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remission although the application was filed some five months after payment of the judgment. “[T]he purpose of the statute is ‘remedial ... and must therefore be construed in favor of the surety.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Osborne Bonding & Surety v. State, 224 Ga.App. 590, 591 (480 S.E.2d 378) (1997).” Legislative history also shows that the last sentence was added for the express purpose of extending the time for sureties to obtain remission. “[U]nder OCGA § 17-6-72(d)(1), a surety may be entitled to a remission of 50% of the bond amount where it files the application for remission at any time within ‘30 days following the expiration of the two-year period following the date of judgment.’” Joe Ray Bonding Company, Inc. v. State, 284 Ga.App. 687, 644 S.E.2d 501 (March 29, 2007). Several months after bond was forfeited, defendant was arrested on the outstanding bench warrant, apparently through no effort of the bonding company. Bonding company applied for refund of half the forfeited bond pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-72(d)(1). Held, trial court properly denied the refund application. Surety is only entitled to refund if the defendant is located, identified or apprehended by surety’s efforts. State v. A 24 Bail Bonding, 280 Ga.App. 463, 634 S.E.2d 99 (June 28, 2006). 1. At bond forfeiture hearing, trial court erred in admitting investigators’ “expert opinion” testimony of (missing) defendant’s true name. “Determination of the principal’s true name did not require the drawing of a conclusion beyond the ken of the average layman. Under the circumstances present here, A 24 was attempting to use the expert opinion as nothing more than a conduit for admission of the hearsay on which the opinion was based. That is not permissible. Cf. Hall County v. Merritt, 233 Ga.App. 526, 528(2), 504 S.E.2d 754 (1998).” 2. “OCGA § 17-6-31(d)(2) provides that ‘the surety may be released from liability at the discretion of the court if: (A) The principal used a false name when he or she was bound over and committed to jail or a correctional institution and was subsequently released from such facility unless the surety knew or should have known that the principal used a false name; and (B) The surety shows to the satisfaction of the court that he or she acted with due diligence and used all practical means to secure the attendance of the principal before the court.’” Trial court here erroneously released surety from bond; there was no competent evidence that defendant used a false name, although there was evidence that surety was aware defendant was using a false name. Confidential Bonding Co. v. State, 279 Ga.App. 794, 632 S.E.2d 684 (June 6, 2006). Trial court properly denied bonding company’s motion for remission or reduction of bond forfeitures where bonding company neither located the defendants in the custody of the sheriff of the county or another county, or surrendered them. Defendants were arrested on bench warrants, but in no case was bonding company responsible for their capture. “OCGA § 17- 6-72(d) sets forth the conditions under which a court may direct remission or reduction of a judgment on the forfeiture of a bond. … If the surety chooses to pay the full bond amount within 120 days after judgment and seeks a remission or refund, then the surety has a lesser burden. As pertains to the case at hand, Confidential in that case would only have had to locate each principal in the custody of the Clarke County sheriff (assuming Confidential filed its application within 120 days after payment of the bond). On the other hand, if the surety chooses not to pay the bond and seeks instead a reduction of the judgment, then the surety has a greater burden. As pertains to the case at hand, Confidential in that case would itself have had to surrender each principal to proper law enforcement officials within 120 days after each judgment.” Jeter v. State, 269 Ga.App. 266, 603 S.E.2d 783 (August 26, 2004). Trial court forfeited defendant’s cash bond when he failed to appear for his trial on charges of DUI and open container. The forfeiture was treated as a final disposition pursuant to OCGA § 17-6-8. More than a year later, Defendant filed his “motion to reopen the case.” Held, defendant’s motion was barred by OCGA § 40-13-33(a), which “‘limits such attacks to within the first 180 days after the conviction has been finally adjudicated, even if a habeas petition could be brought and would be successful.’ Earp v. Brown , 260 Ga. 215, 216(2)(a), 391 S.E.2d 396 (1990).” A.A. Professional Bail v. State, 265 Ga.App. 42, 592 S.E.2d 866 (January 7, 2004). Charged with traffic offenses in city, defendant demanded jury trial, whereupon his charges and bond were bound over to state court. Over a year later, defendant failed to appear for the trial calendar and state sought to forfeit his bond. Bonding company defends, saying that under OCGA § 17-6-31(e) the bond can’t be forfeited on a misdemeanor more than a year after posting bond, unless the delay is the “fault” of the defendant/principal. Trial court forfeits bond on theory that the delay was occasioned by defendant’s jury demand, and thus was his “fault,” a concept that denotes only cause, not necessarily imply any wrongdoing. Court of Appeals reverses, holding that “fault” here means, per the dictionary definition, “failure to have or do what is required” or “something done wrongly.” Defendant’s jury demand “was not fault within the meaning of