☢ test - Í

affirmed; no confrontation violation in admission of statements by victim to EMS worker. Statements describing her injuries and how they occurred were made for medical diagnosis and treatment, not prosecution. “[T]he EMS worker ‘was responsible for emergency medical diagnosis and treatment, to which the cause of the injury was relevant. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment have long been admissible under [statutory hearsay exceptions] and continue to be admissible even after Crawford. ... [Nelson's] statement to the paramedic was made during his initial examination of her to ascertain the scope, diagnosis, and treatment of her injuries, and does not fall within any of the classes of testimonial statements described in Crawford .’ Hester v. State, 283 Ga. 367, 371– 372(4), 659 S.E.2d 600 (2008), quoting Thomas v. State, 288 Ga.App. 602, 608(3), 654 S.E.2d 682 (2007) (no error in admitting hearsay statements ‘made to a nurse and doctor while they were examining the victim to ascertain the scope, diagnosis, and treatment of his injuries.’).” Thomas v. State, 288 Ga.App. 602, 654 S.E.2d 682 (November 28, 2007). Aggravated sodomy and related convictions affirmed. No Crawford violation upon admission of victim’s statements to medical personnel in county jail for purposes of medical treatment, even though police were present. Accord, Hester v. State , 293 Ga. 367, 659 S.E.2d 600 (March 31, 2008) (murder victim’s statements to paramedics, describing defendant’s attack, properly admitted). 16. TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS See subheading UNAVAILABLE WITNESS/ CRAWFORD , below 17. UNAVAILABLE WITNESS/ CRAWFORD Lafavor v. State, 334 Ga.App. 125, 778 S.E.2d 787 (October 8, 2015). Speeding conviction affirmed; no Confrontation Clause violation where second officer didn’t testify, nor did the State offer into evidence any statements made by second officer. State v. Gunn, 333 Ga.App. 893, 777 S.E.2d 722 (September 23, 2015). In battery prosecution, trial court’s order granting motion to suppress reversed and remanded. Trial court ruled that victim’s statements to 911 operator were testimonial, but never listened to recording, relying instead on competing transcripts of the statements from the State and the defense. “[W]hether an emergency exists and remains ongoing is ‘a highly context-dependent inquiry ,’” quoting Michigan v. Bryant (February 28, 2011), below, at 361(III)(B). “And it is for this reason that we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for reconsideration of Gunn’s motion after listening to a recording of the 911 call, which must also be made part of the record so that this Court—should there be another appeal—can do likewise. While a review of a transcript of a 911 call may be sufficient to determine the primary purpose of such a call in some cases, under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, listening to the actual recording may impact the trial court’s analysis and conclusions. Indeed, the State’s transcript suggests that at the beginning of the 911 call, Gunn was continuing to approach and pursue the victim. … But Gunn’s transcript records the victim’s statements differently. … In addition to noting these glaring inconsistencies between the parties’ two prepared transcripts, we also again note that the relatively brief 911 call at issue was made while the alleged victim began to and did drive away from the scene of the altercation. And given the timing of the call and the victim’s actions while making the call, listening to the recording would allow the trial court (and this Court) to hear the victim’s tone of voice, assess her level of composure, and glean clues about the environment in which she made her call.” Note, “neither party tendered the recording into evidence.” Driskell v. State, 333 Ga.App. 886, 777 S.E.2d 717 (September 23, 2015). Simple assault conviction affirmed; no Confrontation Clause violation based on admission of 911 recording in caller’s absence. “The 911 caller, a manager at the Starbucks, told the dispatcher that a ‘gentleman that has just our left parking our parking lot. Uh, he just had a gun out on a previous gentleman.’ He stated further that there had been a ‘big commotion,’ and that both of the vehicles involved were still in the parking lot. As the caller was speaking to the 911 dispatcher, both vehicles exited the parking lot. The caller declined the dispatcher’s offer to send an officer to the scene or to file a report, explaining that he just wanted to report the incident and that he was just ‘making sure the pedestrians and everybody in the area is[sic] going to be safe.’ Although the confrontation had ended by the time the call was transferred to a dispatcher, the call was made while the incident was occurring as the caller explained. The caller’s concern was the safety of those in the area. We therefore hold that the 911 call was ‘made to avert a crime in progress or to seek assistance in a situation involving immediate danger,’ and not to establish ‘evidentiary facts or “bear[ ] testimony” against the defendant.’ Pitts v. State, 280 Ga. 288, 289–290, 627 S.E.2d 17 (2006); see also Thompson v. State, 291 Ga.App. 355, 358(2), 662 S.E.2d 135 (2008) (where caller advised she had been hit and perpetrator was in a different apartment, call was nontestimonial in light of caller’s need for medical attention and proximity of time between the call and the attack).”