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important public policies that support the admission of testimony by two-way video conference.” Court also expresses concern about moving trial to U.S. Attorney’s office. Three judges dissent, arguing that Craig does not apply where the witness is not available to testify in court, and argue instead for application of Crawford v. Washington test – treating the testimony as hearsay, admissible if shown to be reliable and defendant afforded the opportunity to cross-examine. Zepp v. State, 276 Ga.App. 466, 623 S.E.2d 569 (November 18, 2005). Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel did not object to child molesting victims testifying with partition placed between them and defendant, their mother, a procedure to which the defendant agreed in lieu of having the children testify via closed circuit television pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-55. “‘[T]he right to confront is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Clearly, the prosecution of child sex abuse cases poses substantial difficulties because of the emotional trauma frequently suffered by child witnesses who must testify about the sexual assaults they have suffered. To a child who does not understand the reason for confrontation, the anticipation and experience of being in close proximity to the defendant can be overwhelming. This court is unable to recognize any compelling logical reason for which a victim of child molestation would be forced into direct eye to eye contact with the [defendant] at all times. The right to confrontation is a right to ask and secure answers to questions from a witness who is present in court and in full view of the trier of fact. This condition was satisfied by the trial court’s resolution in this case. In many cases, to require eye-to-eye contact between the victim and the [defendant] would not only be intimidating, and very possibly exacerbate the damage done them, but it also serves no meaningful purpose in the search for truth. Would the victim be more likely to tell the truth if forced to stare the defendant in the face? Certainly not as a matter of law and certainly not as a matter of fact. We have no information as to such a proposition and only superstition would suggest it. The victims are at a tender age and they understand their obligation to tell the truth. The mere fact that the trial court used its discretion in allowing the victims to [be separated by a partition] where they would not have to directly face the [defendant] in no way violated the [defendant]’s constitutional right to confrontation. The [defendant] had the full opportunity to confront each victim with a thorough and sifting cross-examination and to expose each victim to the court and jury.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ortiz v. State, 188 Ga.App. 532, 535(2) (374 S.E.2d 92) (1988).” Testimony of child sexual abuse victim by closed circuit television approved by U.S. Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). Harris v. State, 269 Ga.App. 316, 604 S.E.2d 565 (August 30, 2004). Allowing child molestation victim to testify with a chalk board between her and the defendant did not violate defendant’s right to confrontation. While “the defendant is entitled to ‘a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact,’ including ‘an unobstructed view of them while they were on the stand,’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.)” Richardson v. State , 276 Ga. 639, 642, 581 S.E.2d 528 (2003), “[h]ere, the record includes evidence from Harris’s own trial counsel that Harris could see the child witness as she testified. At the hearing on his motion for new trial, Harris’s trial counsel testified that ‘the board was placed in a position where my client could see the witness and the jury.’ Counsel also testified that the child could see Harris, though not as easily as she might have without the blackboard.” Richardson v. State, 276 Ga. 639, 581 S.E.2d 528 (June 2, 2003). “‘The Confrontation Clause does not ... compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere....’ However, that constitutional provision does ‘guarantee[ ] the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.’ Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that ‘the right of confrontation does not require that the defendant be able to see witnesses as they testify.’ Richardson could not insist that the witnesses look directly at him as they testified, but he was entitled to an unobstructed view of them while they were on the stand.” 14. PURPOSE OF EVIDENCE Smoot v. State, 316 Ga.App. 102, 729 S.E.2d 416 (June 5, 2012). Conviction for keeping a place of prostitution reversed on other grounds; no Confrontation Clause violation “in allowing police to testify to contents of web pages they viewed as part of their investigation.” “[T]he Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. Id. at 59(IV); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414(II)(A) (105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425) (1985). Thus, admission of testimony regarding the photographs and the advertising content on the web pages was not barred by the Sixth Amendment. See Weems [ v. State, 269 Ga. 680, 683(3), n. 2 (673 S.E.2d 50) (2009)] (Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of statements that constituted original evidence).” Not clear what the alternative purpose of the evidence here was intended to be. 15. STATEMENTS FOR MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT Freeman v. State, 328 Ga.App. 756, 760 S.E.2d 708 (July 16, 2014). Convictions for burglary and attempted murder