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aware of the fact of his presence in the apartment.’” “Roby … contends the statement should have been excluded because she could not confront Sibert and subject his statements to cross-examination as is her right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See [ Crawford ]. This argument fails because Sibert’s statement was not ‘testimonial.’ That is, the statement, when made, was not offered for the purpose of establishing a fact in a police investigation. See Pitts v. State, 272 Ga.App. 182, 612 S.E.2d 1 (January 24, 2005). Sibert made his spontaneous statement almost immediately after Roby’s obstructing conduct, during Roby’s arrest, and without any questioning, prompting, or investigating by the police. In fact, no ‘investigation’ was conducted; Roby’s arrest was made based upon conduct the police themselves witnessed.” Pitts v. State, 272 Ga.App. 182, 612 S.E.2d 1 (January 24, 2005). False imprisonment and related convictions affirmed. Wife-victim called 911 when husband-defendant came to her house in violation of protective order and refused to leave. She made statements to officers on scene. At trial, she invoked marital privilege. Held, her statements to 911 operator were properly admissible under the unavailable witness exception, but her statements to officers on the scene should have been excluded. “We hold that the statements the victim made to deputies after they arrived on the scene and arrested Pitts are testimonial since the statements resulted from police questioning during the investigation of a crime. [Cit.] At the time these statements were made, Pitts had already been handcuffed, taken outside, and placed in a patrol car. The victim made statements to government officials which a person would reasonably believe would be available for use at a later trial. [Cit.] Therefore, under Crawford, we are constrained to hold that the admission of these statements at trial infringed upon Pitts’ constitutional right to confront the witness against him since he had not had a prior opportunity to cross- examine the declarant about the contents of the hearsay statements. [Cit.] The 911 calls, however, do not come within the ambit of Crawford . Here, the caller’s statements were made while the incident was actually in progress. The statements were not made for the purpose of establishing or proving a fact regarding some past event, but for the purpose of preventing or stopping a crime as it was actually occurring. The caller was requesting that police come to her home to remove Pitts, who she said had broken into her house. The statements made during the 911 calls were made without premeditation or afterthought. Accordingly, the 911 tape was not testimonial. ‘Where non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law.’ [Cit.] Under Georgia law, the 911 statements were admissible as part of the res gestae or as an excited utterance. [Cit.] We find no error in the admission of the 911 tape.” Affirmed, 280 Ga. 288, 627 S.E.2d 17 (February 27, 2006). Accord, Davis v. Washington (June 19, 2006), above; Thompson (April 18, 2008), above. Henry v. State, 278 Ga. 554, 604 S.E.2d 469 (October 25, 2004). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. “Testimony of [victim’s] mother regarding the victim’s statement the day before the murder that she was ‘tired of this. … I’m going to stay with my sister,’ was properly admitted because the statements evidence a sufficient indicia of trustworthiness as they were made by the unavailable witness to one in whom the declarant placed great confidence and to whom the declarant turned for help with problems. Roper v. State, 263 Ga. 201(2), 429 S.E.2d 668 (1993).” On the other hand, testimony of police officer about statements made by murder victim concerning prior difficulties with defendant were inadmissible under Crawford but harmless error. Accord, Griffin v. State , 280 Ga. 683, 631 S.E.2d 671 (June 26, 2006) (statement to close friend not “testimonial”); Miller v. State , 289 Ga. 854, 717 S.E.2d 179 (October 17, 2011) (statements to friend not testimonial). Ross v. State, 278 Ga. 429, 603 S.E.2d 268 (September 27, 2004). Malice murder conviction affirmed. Playing of videotape of deceased witness’s statement to police clearly violated Crawford where defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine witness, but error harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Walton v. State, 278 Ga. 432, 603 S.E.2d 263 (September 27, 2004). Malice murder and firearms convictions affirmed. Hearsay objection is not sufficient to raise Crawford /Confrontation Clause challenge. “There is a distinct difference between a challenge to the admission of evidence based upon the Confrontation Clause and that based upon an exception to the hearsay rule. Yancey v. State, 275 Ga. 550, 551-557(2) (570 S.E.2d 269) (2002). ‘Although the rules concerning the Confrontation Clause and hearsay evidence generally protect similar values, they do not always prohibit the same evidence. The Confrontation Clause may bar the admission of some evidence that would be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. “The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.”’ Id. at 557(3).” Accord, Verlangieri v. State , 273 Ga.App. 585, 615 S.E.2d 633 (June 9, 2005); Cranford v. State , 275 Ga.App. 474, 621 S.E.2d 470 (August 24, 2005); Patterson v. State , 280 Ga. 132, 625 S.E.2d 395 (January 17, 2006); Roberson v. State , 277 Ga.App. 557, 627 S.E.2d 161 (February 9, 2006); Estes v. State , 279 Ga.App. 394, 631 S.E.2d 438 (May 15, 2006); Lopez v. State , 281 Ga.App. 623, 636 S.E.2d 770 (September 20, 2006); Humphrey v. State , 281 Ga. 596, 642 S.E.2d 23