☢ test - Í

confrontation] analysis to dying declarations. Walton v. State, 278 Ga. 432, 434(1) (603 S.E.2d 263) (2004).” 2. Victim’s statements were not, in any event, testimonial, as “the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Glover v. State, 285 Ga. 461, 462(2) (678 S.E.2d 476) (2009). That is precisely the situation in this case. Officer Gerjets responded to the emergency situation, found the fatally wounded victim, and asked her what happened in order to assess the exigencies; also, he wanted to keep the victim talking in order to keep her from losing consciousness before emergency responders arrived. The Confrontation Clause is not implicated. Id.” Snider v. State, 304 Ga.App. 64, 695 S.E.2d 383 (May 12, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation affirmed; no merit to defendant’s contention that he was entitled to confront child hearsay declarant at time out-of-court statements were made. “‘In this situation defendant was not denied the right of confrontation even though he was unable to confront [the child witness] when the statements were originally made. The right of confrontation is satisfied if the witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination,’” quoting Reynolds v. State, 257 Ga. 725, 726(3) (363 S.E.2d 249) (1988). Kimble v. State, 301 Ga.App. 237, 687 S.E.2d 242 (November 20, 2009). Admission of agent’s testimony as to informant’s statements violated defendant’s confrontation rights, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “Agent Delatorre was permitted to offer numerous out-of-court statements of his first informant and [second informant] Jones implicating [co-defendant] Loury as a source for drugs. Further, on cross-examination, Loury's counsel elicited Agent Delatorre's testimony that, ‘I was told we were calling Roy Loury.’ We agree that Agent Delatorre's testimony regarding what Jones or his other informant told him constituted inadmissible hearsay and reject the State's argument that Agent Delatorre's testimony was admissible as original evidence explaining law enforcement's motives and conduct under OCGA § 24-3-2. See Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 36-37(2) (549 S.E.2d 107) (2001); Render v. State, 267 Ga. 848, 849(2) (483 S.E.2d 570) (1997). We also agree with Loury that admission of Jones' out-of-court custodial statements violated Loury's rights under the confrontation clause. See Gay v. State, 279 Ga. 180, 181-182(2) (611 S.E.2d 31) (2005).” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (June 25, 2009). Reversing Massachusetts Court of Appeals, a 5-4 majority finds that crime lab analyst’s certificates of drug test results was improperly admitted into evidence in violation of defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford . “The certificates reported the weight of the seized bags and stated that the bags ‘[h]a[ve] been examined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’” “[T]he certificates were admitted [over objection] pursuant to state law as ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the narcotic ... analyzed.’” “The documents at issue here, while denominated by Massachusetts law ‘certificates,’ are quite plainly affidavits: ‘declaration[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.’ Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed., 2004). They are incontrovertibly a ‘“solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”’ Crawford, supra, at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The fact in question is that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-Diaz and his codefendants was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine – the precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. The ‘certificates’ are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (emphasis deleted).” Note, “we do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case.” Majority rejects a number of arguments from defendant and from dissent (Kennedy, writing for Roberts, Breyer and Alito): that the lab analysts here are not “accusatory” witnesses; that they are not “conventional” or “typical” witnesses; that scientific evidence does not implicate the Confrontation Clause; that the certificates here are admissible at common law as business records; that the defendant could have subpoenaed the witness if he wanted; and finally, that the “necessities of trial” warrant relaxing the requirements of the Confrontation Clause in this instance. Cites a Georgia case, Miller v. State , 266 Ga. 850, 854-855, 472 S.E.2d 74, 78-79 (1996), and a Georgia statute, OCGA § 35-3-154.1, among other state authority, as examples of a constitutionally-permissible approach to the practical logistical challenge of presenting lab witnesses live at trial, one “requiring the defendant to give early notice of his intent to confront the analyst.” Majority rejects dissent contention that this is “burden-shifting”: “It is common to require a defendant to exercise his rights under the Compulsory Process Clause in advance of trial, announcing his intent to present certain witnesses. [Cits.] There is no conceivable reason why he cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his Confrontation Clause rights before trial.” Glover v. State, 285 Ga. 461, 678 S.E.2d 476 (June 1, 2009). Calls to 911 reporting murder were non-testimonial where “the calls were made while the incident was still ongoing, the perpetrator was at large, and the nature of the operator's