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been very cooperative with law enforcement in this case. Law enforcement has agreed that charges should be dropped against [B.D.] in the understanding that charges have been filed against another individual involved in this matter. [B.D.] is now living out of county with his father and is doing well.’ The first two reasons given could indicate that B.D. cooperated with the state in hopes of favorable treatment, and that this cooperation took the form of the charges he made against Hibbs in the May 2004 interview. ] ” Distinguishing Wright v. State , 266 Ga. 887 (471 S.E.2d 883) (1996) (dismissed criminal charges couldn’t be used as “a general attack on the credibility of the witness.”). Distinguished, see Kay (October 29, 2010), above. Butler v. State, 285 Ga. 518, 678 S.E.2d 92 (June 8, 2009). Trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from impeaching State’s witness with prior offense discharged under First Offender Act. “Butler acknowledges this Court's holding in Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798, 801-803 (493 S.E.2d 136) (1997), that under the plain language of the Act, a witness's first offender record cannot be used to impeach his or her testimony by showing commission of a crime of moral turpitude.” Inability to impeach on this basis does not violate defendant’s rights under Confrontation Clause: “In Matthews, we held that ‘ impeachment … to show a general lack of trustworthiness based on a prior criminal conviction’ is ‘not guaranteed by the confrontation clause, ’ and that ‘unless there is an adjudication of guilt, a witness may not be impeached on general credibility grounds by evidence of a first offender record.’ Matthews, 268 Ga. at 802.” Horne v. State, 281 Ga. 799, 642 S.E.2d 659 (March 19, 2007). Trial court granted co-defendant Hill use and derivative use immunity so that State could call him as a witness against Horne, but co-defendant still refused to testify. DA then proceeded to “pose a series of leading questions suggesting the guilt of the accused” over defendant’s objection. Held, trial court committed harmless error by allowing the questioning, where defense counsel warned the court that co- defendant wouldn’t testify. “This Court has found an abridgement of the right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment where the State, in the jury’s presence, posed a series of leading questions suggesting the guilt of the accused to a co-indictee witness who refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds. Lingerfelt v. State, 235 Ga. 139 (218 S.E.2d 752) (1975) (‘ Lingerfelt II’). See also Lingerfelt v. State, 231 Ga. 354(3) (201 S.E.2d 445) (1973) (‘ Lingerfelt I’). In Lawrence v. State, 257 Ga. 423(3) (360 S.E.2d 716) (1987), the Court reached the same result with regard to an unindicted witness who invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, reasoning that the procedure ‘whereby the prosecutor was allowed, in effect, to testify for the witness and circumvent meaningful cross-examination as to obvious inferences, is clearly unacceptable and was harmful to the defendant.’ Id. at 425, fn. 3. … In the present case, Horne’s counsel brought his objection to the attention of the trial court and sought unsuccessfully to question Hill out of the jury’s presence to determine whether the witness would respond. The court did not excuse the jury, nor did it take any other corrective action when it became apparent that the witness intended to remain mute. Although the questions posed to Hill and Hill’s refusal to answer were not evidence, ‘the undeniable effect of this prosecutorial procedure was to place before the jury, through the questions asked, the content of [the witness’] statement to the police, and the clear inference [of the defendant’s guilt]. ’ Lawrence at 425. Here, the questioning bore on a fundamental part of the State’s case, the jury was given no contemporaneous limiting instructions from the court, and Hill ‘could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not admitted by him.’ Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934) (1965). ‘[E]ffective confrontation of [Hill] was possible only if [he] affirmed the statements as his,’ id. 380 U.S. at 420, which he did not do. Assuming that Horne’s objection was sufficient to invoke the protections of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, we hold under the circumstances that Horne’s inability to cross-examine Hill deprived Horne of that right. Id.” Also citing Greenwood v. State, 203 Ga.App. 901(1) (418 S.E.2d 160) (1992). Slakman v. State, 280 Ga. 837, 632 S.E.2d 378 (June 26, 2006). “The right of cross-examination integral to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is not an absolute right that mandates unlimited questioning by the defense.... The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Accordingly, trial courts retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination....’ Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 582(3) (581 S.E.2d 23) (2003) (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted).” Here, witnesses were jurors in defendant’s prior trial who heard defendant make incriminating statements in the courtroom. Defendant complained that he could not cross-examine them effectively without revealing that they had found him guilty of murder. Cook v. State, 276 Ga.App. 803, 625 S.E.2d 83 (December 12, 2005). Trial court committed error, but harmless, in preventing defendant from cross-examining state’s witness about pending theft charge in another jurisdiction. “‘The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant in a criminal trial the general right to cross- examine witnesses against him as well as the specific right to cross-examine a key state’s witness concerning pending criminal charges against the witness.’ Byrd v. State, 262 Ga. 426, 427(2), 420 S.E.2d 748 (1992).” Harmless because