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verdict. Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 557-558(3), 570 S.E.2d 269 (2002).” Statement was cumulative, barely audible, and did not directly accuse defendant of crime. Accord, Humphrey v. State , 281 Ga. 596, 642 S.E.2d 23 (February 5, 2007) ( Crawford violation harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt). Gonzalez v. State, 277 Ga.App. 362, 626 S.E.2d 569 (January 25, 2006). Statement to friend of victim was not testimonial. Accord with Demons (March 29, 2004), below. Accord, Fields (January 5, 2007), above (statement to bystander immediately after robbery not testimonial). Copprue v. State, 279 Ga. 771, 621 S.E.2d 457 (October 24, 2005). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Admission of videotaped statement of unavailable witness, given to police during investigation, was clear Crawford violation, but harmless error because cumulative. Accord, Stovall v. State , 287 Ga. 415, 696 S.E.2d 633 (June 28, 2010). Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 731, 620 S.E.2d 816 (October 11, 2005). 1. At defendant’s murder trial, officer testified that he met victim about a year before her murder; officer was responding to victim’s call for help in removing defendant from her residence. Held, victim’s statements to officer at that time should have been excluded under Crawford as testimonial in nature; however, this evidence was cumulative and “did not go to the core issue in this case,” and thus its admission was harmless error. 2. Same officer testified that thereafter, up to the time of victim’s death, victim “would either call him or they would run into each other in public places and talk. On these occasions, they discussed various topics, including, in some detail, her relationship with [defendant]. [Officer] felt [victim] needed to talk to someone about the relationship, and she regularly confided in him. [Victim] told [officer] that [defendant] had become more abusive over time and that she no longer cared for him because of the abuse.” Held, these statements were not excluded by Crawford because they “were made to [officer] not in the course of an investigation but during social conversations between [victim] and [officer].” Rackoff v. State, 275 Ga.App. 737, 621 S.E.2d 841 (October 5, 2005). DUI conviction affirmed. Intoxilyzer inspection certificates are admissible as business records without the testimony of the technician who prepared them; the Supreme Court decision so holding, Brown v. State , 268 Ga. 76, 485 S.E.2d 486 (1997), remains good law despite Crawford v. Washington . “In Brown, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a certificate of inspection is simply a record made in the regular course of business. Brown, 268 Ga. at 78. See also Jackson v. State, 233 Ga.App. 568, 570(2) (504 S.E.2d 505) (1998). The Court also concluded (i) that the certificates’ primary purpose was to ensure the testing machines’ accuracy, (ii) that the certificates were factual statements and not opinions, (iii) that the certificates were not prepared in response to litigation against any particular individual, and (iv) that ‘the witness against the defendant, the source of the crucial and incriminating evidence, is not the analyst, but the machine itself.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted.) 268 Ga. at 79. Considering Brown’s conclusion that the certificates prepared under OCGA § 40-6-392(f) are records which are routinely maintained and promulgated and which are not made in anticipation of prosecution against any particular defendant, see id. at 80, we hold that the inspection certificate at issue here was not ‘testimonial’ hearsay under Crawford. It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the certificate. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (with respect to nontestimonial hearsay, it is consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the states flexibility in their development of hearsay law).” Accord, Pierce v. State , 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235 (March 10, 2006); Braswell v. State , 281 Ga.App. 500, 636 S.E.2d 689 (September 7, 2006); Phillips v. State , 289 Ga.App. 281, 656 S.E.2d 905 (January 24, 2008). Affirmed , Rackoff v. State , 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E.2d 706 (November 20, 2006). Miller v. State, 273 Ga.App. 761, 615 S.E.2d 843 (June 20, 2005). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Defendant’s wife gave statement to officer responding to domestic disturbance call. At trial, she was unavailable because she lived out of state, so officer was allowed to testify to her statement. Held, officer’s testimony about wife’s statement was clear Crawford violation, as defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine her. Harmless, however, as to those offenses defendant admitted to in his testimony. “[A]lthough Miller contends that he beat his wife in self-defense, the jury was authorized to disbelieve him based on the extent of [wife’s] injuries as shown in the photographs taken at the scene.” As to those offenses denied by defendant, the error was not harmless, as “[wife’s] hearsay testimony was the only real evidence of Miller’s guilt.” Roby v. State, 273 Ga.App. 308, 614 S.E.2d 916 (May 18, 2005). Obstruction conviction affirmed. Officers arrived at defendant’s home looking for Sibert, for whom they had an arrest warrant. Defendant claimed that Sibert wasn’t there, but officers found him and charged defendant with obstruction. “Sibert asked the officers why they were arresting Roby; the officers told him that Roby had obstructed his arrest. The officer then testified, over objection, that Sibert said ‘he wasn’t sure why [the officers] weren’t allowed to come in and why [Roby] would say that he wasn't there because she was