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constituted a Crawford violation. Held, trial court correctly overruled defendant’s objection. “The jury did not hear any details regarding the alleged hearsay; instead, [male victim] Jones merely testified that he got the name Marcus Jennings and supplied it to police. … Here, neither witness actually repeated any alleged hearsay regarding Jennings as the perpetrator. See Little v. State, 280 Ga.App. 60, 63(2) (633 S.E.2d 403) (2006). Instead, Jones and the detective simply testified that Jones provided Jennings’s name to the authorities. Thus, the evidence ‘did not create a credibility problem that could only be cured by cross-examination of the [witness].’ See id. As the trial court explained in its ruling, the State did not offer the evidence to establish the truth of the matter; rather, it was offered for the limited purpose of explaining why the police included Jennings’s photograph in the line-up. The Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.’ Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59(IV), n. 9. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not violate Jennings’s right to confront and cross- examine a witness by admitting the testimony of Jones and the detective.” Taylor v. State, 285 Ga.App. 697, 647 S.E.2d 381 (June 6, 2007). 1. Crawford violation was harmless error. “‘Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case,’” quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682-684 (106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674) (1986). “The substance of [absent co-indictee] Scurry’s statement was cumulative of Taylor’s own testimony and contained nothing which contradicted Taylor’s defense. It follows that the statement’s importance as part of the State’s case was minimal, and there was little if any potential that cross-examination of Scurry would have damaged the State’s case. On these facts, we find that the error in admitting Scurry’s hearsay statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. State, 280 Ga. 560 (629 S.E.2d 220) (2006).” 2. “Because the decision in Crawford was rendered after Taylor’s trial concluded but while Taylor’s case was in the so-called ‘pipeline’ – not yet final or still on direct review – Crawford applies retroactively in the present appeal. Taylor v. State, 262 Ga. 584, 586 (422 S.E.2d 430) (1992); Gay v. State, 279 Ga. 180, 182, n. 2 (611 S.E.2d 31) (2005).” Accord, Jackson v. State , 291 Ga. 22, 727 S.E.2d 106 (April 24, 2012). 3. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise Crawford issue where trial took place before Crawford was decided by U.S. Supreme Court. “In making litigation decisions, trial counsel has no general duty to anticipate changes in the law, and the reasonableness of trial counsel’s conduct is examined from counsel’s perspective at the time of trial. [Cit.]” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (February 28, 2007). Crawford rule cannot be applied retroactively by federal courts to cases “already final on direct review,” using the rules set out in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). States are free to apply greater retroactivity than called for by Teague – see Danforth (February 20, 2008), above. Accord, Perkins v. Hall , 288 Ga. 810, 708 S.E.2d 335 (March 18, 2011) (no retroactive application of Crawford for case “no longer in the ‘pipeline’ of trial and direct review,” such as this capital murder habeas review, citing Whorton .). Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 647, 641 S.E.2d 527 (February 26, 2007). Murder victim was a police officer; his statements to his fellow officers were not made in course of a criminal investigation when he told his friends that “that he would not commit suicide and that his wife would probably have something to do with it if he died. The fact that Glenn worked as a police officer does not automatically convert any statement made to his colleagues into a testimonial statement, as the nature of Glenn’s profession does not inherently change the nature of his statements.” Fields v. State, 283 Ga.App. 208, 641 S.E.2d 218 (January 5, 2007). Immediately after armed robbery, Subway restaurant employee ran next door and told Dunkin Donuts manager what had happened. Manager called police. At trial, manager was allowed to testify to Subway employee’s statements. Held, manager’s testimony was admissible as excited utterance/res gestae. Admission of this evidence did not violate Crawford . The statements “were not made to a police officer during a subsequent investigation of the crime, nor were they made to an officer or 911 operator for the purpose of proving a fact regarding some past event. Accordingly, the statements at issue here were not testimonial in nature, and Crawford does not apply to them.” Accord, Anderson v. State , 286 Ga. 57, 685 S.E.2d 716 (November 2, 2009) (statement was not testimonial where made to someone other than “government officers in production of testimonial evidence” – here, another witness to the shooting). Jordan v. State, 283 Ga.App. 85, 640 S.E.2d 672 (December 15, 2006). Confrontation clause objection cannot be made for the first time at motion for new trial. “Constitutional objections must be specifically asserted before the entry of a verdict in order to be preserved for appeal. ... Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 70(2) (608 S.E.2d 602) (2005) (constitutional