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questions were to assist the police in meeting an ongoing emergency.” Soto v. State, 285 Ga. 367, 677 S.E.2d 95 (May 4, 2009). Co-defendant Wiedeman began testifying for State after pleading guilty. At first, co-defendant’s testimony exonerated defendant of participation in the murder. “Suddenly, in the midst of further questioning by the State, Wiedeman announced that he would not answer any questions. He also refused to answer questions posed by the defense. He continued to refuse to answer questions even after the trial court ordered him to do so and threatened to hold him in contempt. Later, the State was allowed to impeach Wiedeman through the testimony of a police officer and a fellow prisoner by introducing hearsay statements Wiedeman gave to those individuals.” Held, trial court erred in admitting Wiedeman’s hearsay statements, but error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “ Generally, when a witness refuses to continue to testify after having already done so, the proper remedy is to strike pertinent portions of the witness' testimony. As it is said: “[W]hen a witness declines to answer on cross-examination certain pertinent questions relevant to a matter testified about by the witness on direct examination, all of the witness' testimony on the same subject matter should be stricken.” Smith v. State, 225 Ga. 328, 331 (168 S.E.2d 587) (1969). Thus, in this case, once Wiedeman refused to testify further about his and Soto's conduct on the night of the murder, the trial court would have been well advised to strike Wiedeman's testimony. However, neither party sought that remedy and the trial court was presented with only two alternatives: it could refuse to allow the State to impeach Wiedeman with his prior inconsistent statements or it could allow impeachment at the risk of impinging upon Soto's right of confrontation. Because it chose the latter course, we are faced with a difficult question: When, on direct examination, a witness gives testimony that exonerates a defendant, can the State introduce contradictory out-of-court statements to impeach him, when the statements inculpate the defendant and the witness refuses to answer further questions posed by either the State or the defendant?” As to statement to police: the statement was clearly testimonial, and defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Admission of the statement thus violated defendant’s right to confront the witness. As to statement to fellow prisoner: not admissible as prior inconsistent statement for impeachment, because no opportunity for cross-examination, citing Barksdale v. State, 265 Ga. 9 (453 S.E.2d 2) (1995); not admissible under necessity exception because no guarantees of trustworthiness, as “the out-of-court statements of an accomplice are inherently unreliable. See Barksdale, supra at 12, n. 3.” Distinguishing Wilson v. State, 277 Ga. 114 (587 S.E.2d 9) (2003), where the witness denied making the prior inconsistent statement. In this case, to the contrary, Wiedeman was not asked, and he did not say, whether he made a prior statement to the prisoner.” Accord, Grindle v. State , 299 Ga.App. 412, 683 S.E.2d 72 (July 27, 2009) (out-of- court statements of accomplice are inherently unreliable, citing Soto ). Stegall v. State, 297 Ga.App. 425, 677 S.E.2d 441 (April 9, 2009). No confrontation violation where victim’s out-of- court statements were admitted under Child Hearsay Act; witness was not “unavailable” although “she refused to answer questions from either the prosecutor or from defense counsel.” “ Bright [ v. State, 197 Ga.App. 784, 785(4) (400 S.E.2d 18) (1990)] explicitly held that the availability requirement of OCGA § 24-3-16 is met whenever the victim takes the stand, even if the victim ‘is uncommunicative or unresponsive.’ Supra , 197 Ga.App. at 785(4).” “This Court has … expressly rejected Stegall's argument that this interpretation of the availability requirement of OCGA § 24-3-16 violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against her. ‘So long as the witness is made available for confrontation and cross-examination, the defendant's rights are protected,’ ( McGarity v. State, 212 Ga.App. 17, 21(4) (440 S.E.2d 695) (1994)) (punctuation omitted), and ‘[a] defendant is not denied the right to a thorough and sifting cross- examination when the witness appears to answer as well as he or she is capable of answering.’ Bright, supra, 197 Ga.App. at 786(4).” Appears to be invalid in light of Soto (May 4, 2009), above (witness’s refusal to answer questions meant that defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine; admission of prior statements thus violated defendant’s confrontation rights). Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 57, 673 S.E.2d 249 (February 23, 2009). At defendant’s trial for murder of his five-year old stepdaughter, trial court erred in admitting evidence of victim’s statement to police officer regarding a prior injury. Officer responded to a call regarding a domestic disturbance and found the child holding an ice pack to her face. “The officer … testified that when she asked the victim what happened, the victim, who was three or four at the time, repeatedly said ‘Daddy did it.’” “[H]ere the child's words were statements in response to a question by law enforcement after the emergency had already ended and were reflective of past events and, as such, were testimonial in nature.” Harmless error, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Martin v. State, 284 Ga. 504, 668 S.E.2d 685 (October 27, 2008). Defendant pled guilty to rape of one victim and murder of her family members. Rape victim testified at sentencing phase trial (State was seeking death penalty). Defendant was later allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas. As rape victim was deceased at time of retrial, State was allowed to present her