☢ test - Í

Allen v. State, 296 Ga. 785, 770 S.E.2d 824 (March 27, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed. Recording of defendant’s custodial statement was played at trial, including officers’ statements that defendant’s “buddies” had already “dropped the name on you” and “somebody gave up your name.” No Confrontation Clause violation in admission of the statements, as “the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. [Cit.]’ Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177(IV) (n. 9) (541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177) (2004). And, the detectives' statements were clearly not meant to establish as true that others had implicated Allen, but were simply a part of an interrogation technique. See Rowe v. State, 276 Ga. 800, 803(2), 582 S.E.2d 119 (2003). … The detectives did not identify the ‘buddies’ mentioned, and no substance of any supposed statements was placed before the jury by the detectives' reference. Compare Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 551–552(2), 570 S.E.2d 269 (2002).” Harris v. State, 331 Ga.App. 32, 769 S.E.2d 749 (March 6, 2015). Conviction for aggravated child molestation affirmed. Trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting similar transaction evidence of prior victim’s testimonial statements to officer. Harmless, however, as the statements either didn’t implicate defendant or were cumulative of defendant’s guilty plea, which was properly admitted. Gordon v. State, 318 Ga.App. 767, 734 S.E.2d 777 (November 27, 2012). Aggravated battery and other convictions affirmed; no confrontation violation where officer testified to description of perpetrator relayed to him from dispatch. “The description provided to the officer by the eyewitness while police were in pursuit meets the ‘ongoing emergency’ test and was therefore ‘nontestimonial.’” Breedlove v. State, 291 Ga. 249, 728 S.E.2d 643 (June 18, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error “in admitting statements the victim made to a police investigator on the day she was murdered.” Victim here sought advice from detective about her relationship with defendant who “was becoming more and more angry and aggressive.” “[T]he victim was not reporting a crime to a policeman; she was not attempting to build a case against Breedlove; she was merely seeking advice from a knowledgeable friend, who happened to be a policeman, as to what she should do in a difficult situation. See Cuyuch v. State, 284 Ga. 290, 292, n. 8 (667 S.E.2d 85) (2008), citing Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism of the ‘Testimonial’ Statement Concept, 19 Regent U.L.Rev. 429 (2006–2007) (it is appropriate to focus on intent of declarant in determining whether statement is testimonial). The victim's statements were not made during the course of an ongoing investigation; they were not made with intent to prove past events pertaining to a subsequent criminal prosecution.” Adams v. State, 316 Ga.App. 1, 728 S.E.2d 260 (May 2, 2012). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; Confrontation Clause violation was cured by giving defendant opportunity to cross-examine declarant. Co-defendant pled guilty prior to trial and gave statement to State’s investigator, but then refused to testify at defendant’s trial. Trial court then admitted his prior statement over defendant’s objection. Later realizing the error, trial court allowed defendant to cross-examine the co- defendant, who denied making the statement. “[T]he trial court cured its error by permitting Adams to recall Williams as a witness and allowing Adams to cross-examine him. Indeed, when the declarant appears for cross- examination at trial, ‘the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of [his] prior testimonial statements.’ Lott v. State, 281 Ga.App. 373, 374(2) (636 S.E.2d 102) (2006) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59(IV) (124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177) (2004)). And given that Adams was afforded the opportunity to confront and cross- examine [co-defendant] Williams, and in doing so obtained testimony that contradicted the investigator's testimony, the trial court's error in initially admitting Williams's out-of-court statement was cured and, therefore, is not grounds for reversal. See Lott, 281 Ga.App. at 374–75(2) (holding that admission of witness's statement to police was not reversible error because State located witness the day after her statement was read into evidence, and she was made available for cross-examination by defendant).” Gandy v. State, 290 Ga. 166, 718 S.E.2d 287 (November 21, 2011). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; mistrial wasn’t required when defendant’s alleged alternate perpetrator was brought into the courtroom so the jury could see him and witness could identify him. Contrary to defendant’s argument, this wasn’t the equivalent of testimony by the alternate perpetrator (who subsequently took the Fifth). Based on Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598, 604(7) (340 S.E.2d 869) (1986) (jury view of alleged alternate perpetrator, who plead the Fifth Amendment, wasn’t error). Alvarez v. State, 312 Ga.App. 552, 718 S.E.2d 884 (November 15, 2011). Obstruction convictions affirmed; right to confrontation not violated by admission of hearsay, not to prove truth of matter asserted, but to show that officers “were