, or himself, was not an unequivocal assertion of his right to represent himself).” Thomas v. State, 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed, but case remanded to complete record on defendant’s contention that he was denied the right to represent himself despite his express assertion of the right. At various times during the multi-year pendency of his case, defendant was either appointed counsel or allowed to represent himself, but the record here omits transcripts of some pretrial proceedings and does not make clear when and why counsel changed or appeared in some instances. “Once given pro se status, the defendant ‘must be allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial.’ McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174(II)(B) (104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122) (1984). Deprivation of the right to self-representation is structural error, i.e., errors that require automatic reversal. Id. at 177(III), n. 8 (‘Since the right of self-representation is a right that when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to “harmless error” analysis. The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.’); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8(II)(A) (119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35) (1999).” Lewis v. State, 330 Ga.App. 650, 768 S.E.2d 821 (February 10, 2015). False imprisonment and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying continuance and requiring defendant to proceed pro se where he fired his fourth attorney on the morning of trial. “Lewis argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for continuance so that he could obtain witnesses. He concedes, however, that he did not make the required proffer of what those witnesses would testify about or who they were. See Knox v. State, 227 Ga.App. 447, 448, 489 S.E.2d 582 (1997). The fact that he proceeded pro se does not excuse his failure to make the required showing. A party ‘is not held to a different or more lenient standard ... merely because he elected to proceed pro se. One who knowingly elects to represent himself assumes full responsibility for complying with the substantive and procedural requirements of the law.’ Salazar v. State, 256 Ga.App. 50, 53(4), 567 S.E.2d 706 (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Bettis v. State, 328 Ga.App. 167, 761 S.E.2d 570 (July 10, 2014). Aggravated assault and related convictions reversed;