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ten-day notice requirement could be satisfied by the State's ‘substantial compliance.’ Northeast Atlanta Sur. Co. v. Perdue, 294 Ga.App. 32 (668 S.E.2d 508) (2008) (sufficient notice given 22 days after failure to appear); Classic City Bonding Co. v. State, 256 Ga.App. 577, 578 (568 S.E.2d 834) (2002) (sufficient notice given 15 days after failure to appear); AAA Bonding Co. v. State, 192 Ga.App. 684, 685(2) (386 S.E.2d 50) (1989) (statute then required notice within 72 hours of failure to appear; notice sent five days after failure was sufficient). In 2009, however, the legislature amended OCGA § 17-6-71(a) to add that ‘[s]uch ten-day notice shall be adhered to strictly.’” The 2009 amendment also superseded the previous requirement that the bonding company “show harm as well as failure to receive timely notice, Troup Bonding Co. v. State, 292 Ga.App. 5 (663 S.E.2d 734) (2008), citing Griffin v. State, 194 Ga.App. 624, 625(2) (391 S.E.2d 675) (1990); Northeast Atlanta Sur. Co., supra, 294 Ga.App. at 34(2). … [T]he surety need not show harm from the notice violation before obtaining relief from liability.” State v. Anytime Bail Bonding, Inc., 301 Ga.App. 832, 690 S.E.2d 193 (December 31, 2009). No abuse of discretion where trial court found that bonding company was released from liability on bond based on defendant’s giving false name upon arrest. “OCGA § 17-6-31(d)(2) provides that a surety ‘may be released from liability at the discretion of the court’ if ‘(A) The principal used a false name when he or she was bound over and committed to jail or a correctional institution and was subsequently released from such facility unless the surety knew or should have known that the principal used a false name. ’” (Bonding company must also use due diligence to procure defendant’s attendance at court, a fact not contested here.) “The trial court found that Anytime routinely and reasonably relied on the Clayton County jail to alert it as to aliases, that it verified the guarantor Escalera's information, and that it had no access to state and national databases that might have shown that ‘Magana’ was a false name. The mere fact of Morales's status as a Mexican national does not authorize us to reverse the trial court's discretionary judgment that the surety exercised due diligence in its investigation. Because some evidence supports that judgment, it will stand. See Delta Bail Bonds [ v. State, 245 Ga.App. 491, 492 (538 S.E.2d 146) (2000)] (trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering forfeiture when the record contained some evidence that the surety was less than diligent); compare [ State of Ga. v. A 24 Hour Bail Bonding , 280 Ga.App. 463, 465(4) (634 S.E.2d 99) (2006)] ( trial court abused its discretion in releasing surety when county jail gave the surety information including the principal's false name ).” Anytime Bail Bonding, Inc. v. State, 299 Ga.App. 695, 683 S.E.2d 358 (August 3, 2009). Trial court properly ruled that bonding company was not discharged from liability where first indictment was nolle prossed after filing of second indictment, distinguishing Lamp v. Smith, 56 Ga. 589 (1876) (nolle prosse terminated prosecution and relieved surety of liability; bond thus could not be forfeited where defendant failed to appear on re-indictment). “Because, unlike the defendant in Lamp, there was no point of time in which the charge against [principal] Sanchez was not pending, Anytime Bail Bonding was not discharged from its liability as surety based upon the nolle prosequi of the first indictment.” First Choice Bonding Co. v. State, 298 Ga.App. 297, 679 S.E.2d 830 (June 10, 2009). Trial court erred in forfeiting bond where State’s accusation on felony drug charge was filed more than two years after bond was posted. Surety is relieved of liability where felony case not tried within two years, unless “the prosecuting attorney's failure to try the charges is due to the fault of the principal.” OCGA § 17-6-31(e). “There was no evidence in the record of any attempts on behalf of the state to try the case against [principal] Manzano within the prescribed time or that Manzano was at fault for the state's failure to do so.” Troup Bonding Co., Inc. v. State, 292 Ga.App. 5, 663 S.E.2d 734 (May 29, 2008). No error where bond was forfeited after defendant’s failure to appear at both trial and a “bench warrant calendar.” Bonding company contends that failure to set execution hearing after initial failure to appear meant that proper notice of forfeiture and execution hadn’t been given pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-71(a). “‘The triggering dates for the applicable statutory notice and hearing provisions were not limited to calculation from the date of a principal’s initial time of required appearance and failure to appear. Rather, we interpret the statute as allowing initiation of the notice and hearing procedures after any time of required appearance and failure to appear thereat,’” quoting Griffin v. State, 194 Ga.App. 624 (391 S.E.2d 675) (1990). Accord, Don Johnson Bonding Co., Inc. v. State , 309 Ga.App. 6, 709 S.E.2d 50 (March 30, 2011), but statutorily superseded effective May 5, 2009, see Northeast Atlanta Bonding (March 18, 2011), above. State v. Free at Last Bail Bonds, 285 Ga.App. 734, 647 S.E.2d 402 (June 7, 2007). Where surety pays judgment on bond then locates defendant and seeks 50% remission of forfeiture, first part of OCGA § 17-6-72(d) expressly requires the application for remission to be filed “within 120 days from the payment of judgment;” but (d)(1) then provides, in the last sentence, that “The application for 50 percent remission shall be filed no later than 30 days following the expiration of the two-year period following the date of judgment.” Held, trial court properly ruled that surety here was entitled to 50%