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denied compulsory process where he was unable to obtain witness/intox source code evidence from Kentucky. Trial court issued certificate of materiality under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, but Kentucky court denied defendant’s application. “Here, the trial court considered the motion, and issued the certificate, which was then presented to the Kentucky court. It was then for the Kentucky court to decide whether the witnesses and evidence were material and necessary and should have been compelled. [FN: We note that Phillips's arguments that the Kentucky court failed to hold a hearing on necessity and materiality in violation of the Uniform Act and lacked jurisdiction to enter the protective order are properly addressed to the Kentucky courts, and they do not provide a basis to require the trial court to postpone Phillips's DUI trial. ] Thus, the Georgia trial court had no authority to compel the witness. Absent a finding that the Kentucky court lacked jurisdiction (there is no such allegation here), the Kentucky order was entitled to full faith and credit pursuant to Article 4, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. [fn] Although Phillips argues that the trial court should have waited until his appeal had been resolved, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Kentucky appellate court issued a supersedeas of the order, and therefore, the Kentucky trial court's order was enforceable. [fn].” Accord, Davenport v. State , 328 Ga.App. 850, 763 S.E.2d 130 (August 19, 2014). Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848, 734 S.E.2d 1 (November 5, 2012). Convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; no violation of defendant’s right to compulsory process where trial court quashed subpoenas for witnesses without relevant information. “[T]he right to compulsory process relates to the issuance of the process, not to the actual attendance of the witnesses. Mafnas v. State, 149 Ga.App. 286(1), 254 S.E.2d 409 (1979) (disapproved on other grounds in Davenport v. State, 289 Ga. 399, 402, 711 S.E.2d 699 (2011). Appellant's right to compulsory process was not abridged since the subpoenas were issued by the court and served on the witnesses who, in fact, appeared and whose testimony was proffered to the trial court outside the presence of the jury. After the subpoenas were issued and served, the trial court was statutorily authorized, upon written motion, to modify or quash ‘unreasonable or oppressive’ subpoenas. OCGA § 24–10– 22(b)(1). It was only at this point that the inquiry turned to the expected content of the witnesses's testimony. The motion to quash the subpoenas averred, and defense counsel acknowledged, that the subpoenaed witnesses were to be called to impeach the testimony of the jailed prisoner who testified against appellant and who had failed the drug-court program in which the three subpoenaed witnesses worked. Appellant wished to inquire of the witnesses their impression of the veracity of the jailed prisoner, using the series of statutory questions set out in OCGA § 24–9–84(4). The trial court quashed the subpoenas, ruling that the ‘drug-court community’ was not one by which the standard for truthfulness was set and was not large enough to encompass the person's reputation. In implicitly ruling that the subpoenas that had been issued and served were unreasonable or oppressive, the trial court did not violate appellant's right to compulsory process.” Witnesses here were judge and other personnel of drug court who had dealt with State’s witness. F. CONFRONTATION See also EVIDENCE - CO-DEFENDANT STATEMENTS; EVIDENCE – HEARSAY – NECESSITY EXCEPTION; and WITNESSES -TESTIMONY, below 1. BUSINESS RECORDS Phillips v. State, 324 Ga.App. 728, 751 S.E.2d 526 (November 15, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed. No confrontation clause violation where defendant was unable to obtain witness/intox source code evidence from Kentucky . Based on Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 309(2) (637 S.E.2d 706) (2006) (intox inspection certificates weren’t “testimonial” because they weren’t “made in an investigatory or adversarial setting” nor “generated in anticipation of the prosecution of a particular defendant”). “This rationale applies to the ‘testimony’ of the Intoxilyzer 5000 in this case, as well as the employee witnesses and documentation Phillips sought from CMI.” Accord, Davenport v. State , 328 Ga.App. 850, 763 S.E.2d 130 (August 19, 2014). Disharoon v. State, 291 Ga. 45, 727 S.E.2d 465 (May 7, 2012). Affirming McIntyre v. State, 311 Ga.App. 173, 715 S.E.2d 431 (2011) and defendants’ convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses. No Confrontation Clause violation where testifying crime lab witness performed entire DNA lab test except that “she was not present when another technician placed the ninety-six test samples and controls into the scientific instrument used to complete a step of the testing procedure. [Witness] Pickens testified that she read the results from the instrument and concluded that the control samples worked as expected. Distinguishing Bullcoming v. New Mexico , 09-10876, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610, 2011 WL 2472799 (June 23, 2011), which “was based on the fact that the State's witness, while generally familiar with the laboratory's testing procedures, had not specifically participated in, observed, or reviewed the test on the defendant's blood sample. Id. at 2709. Here, however, the level of participation in the DNA testing by the testifying witness was significantly greater than that of the testifying witness in Bullcoming. The testifying witness, Pickens, completed every step of the test with the exception of only being present while another technician merely placed the ninety-six test samples and controls into the scientific instrument that was used to complete a single step of the testing. The United States Supreme Court has signaled that Bullcoming would not apply