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witness was not “key” but rather cumulative of other witnesses. State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 571 S.E.2d 752 (October 28, 2002). Trial court erred by refusing defendant’s attempt to cross-examine co-defendant about the amount of prison time he saved himself by agreeing to testify against defendant. State objected and court excluded testimony on mandatory sentence co-defendant would otherwise have faced, because defendant still faced that same charge. “It is important to note that this concern comes about only when the jury knows that the witness and the defendant were charged with the same crimes and that they have similar criminal histories, and the jury sees the two accomplices as equally culpable or the defendant on trial as less culpable than the accomplice who negotiated a deal. The potential for harm suggested by the State could be put to rest by a limiting instruction given the jury by the trial court prior to the receipt of the witness’s testimony, much like the limiting instruction currently given prior to the admission of similar transaction evidence.” Accord, Perez v. State , 254 Ga.App. 872, 564 S.E.2d 208 (March 27, 2002); Green v. State , 254 Ga.App. 881, 564 S.E.2d 731 (March 27, 2002). Violation of this rule, however, does not require reversal where exclusion of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thompson v. State , 266 Ga.App. 29, 596 S.E.2d 205 (March 3, 2004). Mangum v. State, 274 Ga. 573, 555 S.E.2d 451 (November 19, 2001). Trial court erred, and violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers, when it restricted cross-examination based on the confidentiality of juvenile records and disallowed any inquiry into pending criminal charges against the witnesses in an effort to attack credibility directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives. Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 (1974), guarantees a defendant in a criminal trial both the general right to cross-examine witnesses against him and the more specific right to cross-examine a key state’s witness concerning pending criminal charges against the witness. A criminal defendant’s rights under the confrontation clause are paramount to the State’s policy of protecting juvenile offenders. Id . at 319. Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 528 S.E.2d 250 (March 27, 2000). No merit to Defendant’s claim that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated when the trial court did not permit him to question the state’s witness about the potential sentence the witness could face because of the criminal conduct he had admitted on the stand. Defendant was permitted to ask the witness if he realized that he could be prosecuted and to repeatedly question the witness about any benefit he expected to receive in exchange for his testimony. The mere fact that Defendant was unable to ask the witness to conjecture about possible punishment did not diminish Defendant’s attempt to show the witness’s motive for testifying on behalf of the state, and did not amount to an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 518 S.E.2d 677 (June 14, 1999). A 4-3 majority upholds constitutionality of the 1994 Georgia Criminal Procedure Discovery Act, OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. “The right to confrontation is a ‘trial right,’ guaranteeing a defendant the ability to confront and question adverse witnesses at trial. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52-53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257(2), 290 S.E.2d 911 (1982). As a trial right, it ‘does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony,’ Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at 53, 107 S.Ct. 989 (footnote omitted), and does not guarantee ‘cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. [Cit.]’ Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). Because the confrontation clause guarantees only the right to confront and cross-examine those individuals called to testify against a defendant at trial and the pretrial discovery provisions of the Act do not implicate or infringe upon such right, we find no merit to this argument.” Benham, joined by Fletcher and Sears, dissents: “the right to cross-examination, as guaranteed by OCGA § 24-9-64, may not be meaningful if not accompanied by some right to examine materials to be relied upon by a witness.” Accord, Bazemore v. State , 244 Ga.App. 460, 535 S.E.2d 830 (June 13, 2000). Alexander v. State, 236 Ga.App. 142, 511 S.E.2d 249 (January 28, 1999). Trial court erred in allowing State to call defendant’s co-indictee as a witness, then ask him leading questions when he invoked his right to remain silent, where the witness likewise refuses to answer questions by defense counsel. “[T]he State has no right to ask leading questions of a witness such as Tucker, a co-indictee who has refused to testify. Such questioning is tantamount to the State testifying on behalf of a recalcitrant witness and serves to abrogate a defendant’s fundamental right to confront, question and secure answers from his accusers.” Based on Lingerfelt v. State , 235 Ga. 139, 218 S.E.2d 752 (1975). Harmless error, however, based on overwhelming evidence of guilt. 13. PHYSICAL CONFRONTATION In re: T.S., 317 Ga.App. 683, 732 S.E.2d 541 (September 25, 2012). Deprivation finding reversed; mother’s right of