☢ test - Í

Thompson v. State, 291 Ga.App. 355, 662 S.E.2d 135 (April 18, 2008). Battery and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly admitted victim’s 911 call, which was non-testimonial in these circumstances. “Here, the caller advised that she had been hit, had a swollen face, and was experiencing serious bleeding. Although she did advise of the perpetrator’s location in a different apartment, her call was made with such immediacy after the attack that, upon the officer's arrival, Pope was scared and crying, and blood was running down her chin, shirt, and pants. In light of the caller’s immediate need for medical attention and the proximity in time between the call and the attack, we hold that the trial court did not err in ruling that the call was nontestimonial in nature, in that it was made to seek assistance in a situation involving immediate danger. And although admissibility is not otherwise contested on appeal, we discern no clear error in admitting the contents of the call under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. See [ Pitts v. State, 280 Ga. 288, 291 (627 S.E.2d 17) (2006)]; Christensen v. State, 245 Ga.App. 165, 168(4) (537 S.E.2d 446) (2000) (no clear error where trial court ruled that victim’s statement made while still bleeding 18 minutes after incident was res gestae).” Accord, Owens v. State , 329 Ga.App. 455, 765 S.E.2d 653 (November 3, 2014) (“both of the victim's calls to 911 were made to seek assistance in the course of a situation involving immediate danger to him.”). Hester v. State, 293 Ga. 367, 659 S.E.2d 600 (March 31, 2008). Murder victim’s statements to police were not testimonial. “The evidence shows that [victim] Ms. Parris was on the floor, was moaning, and had apparently lost a large amount of blood. ‘[A]ny reasonable listener would recognize that [she] was facing an ongoing emergency.’ Davis v. Washington (June 19, 2006), below , at (III)(A). Officer Kaufman had the responsibility of securing the area within minutes of the occurrence of a serious injury. Fulfilling that responsibility would logically involve an attempt to determine every possible cause of injury to persons in the area, so that any continuation or repetition of that cause could be prevented. Thus, the statement which the police officer elicited from Ms. Parris was ‘necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford ) what had happened in the past.’ (Emphasis in original.) Davis v. Washington, supra at (III)(A). Furthermore, the interrogation was strikingly informal and brief, in an environment which was neither tranquil nor clearly safe. Davis v. Washington, supra at (III)(A). Therefore, we conclude that the circumstances of Officer Kaufman’s interrogation of Ms. Parris ‘objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She simply was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying. ’ (Emphasis in original.) Davis v. Washington, supra at (III)(A).” Ware v. State, 289 Ga.App. 860, 658 S.E.2d 441 (February 29, 2008). Physical precedent only ; Crawford doesn’t apply to probation revocation hearings. Adopts reasoning of Williams v. Lawrence, 273 Ga. 295, 296 (540 S.E.2d 599) (2001), “a case involving a parole revocation proceeding:” “‘Although the habeas court referred to the “constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,” [defendant] clearly has no Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The same minimum constitutional due process requirements apply in both probation and parole revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656) (1973); State v. Brinson, 248 Ga. 380(1) (283 S.E.2d 463) (1981); Smith v. State, 171 Ga.App. 279, 281 (319 S.E.2d 113) (1984). As Morrissey [ v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 (92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484) (1972)] and Gagnon make clear, the due process right to confrontation at a parole revocation hearing is less stringent than the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation guarantee in a criminal trial. Evidence that would violate the Sixth Amendment or would be inadmissible hearsay if presented at a criminal trial may, in proper circumstances, be considered at a parole or probation revocation hearing without violating the due process right to confrontation. State of Missouri ex rel. Mack v. Purkett, 825 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Mo., 1992).’ (Emphasis added.) Williams, 273 Ga. at 298. Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that the Confrontation Clause did not require the exclusion of the testimony at issue . However, we do not believe that the trial court went far enough in considering whether the evidence was in fact admissible. Although the due process right to confrontation at a probation or parole revocation hearing may be ‘less stringent than the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation guarantee’ the ‘“minimum requirements of due process” include .... the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses ( unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation ).’ (Emphasis added.) Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656) (1973), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484) (1972).” Trial court here failed to consider whether good cause existed here. Court of Appeals finds, however, that remand is unnecessary – even if evidence was admissible, it didn’t support defendant’s probation revocation. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (February 20, 2008). Notwithstanding Whorton v. Bockting (February 28, 2007), below , States are free to apply Crawford retroactively to cases already final on direct review; Whorton only holds that they are not required to do so. But Georgia will not, Perkins v. Hall , 288 Ga. 810, 708 S.E.2d 335 (March 18, 2011) (no retroactive application of Crawford for case “no longer in the ‘pipeline’ of trial and