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defendant by referring to the defendant's name or existence, regardless of the existence of limiting instructions. ’ (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied). Id. at 451-452(1).” Hendricks v. State, 284 Ga. 470, 660 S.E.2d 365 (April 21, 2008). Tyson, co-defendant of Hendricks, pled guilty, but then refused to testify for State, even upon offer of immunity. “After holding Tyson in contempt, the trial court recalled the jurors and informed them that Tyson had pled guilty to various offenses, that he refused to cooperate with the State despite an offer of immunity, and that he had been held in contempt for that refusal. Hendricks asserts that the trial court erred by informing the jury that Tyson refused to testify and had been cited for contempt for doing so.” Held, although Tyson’s refusal to testify may have been irrelevant, informing the jury of that fact was not harmful per se. “‘If a witness’ mere in-court assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights is not necessarily harmful, then a passing reference to [his] mere out-of-court assertion of [his] rights, although irrelevant, is not prejudicial.’ McIntyre v. State, 266 Ga. 7, 11(5) (463 S.E.2d 476) (1995). The trial court’s comment regarding Tyson’s out-of-court refusal to testify, though seemingly irrelevant, would not appear to be any more prejudicial than if that refusal had occurred in the jury’s presence. The trial court did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57 by expressing an opinion as to what had been proven in the case.” Distinguishing Horne (March 19, 2007), below (defendant’s right of confrontation violated “where the State, in the jury’s presence, posed a series of leading questions suggesting the guilt of the accused to a co-indictee witness who refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds.”). Accord, Sillah v. State , 291 Ga.App. 848, 663 S.E.2d 274 (June 5, 2008) (witness was called to stand before jury, but refused to be sworn – no prejudice to defendant). Horne v. State, 281 Ga. 799, 642 S.E.2d 659 (March 19, 2007). Trial court granted co-defendant Hill use and derivative use immunity so that State could call him as a witness against Horne, but co-defendant still refused to testify. DA then proceeded to “pose a series of leading questions suggesting the guilt of the accused” over defendant’s objection. Held, trial court committed harmless error by allowing the questioning, where defense counsel warned the court that co- defendant wouldn’t testify. “This Court has found an abridgement of the right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment where the State, in the jury’s presence, posed a series of leading questions suggesting the guilt of the accused to a co-indictee witness who refused to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds. Lingerfelt v. State, 235 Ga. 139 (218 S.E.2d 752) (1975) (‘ Lingerfelt II’). See also Lingerfelt v. State, 231 Ga. 354(3) (201 S.E.2d 445) (1973) (‘ Lingerfelt I’). In Lawrence v. State, 257 Ga. 423(3) (360 S.E.2d 716) (1987), the Court reached the same result with regard to an unindicted witness who invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, reasoning that the procedure ‘whereby the prosecutor was allowed, in effect, to testify for the witness and circumvent meaningful cross-examination as to obvious inferences, is clearly unacceptable and was harmful to the defendant.’ Id. at 425, fn. 3. … In the present case, Horne’s counsel brought his objection to the attention of the trial court and sought unsuccessfully to question Hill out of the jury’s presence to determine whether the witness would respond. The court did not excuse the jury, nor did it take any other corrective action when it became apparent that the witness intended to remain mute. Although the questions posed to Hill and Hill’s refusal to answer were not evidence, ‘the undeniable effect of this prosecutorial procedure was to place before the jury, through the questions asked, the content of [the witness’] statement to the police, and the clear inference [of the defendant’s guilt].’ Lawrence at 425. Here, the questioning bore on a fundamental part of the State’s case, the jury was given no contemporaneous limiting instructions from the court, and Hill ‘could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not admitted by him.’ Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934) (1965). ‘[E]ffective confrontation of [Hill] was possible only if [he] affirmed the statements as his,’ id. 380 U.S. at 420, which he did not do. Assuming that Horne’s objection was sufficient to invoke the protections of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, we hold under the circumstances that Horne’s inability to cross-examine Hill deprived Horne of that right. Id.” Also citing Greenwood v. State, 203 Ga.App. 901(1) (418 S.E.2d 160) (1992). Harmless error, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Distinguished, see Hendricks (April 21, 2008), above (no error where trial court merely informed jury that witness refused to testify, had previously pled guilty “to various offenses,” and had been held in contempt for refusing to testify). Willard v. State, 244 Ga.App. 469, 535 S.E.2d 820 (June 13, 2000). Arson convictions affirmed. No error in allowing State to place co-defendant who had pled guilty on the stand and have him invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege before the jury, as he had previously been granted immunity, and no substantive questions were asked of him. 1. Proper procedure was followed. “The trial court immediately conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury as required by Parrott v. State, 206 Ga.App. 829, 832(2), 427 S.E.2d 276 (1992), and Willard expressed his intention to refuse to testify. After hearing his testimony, the trial court granted immunity to Willard but cautioned the State that if Willard nevertheless refused to testify, ‘the court would not allow any cross-examination of the witness and the witness would be dismissed from the witness stand because the defendant would not have ... an effective cross-examination.’” After witness invoked privilege before the jury, prosecutor asked if he had pled guilty to the same charges, but defense counsel objected and the