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necessarily expose the jury to new evidence, although it could conceivably have that effect depending on the object and its use under the circumstances. The use of an object by the jury may constitute no more than a common sense illustration of the evidence admitted at trial. See Annotation, Propriety of Juror’s Tests or Experiments in Jury Room, 31 A.L.R.4th 566 (1984).” 12. LIMITED CROSS-EXAMINATION Deleon-Alvarez v. State, 324 Ga.App. 694, 751 S.E.2d 497 (November 14, 2013). Defendants’ convictions for kidnapping for ransom affirmed; no error in limiting defense cross of State’s witness, based on misleading questions. Witness had been given testimonial immunity, but counsel’s questions suggested that witness had been given transactional immunity. “Here, the trial court was authorized to determine that, as phrased, the questions that drew objections tended to confuse issues relating to the specific type of immunity extended to Tejada. [fn] In sustaining those objections, the trial court articulated that concern, issued curative instructions to the jury, and admonished defense counsel not to ask questions that misrepresented applicable law and circumstances. These actions taken by the court did not impose unreasonable limits on Palacios–Baras's cross-examination of Tejada, nor did the actions cut off all inquiry into the subject of Tejada's testimonial immunity.[fn] Instead, as the record reveals, Palacios–Baras's counsel thereafter chose not to ask Tejada any additional question(s) that might have exposed to the jury Tejada's belief concerning ‘whether the deal [he] struck with the State was sufficiently lucrative to render [his] testimony less creditworthy.’ [fn] Given the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 733 S.E.2d 715 (October 29, 2012). Murder conviction affirmed; no confrontation violation in limiting cross-examination of State’s witness to relevant matter. “Nicely asserts that he should have been permitted to cross-examine Dr. Gowitt about an understanding among some Georgia medical examiners that one will not testify ‘against’ the findings of another, an understanding that Dr. Gowitt allegedly has adopted. … The trial court permitted Nicely to examine Dr. Gowitt outside the presence of the jury about any understanding among medical examiners, and Dr. Gowitt explained that this understanding would not extend in any event to Dr. Greenbaum, who is not a medical examiner. Moreover, Dr. Gowitt testified unequivocally that he did not feel bound—‘legally, ethically, morally, or any other way’ — to adopt or accept the findings of Dr. Greenbaum. In these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in disallowing cross-examination on any common understanding among some medical examiners.” Kay v. State, 306 Ga.App. 666, 703 S.E.2d 108 (October 29, 2010). Defendant’s child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly prohibited defense from cross-examining victim about her placement with DFCS. “Kay argues that the trial court's ruling restricted his defense counsel from cross-examining the victim and the victim's mother about the victim's desire to fabricate the allegation and testify favorably for DFCS and the State so she could remain with her mother instead of in the custody of DFCS. Hibbs [ v. State, 299 Ga.App. 723, 724-725(2) (683 S.E.2d 329) (2009), providing right to cross juveniles about ‘whether they are currently on probation for a juvenile offense or have an open or pending case in juvenile court, or whether they are currently committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice’] thus has no application here. The children's placement with DFCS was not relevant to any issue in the case, and nothing about the placement could show that either the victim or her mother had any reason to slant their testimony in favor of the State .” Mother didn’t testify here. Williamson v. State, 300 Ga.App. 538, 685 S.E.2d 784 (October 20, 2009). No confrontation violation where witness testified against defendant after pleading guilty to victim’s own charges, but without a plea deal, sentencing deferred; two months after defendant’s trial, was allowed to withdraw guilty plea, and plead to lesser charge. Defense counsel was able to thoroughly cross-examine witness about his possible sentence. “When asked whether he hoped to receive some benefit from his testimony, [witness] Weeks responded, ‘I hope it's going to help me.’ The trial court did not limit defense counsel's questioning on this issue. Thus, [defendant] was not denied her right to explore Weeks's potential bias or partiality.” Hibbs v. State, 299 Ga.App. 723, 683 S.E.2d 329 (July 6, 2009). Conviction for aggravated child molestation reversed; defendant’s right to confront witness was denied by prohibiting cross-examination of victim on juvenile charges pending against him at time of outcry, although charges were dismissed prior to defendant’s trial. “Such cross- examination must be permitted because Hibbs is ‘entitled to a reasonable cross-examination on the relevant issue of whether the witness entertained any belief of personal benefit’ [fn] from testifying against Hibbs in the course of the police interview in May 2004. [fn: That Hibbs may have hoped for personal benefit is revealed in the juvenile records. In February 2005, the juvenile court charges against B.D. were dismissed on the following grounds: ‘Youth has