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for defendant where he was confined for more than 90 days prior to murder indictment. Contrary to trial court’s holding, two days defendant spent in hospital, chained to gurney and watched by deputy, counted as “confinement” for purposes of OCGA § 17-7-50. “Since it is undisputed that appellant was under arrest, was taken to the hospital pursuant to governmental authority, and was physically restrained during his two-day hospital stay as he was handcuffed to the hospital bed under the watchful eye of a deputy sheriff in an area of the hospital that contained jail cells, appellant was ‘in confinement’ during his hospital stay, and the 90–day period in which his case was required to be presented to the grand jury commenced on November 23. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion for bail on the charges for which appellant was arrested and held for 90 days without grand jury action.” Bryant v. Vowell, 282 Ga. 437, 651 S.E.2d 77 (September 24, 2007). Jailed without bond on charge of child molestation, defendant moved for bond under OCGA § 17-7-50 when no grand jury considered his charges for 90 days. After filing of defendant’s motion, grand jury indicted on the two original charges and six more, four of which were alternative charges to the original two; the other two were additional charges of molesting the same victim. Trial court set bond on the two original charges, but not the new charges. Defendant contends on this pre-trial habeas petition that he was entitled to bond on all the charges under OCGA § 17-7-50. Held, the indictment didn’t end defendant’s right to bond on the original charges; but absent showing of bad faith not made here, defendant was only entitled to bond on the original charges, not any additional charges later made. “Since it is clear that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting OCGA § 17-7-50 was to entitle a person arrested and incarcerated for 90 days to grand jury review of the charge or to have bond set upon motion therefor, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the logical interpretation is that the arrestee is entitled to grand jury review of, or bail set for, the charge or charges on which the accused was arrested. Since the entitlement to have bail set arises on the 91 st day and is actionable upon motion therefor ( Rawls v. Hunter, [267 Ga. 109 (475 S.E.2d 609) (1996)]), it is unreasonable to require the trial court before whom a motion to set bail is pending on the 91 st day to anticipate which charges arising from the factual scenario that resulted in the defendant’s arrest will be pursued by the prosecuting attorney. [fn3: While it would be a subversion of the legislative intent to subject an arrestee to continued incarceration by the service over time of a steady stream of ‘piece-meal’ arrest warrants which charged, one at a time, a litany of offenses arising out of the same event, the trial court, the habeas court, and we do not see any evidence of an exercise of such bad faith in the case at bar. ] Our determination is not affected by the fact that prior to the trial court’s ruling on Bryant’s motion to set bail, the grand jury considered the case against Bryant and returned a true bill of indictment setting forth additional charges that arose out of the factual circumstances that had resulted in Bryant’s arrest. It is the arrest and incarceration for 90 days without grand jury action that the General Assembly sought to prevent; the return of the true bill of indictment in itself triggers a timetable during which an indictee must make a first appearance, where the indictee’s release on bail pending trial of the additional charges will be considered.” IV. Owens v. Hill, 295 Ga. 302, 758 S.E.2d 794 (May 19, 2014). In this civil action, trial court erred by enjoining Hill’s execution on various constitutional grounds. Hill challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 42-5-36(d)(2) which, effective July 1, 2013, designates “‘identifying information’ concerning the persons and entities that participate in executions, including those who participate in the procurement of execution drugs, to be a ‘confidential state secret.’” No denial of access to the courts. Trial court erred by finding that the act denies Hill access to the courts. “‘[P]laintiffs' access-to-the-courts argument still hinges on their ability to show a potential Eighth Amendment violation. One is not entitled to access to the courts merely to argue that there might be some remote possibility of some constitutional violation.’ Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465, 467(I) (5th Cir.2013). Said simply, losing in court is not the same as being denied access to the courts. … The fact is that Hill's ‘claim concerning lack of access to the courts is belied by the proceedings below and the instant appeal.’ Goddard v. City of Albany, 285 Ga. 882, 886(4), 684 S.E.2d 635 (2009). As to his due process claim, his lack of success here, having had full consideration of his case by the Superior Court in the first instance and then this Court on appeal, stems not from a lack of access to the courts or to due process but, instead, simply from the fact that he failed to show that obtaining the requested information would allow him to make a colorable claim. See Clemons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1129 n. 9 (II)(C) (8 th Cir., 2009) (‘[W]e have located no authority indicating the prisoners have such a due process right to probe into the backgrounds of execution personnel.’).” Daker v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 504, 755 S.E.2d 201 (February 24, 2014). Superior court erred by finding that prisoner’s mandamus petition “was frivolous on its face.” Petition sought to compel warden to provide access to a law library. “Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821(II)(A) (97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES A. ACCESS TO THE COURTS