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the bond amount.” Accord, Gomez-Ramos v. State , 297 Ga.App. 113, 676 S.E.2d 382 (March 11, 2009) (forfeiture of defendant’s property bond was not pre-empted by federal government’s deportation). Legislatively superseded by HB 147, amending OCGA § 17-6-72, effective May 5, 2009. F. REVOCATION AND MODIFICATION Edvalson v. State, S15A1869, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 856812 (March 7, 2016). In child pornography prosecution, pretrial habeas petition properly denied. State sought to revoke defendant’s bond based on violation of condition that he have no “internet enabled” devices in his home; rather than revoking the bond, however, the court imposed additional restrictions. Held, 1. no violation of Due Process resulted: “Edvalson had clear notice that the originally-imposed bond conditions, and his alleged violation of those conditions, were at issue with the possible sanction of the complete revocation of his bond. Even in the situation of a complete revocation of bond, only minimal due process is required prior to the revocation. Camphor v. State, [272 Ga. 408, 410(2)(b), 529 S.E.2d 121 (2000)]. Edvalson’s bond was not revoked and he was not deprived of his freedom by incarceration; indeed, he prevailed in the State’s attempt to revoke his bond. Furthermore, he had a full and fair opportunity to be heard before his bond was modified. In the revocation proceeding, the superior court had the authority to impose additional reasonable restrictions on Edvalson’s behavior as conditions of his pretrial release on bond. Id. ” 2. Conditions were reasonable. “As the habeas court noted, the conditions of bond detailed by the superior court at the revocation hearing merely reflected and clarified the preventive nature of the special conditions of the original bond order in light of the new evidence regarding Edvalson’s conduct. Indeed, the additional conditions did not constitute unanticipated restrictions at all; they merely helped to effectuate the goal of the special conditions as stated in the original bond order. The plain purpose of the special conditions, from inception, was to prevent Edvalson from having access to children, images of children, and the internet for the purpose of creating, obtaining, promoting, or disseminating child pornography. This reflects the State’s compelling interest, ‘in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minor children by protecting them from being subjects of pornography, which is obviously harmful to [their] psychological, emotional, and mental health.’ (Quotation marks omitted.) Bennett v. State, 292 Ga.App. 382, 384(1), 665 S.E.2d 365 (2008), quoting Aman v. State, 261 Ga. 669, 670(1)(b), 409 S.E.2d 645 (1991). The special conditions of bond as summarily set forth in the initial bond order would ill-serve this compelling public safety interest if Edvalson could engage in the criminal conduct sought to be prohibited by merely doing so outside of the confines of his home. Thus, the special conditions imposed in this case were appropriate and reasonable under the facts, and therefore, do not constitute an abuse of the superior court’s discretion.[fn] Camphor v. State, supra at 410–411(2)(b), 529 S.E.2d 121.” Neal v. State, 297 Ga.App. 223, 676 S.E.2d 864 (March 31, 2009). Misdemeanor obstruction and marijuana possession convictions affirmed. No abuse of discretion in trial court’s revocation of defendant’s bond, based on failure to report to pre-trial supervision as previously ordered. “Trial courts ‘have authority, as an incident of their inherent powers to manage the conduct of proceedings before them, to revoke bail during the course of a criminal trial, when such action is appropriate to the orderly progress of the trial and the fair administration of justice.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 277 Ga.App. 155, 157(2) (626 S.E.2d 152) (2006). The record shows that, after hearing the testimony of Neal's pre-trial supervisor, the trial court provided Neal with the opportunity to speak with the supervisor. The trial court then revisited the state's request for bond revocation later in the day and provided Neal an opportunity to be heard. Neal raised a procedural argument challenging the revocation, but he did not dispute the state's allegations, and the trial court found that he had violated his bond conditions. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in revoking Neal's appearance bond. See Camphor v. State, 272 Ga. 408, 410-411(2)(b) (529 S.E.2d 121) (2000); Branton v. State, 292 Ga.App. 104, 108(3) (663 S.E.2d 414) (2008).” Branton v. State, 292 Ga.App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (June 19, 2008). Convictions for aggravated assault on peace officer and related convictions affirmed. No abuse of discretion where trial court revoked defendant’s bond during trial, based on the nature of the charges and other offenses committed while charges pending. Trial court stated, “The court is revoking his bond based on the testimony of the case in chief that was presented by the [S]tate and ... his subsequent guilty plea to these misdemeanor convictions.... I have no confidence that this man will do what he is supposed to do or come back to this court as he is supposed to.... I don’t want him on the street. A person allegedly was shot twice, and there was a very serious police chase in which there has been evidence now that has been admitted involving a firearm. The court just thinks until this matter is fully resolved, he [does not] need to be on the streets.” “‘Trial courts have authority, as an incident of their inherent powers to manage the conduct of proceedings before them, to revoke bail during the course of a criminal trial, when such action is appropriate to the orderly progress of the trial and the fair administration of justice.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 277 Ga.App. 155, 157(2) (626 S.E.2d 152) (2006). And here, ‘defense counsel was given the opportunity to be heard and did, in fact, argue against