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direct review,” such as this capital murder habeas review, citing Whorton .). Davis v. State, 289 Ga.App. 526, 657 S.E.2d 609 (February 7, 2008). Burglary conviction reversed. Victim’s identification of defendant at scene was testimonial; where victim died before trial, its admission through officer violated Crawford . Key v. State, 289 Ga.App. 317, 657 S.E.2d 273 (January 25, 2008). No Crawford violation where trial court admitted 911 recording of concerned citizen following drunk driver for several minutes. “The Supreme Court of Georgia has held ‘that the determination of whether the recording of a 911 phone call is testimonial should be made on a case-by-case basis.’ Pitts v. State, 280 Ga. 288, 289 (627 S.E.2d 17) (2006). If the primary purpose of the 911 call ‘is to establish evidentiary facts, so that an objective person would recognize that the statement would be used in a future prosecution, then that phone call “bears testimony” against the accused and implicates the concerns of the Confrontation Clause.’ Id. Where, however, the caller’s primary purpose is ‘to avert a crime in progress or to seek assistance in a situation involving immediate danger, then the statements made during the phone call are not testimonial.’ Id. Even where a statement made on a 911 call ‘come[s] close to providing testimonial evidence,’ the court must consider whether the primary purpose of the call remained the prevention of immediate harm to the caller or others. See id. at 291 (holding statement that defendant was ‘wanted’ for violating his parole was made to illustrate the danger of the situation, and the primary purpose of the call remained the prevention of immediate harm to the caller). Here, the primary purpose of Jones’ 911 call was to prevent immediate harm to the public, not to establish evidentiary facts for a future prosecution against Key. In calling 911, Jones repeatedly made clear that he believed that the driver of the SUV was ‘going to cause an accident’ or was ‘going to hurt somebody.’ His purpose did not become testimonial based on his assertions that the driver of the SUV was ‘drunk.’” Thomas v. State, 288 Ga.App. 602, 654 S.E.2d 682 (November 28, 2007). No Crawford violation upon admission of victim’s statements to medical personnel in county jail for purposes of medical treatment, even though police were present. Gifford v. State, 287 Ga.App. 725, 652 S.E.2d 610 (October 2, 2007). Store clerk’s statements to police immediately after armed robbery were testimonial; trial court erred in admitting officer’s testimony relating those statements where clerk died before trial. Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 651 S.E.2d 66 (September 24, 2007). Defendant was tried and convicted of murdering Taylor after Taylor testified against defendant in defendant’s trial for murdering Barnes. (Defendant’s conviction for murder of Barnes was overturned on appeal.) At the trial for Taylor’s murder, the prosecutor from the first trial was allowed to testify to statements Taylor made to him outside court. Held, victim’s statements to the assistant district attorney were testimonial and inadmissible under Crawford . Delgado v. State, 287 Ga.App. 273, 651 S.E.2d 201 (August 16, 2007). Child molestation victim’s testimony about statements made to her by defendant’s wife and daughter violated Crawford. Trial court erred where it admitted taped statement of child molestation victim, repeating statements she attributed to defendant’s wife and daughter, made immediately after the molestation. “The declarants were under subpoena but failed to appear for trial.” “We recognize that the statements of the absent declarants in the case at bar were made to the victim, not to the investigator who interviewed the victim. Compare Brawner v. State, 278 Ga. 316, 318(2) (602 S.E.2d 612) (2004) (missing declarant’s statement to detective held ‘testimonial’ hearsay). But they were relayed by the victim on an audiotape made in the context of a formal investigation. The audiotape was created under ‘circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe’ that any and all statements contained therein would be available for use at a later trial. Even if it could be said that the declarants were unavailable for trial, Delgado did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. Accordingly, Delgado’s constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of the statements of his wife and daughter through the audiotaped interview of the victim. [Cit.]” Harmless error, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. This is not consistent with Crawford; victim’s statement is testimonial, but admissible because she in fact testified. The other declarants’ statements are not testimonial, because made to victim, not to police, and are otherwise admissible as part of res gestae. Jennings v. State, 285 Ga.App. 774, 648 S.E.2d 105 (June 11, 2007). Female robbery victim did her own investigation and was told that defendant was her assailant. She gave the information to male victim, who gave it to police. At trial, defendant objected to male victim’s testimony as to how he obtained defendant’s name, contending that the testimony