☢ test - Í

L.Ed.2d 72) (1977). This right of access to the courts ‘requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.’ Id. at 828. See also Portis v. Evans, 249 Ga. 396(2) (291 S.E.2d 511) (1982). ‘Prisoner access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of constitutional rights cannot be unjustifiably denied or obstructed. [Cit.]’ Howard v. Sharpe, 266 Ga. 771, 772(1) (470 S.E.2d 678) (1996). Meaningful access to the courts includes the right to contest the legality of a conviction. Id. Any restriction on a prisoner's access to the courts must be ‘clearly warranted by the particular circumstances of each case.’ Id. at 773. In keeping with Bounds, supra, this Court has upheld relief granted to an inmate who lacks access to an adequate law library. See James v. Hight, 251 Ga. 563, 564 (307 S.E.2d 660) (1983) (affirming trial court's order transferring inmate to a facility with an adequate law library). See also Portis v. Evans, supra, 249 Ga. at 397 (visitation by an attorney unable to provide legal assistance to a prison without an adequate library did not comply with Bounds ).” Petition here thus wasn’t “frivolous on its face.” “‘When an inmate claims that he was denied all access to a jail law library or jail legal resources during the course of litigation ..., the claim is a serious one and should be carefully considered by the trial court.’ Portee v. State, 277 Ga.App. 536, 537 at n. 2 (627 S.E.2d 63) (2006). [fn: The fact that appellant has been able to file various pleadings in the courts does not in and of itself render his allegations superfluous or frivolous. For example, the right of access also includes a post-filing opportunity to research and formulate rebuttals to authorities cited in the responsive pleadings of the adversary. See Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619(II) (5 th Cir., 1985). ] ” B. ASSOCIATION Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 671 S.E.2d 497 (January 12, 2009). Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, OCGA § 16-15-1 et seq., does not infringe on constitutional right of association. Guilt pursuant to the Act requires active participation in gang activities, not mere association or membership. “‘[T]he act of associating with compatriots in crime is not a protected associational right [Cits.]’ Helton v. State, [624 N.E.2d 499, 506(I)(A) (Ind.App., 1993)]. To support a conviction, the accused must be shown to have conducted or participated in criminal street gang activity through the commission of ‘an actual criminal act. Mere association is insufficient.’ State v. Walker, [506 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa, 1993)]. OCGA § 16-15-4(a) “comports with ... due-process requirements ... because it punishes conduct, not association.’ State v. Bennett, [782 N.E.2d 101, 110(V)(B) (Ohio App., 2002)].” C. BURDEN OF PROOF In re: A.S., 293 Ga.App. 710, 667 S.E.2d 701 (September 26, 2008). Where trial court expressly announced conviction based on wrong burden of proof, case remanded for findings applying correct burden of proof. Trial court erred in expressly finding juvenile to be delinquent based on “clear and convincing evidence” of child molestation; burden of proof is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Distinguishing cases where trial court articulated no burden of proof, e.g., Smiley v. State , 252 Ga.App. 235, 555 S.E.2d 887 (2001), and defendant waived the issue by failing to object. “Given that the trial court's statement that it was adjudicating A.S. delinquent under an erroneous standard of proof ‘raises a question whether [A.S.] has been deprived, to some extent, of a fair trial,’ [ Jones v. State, 252 Ga.App. 332, 334(2)(a) (556 S.E.2d 238) (2001)] we find no waiver. ‘Where, as here, the trial judge ... acts as finder of fact, our duty is [to make] certain the proper standard was utilized by the court.’ In re: R.L.Y., 181 Ga.App. 14, 16 (351 S.E.2d 243) (1986). Accordingly, and consistent with other appeals from the juvenile court involving the erroneous application of the standard of proof, we reverse and remand the case for further findings applying the correct standard of proof. See In re: C.T.L., 182 Ga.App. 845, 846 (357 S.E.2d 298) (1987) (failure of juvenile court to apply correct standard of proof required case be remanded for further findings); In re: R.L.Y., supra at 17.” Accord, In re: R.S. , 317 Ga.App. 412, 731 S.E.2d 97 (August 10, 2012). Mohamed v. State, 276 Ga. 706, 583 S.E.2d 9 (June 30, 2003). “[U]nder OCGA § 16-9-31(d), the State need prove nothing more than the defendant’s possession of two financial transaction cards as described therein to procure a conviction under OCGA § 16-9-31(a). OCGA § 16-9-31(d) thus is a mandatory presumption of guilt based upon certain facts. But the crime of financial transaction card theft set forth in OCGA § 16-9-31(a) contains elements other than the mere possession of two such financial transaction cards. Mandatory presumptions that shift the burden of proof to the defendant are impermissible in criminal cases.” D. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL See subheading DOUBLE JEOPARDY – COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL , below E. COMPULSORY PROCESS Phillips v. State, 324 Ga.App. 728, 751 S.E.2d 526 (November 15, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; defendant wasn’t