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the motion to revoke bond.’ Under the circumstances of this case, we find no error. See id.” Accord, Neal (March 31, 2009), above. Patel v. State, 283 Ga.App. 181, 641 S.E.2d 184 (December 15, 2006). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw nolo plea on family violence battery charge. Evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant violated bond condition that he “stay away absolutely, directly or indirectly, by person, telephone, messenger or any other means of communication from [his wife]”: “one witness testified that Patel admitted (i) he had been communicating with his wife through a mutual friend and (ii) he met with his wife at the courthouse to have her withdraw a temporary protective order against him. Another witness testified that she saw Patel in the clerk’s office with his wife and that he sat directly behind her in the courtroom.” Parker v. State, 277 Ga.App. 155, 626 S.E.2d 152 (January 9, 2006). Cocaine trafficking conviction affirmed. “ Parker claims the trial court erred in revoking his pre-trial bond during trial . He claims this revocation was without notice and without a hearing. The record shows that after Parker testified, the prosecutor moved to revoke his bond and take him into custody. He stated that in light of Parker’s testimony, the weight of the charges and the mandatory minimum sentence, Parker should be taken into custody pending the jury’s verdict. The trial court agreed, noting that it would be a very short period of time before the jury began deliberating. ‘[T]rial courts have authority, as an incident of their inherent powers to manage the conduct of proceedings before them, to revoke bail during the course of a criminal trial, when such action is appropriate to the orderly progress of the trial and the fair administration of justice.’ Clarke v. State, 228 Ga.App. 219, 222 (491 S.E.2d 450) (1997) (quoting Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642, 644, 5 L.Ed.2d 683, 686 (1961)). And, the amount of due process required in order to revoke a bond ‘must necessarily depend on the circumstances in each case.’ Hood v. Carsten, 267 Ga. 579, 581 (481 S.E.2d 525) (1997). But, at a minimum, the accused must have a hearing within a reasonable time after arrest. Id. at 582. Here, defense counsel was given the opportunity to be heard and did, in fact, argue against the motion to revoke bond. Accordingly, Parker was given notice and an opportunity to be heard, thus satisfying the due process required to revoke bond. Hood, supra.” Accord, Branton (June 19, 2008), and Neal (March 31, 2009) both above. Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga.App. 614, 624 S.E.2d 166 (November 3, 2005). Harrassing phone calls conviction affirmed. Defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy when he was twice jailed pre-trial based on State’s motion to revoke bond, each time held several months before hearing on the motion to revoke bond. Held, any violation of due process in pre-trial detention should be addressed by habeas corpus, and does not trigger double jeopardy protections unless intended to punish for the underlying offense. Here, record demonstrates that bond revocations were based on violations of conditions which were reasonable in the circumstances. Camphor v. State , 272 Ga. 408, 529 S.E.2d 121 (May 1, 2000). Malice murder, aggravated stalking and related convictions affirmed; no due process violation in modifying pretrial bond to include stay away provision, without prior notice. Defendant was charged with criminal damage to property and posted bond. At a preliminary hearing, his bond was modified to require him to stay away from the victim. A month later, he went to her house and shot and killed a man he found there “In Hood [ v. Carsten, 267 Ga. 579, 481 S.E.2d 525 (1997)] we held that minimal due process is required prior to the revocation of bond ‘[b]ecause a bond revocation involves the deprivation of one's liberty.’ Id. at 581, 481 S.E.2d 525. Unlike Hood, Camphor was not deprived of his freedom and he had an opportunity to be heard before his bond was modified. The court merely imposed a reasonable restriction as a condition of pretrial release. ‘When a defendant is charged with a violent crime against a specific victim, it is within the trial court's inherent powers to require that the defendant avoid any contact with the victim as a condition of remaining free pending trial.’ Clarke v. State, 228 Ga.App. 219, 220(1), 491 S.E.2d 450 (1997). The condition imposed in this case was appropriate and reasonable under the facts and did not constitute an abuse of the court's discretion.” Accord, Edvalson (March 7, 2016), above) (at revocation hearing, court could instead modify bond conditions to prevent child pornography defendant from having internet access). Pullin v. Dorsey, 271 Ga. 882, 525 S.E.2d 87 (January 18, 2000). Habeas court properly denied defendant’s petition; trial court’s decision to increase bail based on new information was not abuse of discretion. Defendant was originally granted, and posted, bond of $100,000, but after State moved for reconsideration, bond was increased to $750,000. “The basis for the increase was stated by the trial court to be Pullin's prior felony convictions, the risk of intimidation or injury of witnesses, and the risk of flight. The concern regarding risk of flight was associated with Pullin's employment situation. The record showed that some confusion about Pullin's employment status arose from the first bond hearing. By the time of the second hearing, however, the parties agreed that Pullin had been discharged from his employment after his arrest and