☢ test - Í

lawfully discharging their official duties.” “See Little v. State, 280 Ga.App. 60, 64(2) (633 S.E.2d 403) (2006) (‘The Confrontation Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. Any out-of-court statements alluded to by the officer at this juncture served the purpose of explaining how certain events came to pass or why the officers took the actions they did. Because the statements were not offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted, the Confrontation Clause does not apply.’) (punctuation and citation omitted).” Ardis v. State, 290 Ga. 58, 718 S.E.2d 526 (November 7, 2011). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial counsel’s representation was deficient for failing to object to admission of now-deceased victim’s statement to police. Victim “Langston died of unrelated causes prior to Ardis' trial. … Since Langston was interviewed by the police for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting the crimes that took place in the parking lot, his statement was clearly testimonial in nature. And because Langston was an unavailable witness and Ardis presumably had no prior opportunity to cross-examine him, admission of his statement into evidence violated the rule in Crawford. As such, trial counsel's failure to attempt to prevent the offending evidence from infecting the trial was deficient under the first prong of Strickland. ” No prejudice, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, including defendant’s own admission. Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 717 S.E.2d 179 (October 17, 2011). Son’s murder conviction affirmed, but mother’s conviction reversed; trial court erred in admitting evidence in violation of confrontation rights, but harmless as to son because evidence only implicated mother. Improper evidence: testimony of Florida judge allowed “to testify to the contents of three petitions for temporary protective injunctions that were filed in the Florida court in which he presided.” “These included [victim] Miranda's claims that [defendant mother] Tonya ‘threatens to kill me, threatens to stab me, beat me, [and] I'm in fear, great fear of my life.’” Not made harmless as to mother or merely cumulative by other admitted evidence: “the detail contained in the affidavits, the lengthy statements read to the jury by an officer of the court, and the fact that they were written by Miranda herself and not merely attributed to her make these statements highly prejudicial and of a different grade than the properly admitted evidence.” Bonilla v. State, 289 Ga. 862, 717 S.E.2d 166 (October 17, 2011). Murder and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; trial court properly allowed assault victim to testify that murder victim said “He got me,” when stabbed by defendant. Murder victim’s statement was not testimonial because it “was not made to an investigating police officer or even a 911 operator, but informally to bystanders as events were actually happening and just after he had suffered a serious stabbing. He was telling the bystanders what had occurred and seeking help, not making a statement in contemplation of its use at a later trial,” citing Davis (June 19, 2006) and Bryant (February 28, 2011), below. Philpot v. State, 309 Ga.App. 196, 709 S.E.2d 831 (March 22, 2011). Physical precedent only. Burglary and related convictions affirmed; similar transaction testimony didn’t violate defendant’s confrontation rights. Officer testified to out- of-court statements of prior victim, a few minutes after the burglary. While telling the officer what happened, the victim “looked out her window and exclaimed that the burglar (Philpot) was standing in the backyard of a home across the street,” causing officer to chase and arrest defendant. “Given our review of the record, we conclude that the prior victim's statements to the officer were primarily offered to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, and are therefore nontestimonial in nature.” Based on Michigan v. Bryant (February 28, 2011), below. “[W]hile the (at that time) unidentified burglar had already fled the scene of the prior victim's home by the time the officer arrived, it could have reasonably been presumed by both the prior victim and the officer that the burglar, who had just left the scene of the crime armed with a knife, was still in the immediate vicinity. Thus, while the prior victim was no longer being immediately threatened, similar to the situation in Bryant, the armed perpetrator was still on the loose, and thus continued to pose a serious potential threat to the prior victim and her neighbors. Indeed here, the police officer, unlike the officers in Bryant, had reason to believe that the armed perpetrator was still in the immediate area.” Barnes concurs in judgment only: “neither Bryant nor the present case should be construed as opening the floodgates for the admission of out-of-court statements by a victim or witness merely because the statements occurred at the scene of the crime or would fall within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (February 28, 2011). Michigan Supreme Court erred in reversing defendant’s murder conviction, holding that victim’s post-shooting statements to police were testimonial; “the circumstances of the interaction between [victim] Covington and the police objectively indicate that the ‘primary purpose of the interrogation’ was ‘to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’” Facts. Officers responded to 911 call at a convenience store and encountered victim, bleeding from a bullet wound which would prove fatal. Victim “appeared to be in great pain, and spoke with difficulty.” Officers asked questions like “what happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.” Victim said defendant shot him through the back door of defendant’s house.