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D. EXCESSIVE BAIL Myers v. St. Lawrence, 289 Ga. 240, 710 S.E.2d 557 (May 31, 2011). Pre-trial habeas petition properly denied. No abuse of discretion where trial court denied bail to defendant on his charges of aggravated assault and related offenses, “finding that Myers posed: a significant flight risk; a significant threat to persons, the community, or property; a significant risk for committing a felony pending trial; and a significant risk for intimidating witnesses. The court also noted that Myers had a lengthy history of felonies [fn] and had previously been a fugitive from justice.” “Myers has been charged with felonies and, thus, he is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. Constantino v. Warren, 285 Ga. 851, 853(1), 684 S.E.2d 601 (2009). … ‘[T]he foremost consideration when fixing bail is the probability that the accused, if freed, will appear at trial; and ... the amount of bail assessed is within the sole discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ Pullin v. Dorsey, 271 Ga. 882, 882–883, 525 S.E.2d 87 (2000).” Fact that defendant faced likelihood of lengthy incarceration as a recidivist, among other factors, supported denial of bond. Hernandez v. State, 294 Ga.App. 289, 669 S.E.2d 434 (October 29, 2008). In defendant’s drug trafficking prosecution, bail of $1,000,000 was not excessive. “‘Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to insure the presence of the defendant is [unconstitutionally] excessive.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mayfield v. State, 198 Ga.App. 252, 252-253 (401 S.E.2d 297) (1990). The trial court's foremost consideration when fixing the amount of bail should be the probability that the defendant, if freed, will appear at trial. Id. at 253. The defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that he does not pose a significant flight risk. See Dunn v. Edwards, 275 Ga. 458(1) (569 S.E.2d 525) (2002). Other factors that the court may consider include the defendant's ability to pay, the seriousness of the offense, and the defendant's character and reputation. Id. ‘[T]he amount of bail assessed is within the sole discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ Pullin [ v. Dorsey, 271 Ga. 882 (525 S.E.2d 87) (2000)]. The record in this case shows that the trial court was very concerned that Hernandez posed a significant risk of fleeing. Hernandez's counsel conceded that Hernandez is not a United States citizen, and Hernandez presented no evidence that he was in this country legally. See Dunn, 275 Ga. at 458(1). Likewise, no evidence was presented that Hernandez owned a house or any real property in Georgia. The circumstances surrounding Hernandez's arrest support an inference that he had access to large amounts of cash, and the crimes for which he was arrested are very serious and carry severe potential consequences.” Pullin v. Dorsey, 271 Ga. 882, 525 S.E.2d 87 (January 18, 2000). Habeas court properly denied defendant’s pre-trial petition; trial court’s decision to increase bail based on new information was not abuse of discretion. Defendant was originally granted, and posted, bond of $100,000 in his murder prosecution, but after State moved for reconsideration, bond was increased to $750,000. “The basis for the increase was stated by the trial court to be Pullin's prior felony convictions, the risk of intimidation or injury of witnesses, and the risk of flight. The concern regarding risk of flight was associated with Pullin's employment situation. The record showed that some confusion about Pullin's employment status arose from the first bond hearing. By the time of the second hearing, however, the parties agreed that Pullin had been discharged from his employment after his arrest and had not, at the time of the second bail hearing, embarked upon other employment. The court also had before it information that Pullin, at the time of the murder, was engaged in litigation with the victim regarding child support, and that one of the victim's children (not Pullin's child) saw the killer at the murder scene. Given that information and the fact that Pullin had two prior felony convictions, we see no clear abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to increase bail based on information not available at the first hearing.” Mullinax v. State, 271 Ga. 112, 515 S.E.2d 839 (May 17, 1999). Trial court properly denied habeas petition based on alleged excessive bail on murder charge. “ When fixing bail in Georgia, a trial judge's foremost consideration is the probability that the accused, if freed, will appear at trial and to a lesser extent ‘the accused's ability to pay, the seriousness of the offense, and the accused's character and reputation. [Cit.]’ Spence v. State, 252 Ga. 338, 341(2)(b), 313 S.E.2d 475 (1984). See generally OCGA § 17-6-1(e). A defendant who seeks release on bail has the burden of showing ‘roots in the community, that the defendant does not pose a significant risk of fleeing, threatening the community, committing another crime, or intimidating a witness. [Cits.]’ Cowards v. State, 266 Ga. 191, 193(2), 465 S.E.2d 677 (1996). However, in all cases the amount of bail assessed is within the sole discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585(2), 134 S.E.2d 790 (1964). The State adduced evidence that Mullinax, who is a teenager and a high school drop-out, had little contact with his family and no means of support. Mullinax did not reside with either parent and had no apparent supervision from any other relative or adult. He had been arrested previously for possession of marijuana, shoplifting, and simple battery. With regard to the crime charged, a GBI agent testified that Mullinax had been in contact with potential witnesses to coach them about the information they were to supply to law enforcement officers investigating the