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case. Under the circumstances, based upon the seriousness of the offense charged and the likelihood that Mullinax would not appear at trial, we discern no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in holding that the bail amount originally set was not excessive. Taylor v. Chitwood, 266 Ga. 793(2), 471 S.E.2d 511 (1996); Jones v. Grimes, supra, 219 Ga. at 587(2), 134 S.E.2d 790.” E. FORFEITURE/DISCHARGE AA-Professional Bail Bonding v. Deal, 332 Ga.App. 857, 775 S.E.2d 217 (July 8, 2015). Physical precedent only. Trial court properly denied bonding company’s “motion to set aside the forfeiture of a bond.” 1. Contrary to bonding company’s argument, defendant’s placement in a non-court ordered pretrial diversion program did not release bondsman’s liability pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-31(d)(1)(C). Defendant here was charged with shoplifting; she agreed to placement in a pretrial diversion program by the Gwinnett County Solicitor pursuant to OCGA § 15-18-80. The program called for completion of certain conditions by defendant, following which the State would agree to nolle pros her charge. She violated the conditions of the program, was removed from it, and noticed to appear for arraignment. When she failed to appear, the State moved to forfeit her bond. “OCGA § 17–6–31(d)(1)(C) provides that a ‘surety shall be released from liability if, prior to entry of judgment, there is ... [a] court ordered pretrial intervention program....’ (Emphasis supplied). But here, [defendant] Kisudila's entry into the pretrial diversion program was based upon an agreement with the State's solicitor rather than as the result of an explicit court order. In fact, the trial court was not involved in any part of the State's decision to enter Kisudila into the program; its signature appears nowhere on the ‘Notice of Diversion/Abeyance’ form, which both Kisudila and the State's solicitor signed; and the court did not monitor Kisudila's compliance—or lack thereof—with the terms of the program.” Provision that the charges “will be dismissed” does not equate to court approval or order, notwithstanding that “an entry of nolle prosequi must be approved by the trial court,” because “as a practical matter, if the State chooses to no longer prosecute a defendant, the case will more than likely ultimately be dismissed. Thus, contrary to [bonding company] AAPB's argument, the language used in the Notice of Diversion/Abeyance does not necessarily write a check that can only be cashed with the trial court's endorsement. Moreover, AAPB's reading of the term ‘court ordered’ as embracing mere court approval of actions initiated wholly by the State is far too expansive. … In any event, given the court's complete lack of involvement in this pretrial diversion program and the clear and unambiguous text of OCGA § 17–6–31(d)(1)(C), indicating that direct involvement by the court is required in order to release a surety from liability for a principal entering into such a program, we find that the trial court's interpretation of the statute is correct.” 2. Enactment of OCGA § 15-18-80 didn’t “implicitly” remove the “court ordered” requirement from OCGA § 17-6-31(d)(1)(C). “AAPB's argument is belied by the fact that court- ordered pretrial diversion programs still currently exist (even if rare), despite the passage of OCGA § 15–18–80. And importantly, OCGA § 15–18–80 contains no language explicitly eliminating such programs.” Powell v. State, 313 Ga.App. 535, 722 S.E.2d 158 (January 12, 2012). Bond forfeiture affirmed; forfeiture notice was properly sent within ten days of defendant’s failure to appear, but improperly set the forfeiture hearing just 115 days later, instead of 120-150 days later. “Over Powell's objection, the trial court granted a continuance of the hearing until February 2, 2011, in order to comply with the 120–day minimum statutory period; and state's counsel immediately hand-delivered to Powell notice of the new execution hearing date. … Powell contends that the first notice, which she received within the ten-day statutory period, did not comply with OCGA § 17–6–71(a) because, though timely, it did not provide for an execution date within the time frame set forth in the statute; and she further contends that the second notice, which she received on January 13, 2011, was ineffective because not served upon her within the ten-day period following [defendant] Grant's failure to appear on September 20, 2010. This argument is without merit. … That the state sought and obtained a continuance from the originally-scheduled date for the execution hearing does not magically render the original notice invalid. And the original notice being valid, it is also not later invalidated by a subsequent notice of a new hearing date.” Northeast Atlanta Bonding Co. v. State, 308 Ga.App. 573, 707 S.E.2d 921 (March 18, 2011). Bond forfeiture affirmed. 1. Where defendant misses one hearing, but court fails to send bond forfeiture notice timely, under 2009 amendment to OCGA § 17-6-70(a), surety is relieved from liability, and court can’t then forfeit bond after noticing defendant to again appear before the court. 2. This rule doesn’t apply, however, in the scenario presented here, where court failed to give surety notice of the first hearing, meaning that the bond couldn’t have been forfeited at that hearing anyway. A.A. Professional Bail v. Perdue, 306 Ga.App. 72, 701 S.E.2d 542 (September 14, 2010). Trial court erred by granting State’s motion for bond forfeiture where notice of the execution hearing was not served on surety “within ten days of the principal's failure to appear, as required by the 2009 amendments to OCGA § 17-6-71.” “We have previously held that the