☢ test - Í

testimony from defendant’s prior sentencing trial at guilt-innocence phase of retrial. Held, no violation of Confrontation Clause or Georgia’s statutory hearsay exception for prior testimony; defendant was able to cross-examine victim at prior trial, and the “parties and issues” at the two trials were “substantially similar,” notwithstanding that one was penalty phase and the other was guilt-innocence phase. Based on “OCGA § 24-3-10, the ‘prior testimony’ exception to the hearsay rule.” “‘(The rule) does not require that all the issues ... in the two proceedings must be the same, but at most that the issue on which the testimony was offered in the first suit must be the same as the issue upon which it is offered in the second. Additional issues or differences in regard to issues upon which the former testimony is not offered are of no consequence. Moreover, insistence upon precise identity of issues ... [is] out of place with respect to former testimony where the question is ... merely ... the salvaging, for what it may be worth, of the testimony of a witness not now available in person.’ [Cit.] Prater [ v. State, 148 Ga.App. 831, 837-838(5)(A)(2) (253 S.E.2d 223) (1979)] (holding that prior testimony from a commitment hearing and an extradition hearing in Tennessee was admissible at defendant's burglary and armed robbery trial).” Analogized to “ Hosick v. State, 262 Ga. 432(4) (421 S.E.2d 65) (1992) (preliminary hearing testimony); Littles v. Balkcom, 245 Ga. 285(3) (264 S.E.2d 219) (1980) (commitment hearing testimony); Robinson v. State, 68 Ga. 833 (1882) (committing trial testimony).” Distinguished from Craft v. State, 154 Ga.App. 682(1) (269 S.E.2d 490) (1980) (“prior testimony from a defendant's bond hearing … held inadmissible at the trial of the case”). Contrary to defendant’s assertion, victim’s sentencing-phase testimony did present him the opportunity to cross- examine her “regarding issues of his culpability or [victim’s] credibility.” “[A]s this Court has repeatedly noted, evidence relating to guilt or innocence is relevant to sentence and, thus, admissible, in a sentencing trial, ‘not because the validity of the conviction is at issue, but because the [fact-finder] needs to examine the circumstances of the offense[s] (as well as any aspect of the defendant's character or prior record) in order to decide intelligently the question of punishment. [Cits.]’ Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206, 210(8) (327 S.E.2d 168) (1985). See also Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521(3) (350 S.E.2d 446) (1986); Blankenship v. State, 251 Ga. 621 (308 S.E.2d 369) (1983). Indeed, such evidence was particularly important at Martin's sentencing trial where the trial judge, as the fact-finder, heard for the first time evidence relating to the circumstances of the offenses. See Romine, supra, 256 Ga. at 528(3). Martin's guilty plea to all counts of the indictment did not relieve the State of its burden, before a death sentence could be imposed, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance alleged in its notice of intent to seek the death penalty. OCGA § 17-10-30(c); Green v. State, 246 Ga. 598(10) (272 S.E.2d 475) (1980). In Martin's case, several of the statutory aggravating circumstances contended by the State are also offenses with which Martin is charged and will be tried at his guilt/innocence trial .” “The fact that defense counsel did not extensively cross-examine her does not establish that he did not have an adequate opportunity to do so. Thus, we conclude that, in this case, the issue of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the alleged statutory aggravating circumstances is substantially the same, for section 24-3-10 purposes, as the issue of ultimate proof of guilt and, therefore, that the sentencing trial provided Martin a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Wright. See Prater, supra, 148 Ga.App. at 838(5)(A)(2)(a).” For the same reasons, no Crawford violation. Distinguished, Silverio v. State , 306 Ga.App. 438, 702 S.E.2d 717 (October 13, 2010) (defendant couldn’t use co-defendant’s sworn statements from guilty plea hearing, as parties and issues weren’t substantially similar; State had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the issues relevant to defendant’s trial). Accord, Thomas v. State , 290 Ga. 653, 723 S.E.2d 885 (March 5, 2012) (no confrontation violation in use at trial of missing witness’s testimony from preliminary hearing). Cuyuch v. State, 284 Ga. 290, 667 S.E.2d 85 (September 22, 2008). Reversing Court of Appeals at 286 Ga.App. 629, 649 S.E.2d 856, unanimous Supreme Court holds that trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses in violation of defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights. Officer was approached on street by victim, Pasqual, who was bleeding heavily from a cut on his arm. Pasqual said his roommate had cut him at their residence, 300 feet away, and that the roommate was still at the residence. Second officer, Lummus, went to residence; en route, he met witness Lorenzo, who was “standing on the side of the road yelling that his friend needed help.” Lorenzo took second officer to defendant’s residence, where no emergency appeared to be in progress; officer testified that “whatever happened had already happened prior to [his] arrival.” Defendant and another person were sitting calmly on the sofa. Through a translator, Lorenzo told second officer that defendant had cut Pasqual, who had been badly cut and needed help. Lorenzo showed the officer where defendant had thrown the knife. Pasqual was brought to the scene and identified defendant as the person who cut him. Neither Pasqual nor Lorenzo could be located to testify at trial, so the officers were allowed to testify to the statements made by Pasqual and Lorenzo. Held, while Pascual’s initial report that he had been cut by defendant may have been made to enable officer “to meet an ongoing emergency,” his later identification of defendant “was to establish past facts with a view to a future prosecution,” and thus was testimonial. As to Lorenzo, “we acknowledge that it is possible that Sergeant Lummus thought he was dealing with a crime victim other than Pasqual at the residence and thus thought he might be dealing with an ongoing emergency. However, as Davis [June 19, 2006, below] counsels, ‘it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's