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opposing counsel's statement as to the existence of a deal, and the trial court overruled the objection. An attorney's statements in place can be considered evidence, see Rank v. Rank, 287 Ga. 147, 149(2) (695 S.E.2d 13) (2010); Wright v. State, 284 Ga.App. 169, 171(1) (643 S.E.2d 538) (2007) (physical precedent only), but as explained by the trial court when it ruled, defense counsel had already cross-examined the witness as to the existence of any incentive from the State in exchange for her testimony. The witness denied any deal, and the State's comment was merely consistent with that denial. Further, the witness herself compromised her own credibilty by voluntarily requesting ‘help’ with her pending charges, and any cross-examination of the State's counsel was highly unlikely to have had additional evidentiary value. ‘Harm as well as error must be established by an appellant in order to secure a reversal of his conviction,’ Rutledge v. State, 245 Ga. 768, 771(3) (267 Ga.App. 199) (1980), see also In re: T.S., 317 Ga.App. 683, 732 S.E.2d 541 (September 25, 2012) (harm as well as error must be shown when asserting inability to confront a witness), and based on the record before us, we discern no error requiring a reversal on the ground urged.” Hatley v. State, 290 Ga. 480, 722 S.E.2d 67 (February 6, 2012). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed. 1. “We agree with Hatley that the Child Hearsay Statute does not, as construed in previous cases and as applied in this case, comport with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. However, the right of confrontation can be satisfied by construing the statute to require pretrial notice of the State's intent to use a child victim's hearsay statements; thus, we will construe the statute in that way.” Prior procedure – allowing the State to merely make the child available at trial without calling her as a witness – is deemed insufficient in light of lane from Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), declaring “that a ‘witness's testimony against a defendant is ... inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’ Id. at 2531. The Court recognized that there are two classes of witnesses — those who testify against the defendant and those who testify in his favor — and concluded that ‘the prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may call the latter.... [T]here is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.’ Id. at 2534. Given this language, we must conclude that the Child Hearsay Statute, as construed by this Court in Sosebee [ v. State, 257 Ga. 298, 357 S.E.2d 562 (1987)], and in other appellate cases, cannot pass constitutional muster because it fails to put the onus on the prosecution to put the child victim on the witness stand to confront the defendant. Any cases suggesting the contrary are hereby overruled.” Announces new interpretation of OCGA § 24–3–16, intended to “assure that a defendant's right to confront his accuser will be protected until a more detailed procedure is provided by a USCR or statutory amendment.” New rule requires “the prosecution to notify the defendant within a reasonable period of time prior to trial of its intent to use a child victim's hearsay statements and to give the defendant an opportunity to raise a Confrontation Clause objection. If the defendant objects, and the State wishes to introduce hearsay statements under OCGA § 24–3–16, the State must present the child witness at trial; if the defendant does not object, the State can introduce the child victim's hearsay statements subject to the trial court's determination that the circumstances of the statements provide sufficient indicia of reliability. The trial court should take reasonable steps to ascertain, and put on the record, whether the defendant waives his right to confront the child witness.” 2. Error in admitting child’s testimonial statement made to police was harmless, as it was cumulative of the child’s non-testimonial statement to her mother (as to all offenses for which defendant was convicted). Accord, Welch v. State , 318 Ga.App. 202, 733 S.E.2d 482 (October 25, 2012) (any error in admitting child hearsay without offering to call the child as a court’s witness was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, cumulative of child’s statement); Walker v. State , 322 Ga.App. 158, 744 S.E.2d 349 (June 11, 2013) (no Confrontation violation where trial court offered defendant opportunity to confront child victim and defendant, through counsel, declined); State v. Dague , 325 Ga.App. 202, 750 S.E.2d 476 (November 18, 2013). Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 642 S.E.2d 640 (March 19, 2007). Confrontation Clause violation is subject to harmless error analysis. “Whether a violation of the Confrontation Clause is harmless depends on a host of factors, including ‘the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross- examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. [Cits.]’ Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674) (1986).” Statement here was cumulative, or addressed unimportant aspects of case, while evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Accord, Williams v. State , 328 Ga.App. 876, 763 S.E.2d 261 (August 26, 2014). 9. HEARINGS OTHER THAN TRIAL Sheppard v. State, 300 Ga.App. 261, 684 S.E.2d 397 (September 29, 2009). Allowing prosecutor to make proffer of evidence at similar transaction hearing didn’t deprive defendant of right of confrontation. “[W]here the defendant has the