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refusal to answer certain questions or ‘would offer testimony in explanation of his [prior trial testimony] or in exculpation of [Green].’ [ Hawkins v. State, 175 Ga.App. 606, 610(2) (333 S.E.2d 870) (1985)]. Under these circumstances, Green ‘was not denied the right of confrontation, he simply did not exercise it,’ and he has waived any objection he may have had on confrontation clause grounds. Id. See Sherrell v. State, 274 Ga. 431, 432(3) (554 S.E.2d 726) (2001); Lively [ v. State, 237 Ga. 35, 36 (226 S.E.2d 581) (1976)]; Lott v. State, 281 Ga.App. 373, 374-375(2) (636 S.E.2d 102) (2006). In some instances, the failure to cross-examine may not waive a confrontation clause claim because it is clear from the record that an attempt at cross-examination would have been futile. See Horne [ v. State, 281 Ga. 799, 806-807(5) (642 S.E.2d 659) (2007)] (defense counsel declined to attempt cross-examination after witness refused to utter any response to 117 questions posed by the state); Lawrence [ v. State, 257 Ga. 423, 424(3) (360 S.E.2d 716) (1987)] (defendant declined to attempt cross-examination after witness invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to answer all of the questions posed by the state on direct examination). That is not the case here, where Robinson refused to answer some but not all of the questions posed to him by the state. See Hawkins, 175 Ga.App. at 609-610(2).” Compare to Soto (May 4, 2009), below. Accord, Conn v. State , 300 Ga.App. 193, 685 S.E.2d 745 (September 23, 2009) (no confrontation violation where defense counsel declined to ask questions of eight-year old molestation victim who only answered prosecutor questions by nodding or shaking her head); Lindsey v. State , 321 Ga.App. 808, 743 S.E.2d 481 (May 21, 2013) (no confrontation violation in admission of co-defendant’s taped statement, where counsel declined cross after co-defendant “refused to provide meaningful testimony” at trial). Soto v. State, 285 Ga. 367, 677 S.E.2d 95 (May 4, 2009). Co-defendant Wiedeman began testifying for State after pleading guilty. At first, co-defendant’s testimony exonerated defendant of participation in the murder. “Suddenly, in the midst of further questioning by the State, Wiedeman announced that he would not answer any questions. He also refused to answer questions posed by the defense. He continued to refuse to answer questions even after the trial court ordered him to do so and threatened to hold him in contempt. Later, the State was allowed to impeach Wiedeman through the testimony of a police officer and a fellow prisoner by introducing hearsay statements Wiedeman gave to those individuals.” Held, trial court erred in admitting Wiedeman’s hearsay statements, but error was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “ Generally, when a witness refuses to continue to testify after having already done so, the proper remedy is to strike pertinent portions of the witness' testimony. As it is said: “[W]hen a witness declines to answer on cross-examination certain pertinent questions relevant to a matter testified about by the witness on direct examination, all of the witness' testimony on the same subject matter should be stricken.” Smith v. State, 225 Ga. 328, 331 (168 S.E.2d 587) (1969). Thus, in this case, once Wiedeman refused to testify further about his and Soto's conduct on the night of the murder, the trial court would have been well advised to strike Wiedeman's testimony. However, neither party sought that remedy and the trial court was presented with only two alternatives: it could refuse to allow the State to impeach Wiedeman with his prior inconsistent statements or it could allow impeachment at the risk of impinging upon Soto's right of confrontation. Because it chose the latter course, we are faced with a difficult question: When, on direct examination, a witness gives testimony that exonerates a defendant, can the State introduce contradictory out-of-court statements to impeach him, when the statements inculpate the defendant and the witness refuses to answer further questions posed by either the State or the defendant?” As to statement to police: the statement was clearly testimonial, and defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Admission of the statement thus violated defendant’s right to confront the witness. As to statement to fellow prisoner: not admissible as prior inconsistent statement for impeachment, because no opportunity for cross-examination, citing Barksdale v. State, 265 Ga. 9 (453 S.E.2d 2) (1995); not admissible under necessity exception because no guarantees of trustworthiness, as “the out-of-court statements of an accomplice are inherently unreliable. See Barksdale, supra at 12, n. 3.” Distinguishing Wilson v. State, 277 Ga. 114 (587 S.E.2d 9) (2003), where the witness denied making the prior inconsistent statement. In this case, to the contrary, Wiedeman was not asked, and he did not say, whether he made a prior statement to the prisoner.” Deloatch v. State, 296 Ga.App. 65, 673 S.E.2d 576 (February 12, 2009). Defendant’s confrontation right was violated by allowing prosecutor to ask series of incriminating questions of “an alleged co-defendant in two similar transactions,” who took the fifth. “Even though the evidence at issue in this case did not directly implicate Deloatch in the matter for which he was on trial, the effect is the same; Deloatch's right to confront witnesses against him was violated. The procedure permitted by the court placed before the jury the content of [co-defendant] Drake's statement, from which the jury could infer that since Deloatch committed the two armed robberies with Drake, he committed the armed robbery at issue in the instant case. The trial court did instruct the jury that it was not to consider the questions asked by the state or the responses by Drake as evidence in the case. However, as we stated in Collins v. State, 242 Ga.App. 450 (529 S.E.2d 412) (2000). ‘[u]nless [a] statement is otherwise directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause is violated by the admission of a nontestifying co-defendant's statement which inculpates the