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confrontation was violated when juvenile court excluded her from courtroom during juvenile’s testimony, without any finding of necessity or other means to participate. “Effective confrontation does not necessarily require a face-to- face confrontation. In re: B.H., 295 Ga.App. 297, 301(5) (671 S.E.2d 303) (2008). If the trial court finds that testifying in the physical presence of a parent would cause a child trauma and excludes the parent from the proceedings, the parent's due process rights are protected if she can listen to the child's testimony and contemporaneously consult with her attorney to assist in propounding questions for cross-examination. Id. (no due process violation when excluded parent watched child's testimony via closed-circuit television and was provided with a runner to take notes to the parent's lawyer). See also In re: M.H.W., 275 Ga.App. 586, 590(1) (621 S.E.2d 779) (2005) (no harm in requiring father to continue cross- examination of mother by telephone); In re: C.W.D., 232 Ga.App. 200, 209–210(5) (501 S.E.2d 232) (1998) (children testified and were cross-examined via closed-circuit television after juvenile court determined that making them testify in mother's presence would be detrimental to their health). On the other hand, we have reversed and remanded cases in which a parent was excluded from the courtroom during her child's testimony, absent a showing that exclusion was necessary and that the parent was given a means to consult with her lawyer while listening to the child's testimony. See In re: M.S., 178 Ga.App. 380, 381 (343 S.E.2d 152) (1986) (termination order reversed because parent was excluded even from observing child's testimony through a one-way mirror); In re: B.G., 225 Ga.App. 492, 494(1) (484 S.E.2d 293) (1997) (due process violation was not harmless when parent excluded from courtroom and given no means to listen to child's testimony and contemporaneously consult with lawyer). If a parent cannot hear her child's testimony in a deprivation or termination of parental rights proceeding, she cannot assist her lawyer in developing the child's cross-examination and her due process right to confrontation is limited. In this case, ‘the trial court erred in excluding the mother from the courtroom without a showing of necessity and without using procedures which would accommodate her ability to hear the testimony and consult with her attorney.’ In re: B.G., 225 Ga.App. at 494(1). The error was harmful because the mother was unable to assist her attorney in developing questions for the cross- examination of the child. Id.” United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11 th Cir., February 13, 2006). En banc decision. District court violated defendants’ Confrontation Clause rights by allowing witnesses to testify via remote videoconference from Australia in trial conducted in Alabama, even though “[b]oth defendants, the jury, and the judge could see the testifying witness on a television monitor; and the witnesses could see the temporary courtroom in the U.S. Attorney’s conference room. [fn] Each Defendant’s attorney cross-examined both [witnesses].” Applies rule from Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), where “the Supreme Court upheld, over a defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge, a Maryland rule of criminal procedure that allows child victims of abuse to testify by one-way closed circuit television from outside the courtroom.” From Craig : “‘though we reaffirm the importance of face-to-face confrontation with witnesses appearing at trial, we cannot say that such confrontation is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to confront one’s accusers.’ Id. at 849-850, 110 S.Ct. at 3165-66. But the Court held ‘that a defendant’s right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.’ Id. at 850, 110 S.Ct. at 3166. The Court reasoned: “the right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause includes not only a “Personal examination” ... but also (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.”’ Id. at 845-46, 110 S.Ct. at 3163 (citations omitted).” Eleventh Circuit finds that this case doesn’t satisfy the first prong of the two-prong Craig rule: that “the testimony was necessary to further an important public policy.” Eleventh Circuit finds that there was not showing of necessity here, and expresses grave doubt that “an important public policy” has been shown. Trial court faulted for failing to comply with the mandate of Craig to hold an evidentiary hearing and making findings of necessity and reliability. As to necessity : No showing of necessity because Court failed to consider whether the witnesses’s testimony could have been taken by Rule 15 deposition, with the defendants physically present to confront the witnesses. As to important public policy : “The Government’s interest in presenting the fact-finder with crucial evidence is, of course, an important public policy. We hold, however, that, under the circumstances of this case (which include the availability of a Rule 15 deposition), the prosecutor’s need for the video conference testimony to make a case and to expeditiously resolve it are not the type of public policies that are important enough to outweigh the Defendants’ rights to confront their accusers face-to-face. … All criminal prosecutions include at least some evidence crucial to the Government’s case, and there is no doubt that many criminal cases could be more expeditiously resolved were it unnecessary for witnesses to appear at trial. If we were to approve introduction of testimony in this manner, on this record, every prosecutor wishing to present testimony from a witness overseas would argue that providing crucial prosecution evidence and resolving the case expeditiously are