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opportunity to cross examine the relevant witnesses during trial, he or she has not been deprived of any substantial rights,” citing Ellis v. State, 282 Ga.App. 17, 23-24(3)(b) (637 S.E.2d 729) (2006). See also Hinton v. State, 290 Ga.App. 479, 481(2) (659 S.E.2d 841) (2008). Gresham v. Edwards, 281 Ga. 881, 644 S.E.2d 122 (April 22, 2007). Pre-trial habeas petition properly denied; Crawford , and Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, do not apply to preliminary hearings. “In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a criminal defendant’s right of confrontation at trial and, in its historical overview of the right, recounted ‘the manner in which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials ’ (id., at 43, 124 S.Ct. 1354) and the admissibility at trial of the pre-trial examination of an unavailable witness (id., at 43-50, 124 S.Ct. 1354), noting that the Court’s cases ‘have thus remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross- examine.’ Id., at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (all emphases added). In earlier decisions, the Court stated, ‘[t]he right to confrontation is basically a trial right’ ( Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968)); [fn] ‘[i]t is this literal right to “confront” the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause’ ( California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)); ‘[t]he opinions of this Court show that the right to confrontation is a trial right ...’ ( Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (plurality decision)), and ‘the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.’ Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). [fn]” Magistrate Court properly admitted hearsay from investigating detective as the only witness at the preliminary hearing. Fact that preliminary hearing is a “critical stage” of prosecution relates to right to counsel, not right to confrontation, which is a “trial right,” citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744, n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). See also California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 159, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (‘[T]he inability to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his prior statement cannot easily be shown to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial’). Thus, the ‘critical’ nature of the proceeding is not the decisive factor with regard to the applicability of the right of confrontation.” Accord, Bell v. State , 291 Ga.App. 437, 662 S.E.2d 248 (May 7, 2008); In re: T.F. , 295 Ga.App. 417, 671 S.E.2d 887 (December 31, 2008) (Physical precedent only) (confrontation right not applicable to juvenile court transfer hearing ; juvenile court could consider hearsay in deciding whether to transfer case to superior court); Daniel v. State , 298 Ga.App. 245, 679 S.E.2d 811 (June 8, 2009) (no confrontation right at motion to suppress hearing ). 10. IMPEACHMENT; DEAL WITH STATE See WITNESSES – IMPEACHMENT – DEAL WITH STATE/POTENTIAL SENTENCE , below 11. JURY EXPERIMENTS Dixon v. State, 303 Ga.App. 517, 693 S.E.2d 900 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping with injury, rape and aggravated assault affirmed; jury’s experiment to see if cords used to tie victim would leave a mark, as suggested by defense counsel’s closing argument, was not prejudicial. “[W]e find no basis for concluding that the experiment allegedly conducted by the jurors during deliberations influenced the jury in a manner harmful to Dixon's cause. During the trial, Dixon's counsel argued to the jury that if [victim's] wrists had been bound with an electrical cord, as she testified, then the cord would have left marks on her wrists. The experiment showed that a cord tied around the wrists does leave marks, so the experiment would have supported Dixon's arguments. Thus, we conclude that the alleged experiment was not ‘so prejudicial that the verdict must be deemed inherently lacking in due process,’” quoting Gentry (March 8, 1999), below. Gentry v. State, 236 Ga.App. 820, 513 S.E.2d 528 (March 8, 1999). “Gentry contends that a member of the jury engaged in misconduct during deliberations that prejudiced his right to a fair trial and requires reversal of his convictions. After the conclusion of the trial, one of the jurors revealed to the prosecutor that he used a toy ‘matchbox’ car he had brought from home, along with a Styrofoam coffee cup which was in the jury room, to briefly illustrate to the other jurors the collision between Gentry’s vehicle and the vehicle driven by Bennett. Since a defendant has a right to be confronted with all the evidence against him, it is improper for the jury to conduct tests or experiments during deliberations which have the effect of producing evidence not introduced at trial. Williams v. State, 252 Ga. 7, 8-9, 310 S.E.2d 528 (1984); Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 683-685, 229 S.E.2d 465 (1976); Smith v. State, 122 Ga. 154, 50 S.E. 62 (1905). Any such test or experiment which has the effect of exposing the jury to new evidence is improper and will require the grant of a new trial if the new evidence is so prejudicial that the verdict must be deemed inherently lacking in due process. Williams, 252 Ga. at 8-9, 310 S.E.2d 528. On the other hand, it is not improper for the jury to use its common experience to conduct illustrations or experiments which merely examine or verify evidence admitted during the trial. An object, not itself admitted into evidence, used by a juror as a model to illustrate trial evidence during jury deliberations does not