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question was never answered. 2. Trial court properly allowed witness to be called to the stand, as “‘[t]he trial court's grant of an order of immunity pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-28(a) removed ... any right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. [Cit.]’ Hawkins v. State, 175 Ga.App. 606, 609(1), 333 S.E.2d 870 (1985).” The potential for the witness to be charged with perjury committed during his trial doesn’t entitle him to refuse to testify; nor does “a remote possibility” of federal prosecution overcome the trial court’s power to force the witness to testify upon a grant of immunity. 3 . Defendants’ right to confront and cross-examine the witness wasn’t violated, since the witness didn’t testify. “‘Indeed, a witness' in-court invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights is not necessarily harmful. What is harmful is for the trial court to allow the State, once a witness has invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, in effect, to testify for the witness and circumvent meaningful cross-examination as to obvious inferences.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McIntyre v. State, 266 Ga. 7, 11(5), 463 S.E.2d 476 (1995). … Moreover, Willard never responded in any fashion to the single question, and ‘an unanswered question does not furnish grounds for a mistrial. [Cits.]’ Berry v. State, 210 Ga.App. 789, 791(4), 437 S.E.2d 630 (1993). Appellants were not deprived of their right to an effective cross- examination, because the witness never answered or refused to answer the single question directed to him by the State.” Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. 698, 523 S.E.2d 866 (November 15, 1999). Defendant’s malice murder conviction reversed; trial court violated defendant’s confrontation rights by admitting non-testifying joint offender’s statement to police. “OCGA § 24-3-52 provides that ‘[t]he confession of one joint offender or conspirator made after the enterprise is ended shall be admissible only against himself.’ This statute ‘was designed to protect a defendant from the hearsay confession of a co-conspirator who does not testify at trial. [Cits.]’ Livingston v. State, 268 Ga. 205, 211, 486 S.E.2d 845 (1997). Furthermore, the introduction of a non-testifying joint offender's confession to show the defendant's involvement in the crimes violates the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. Id. The State's arguments about the trustworthiness of [co-offender] Brooks's statement and the necessity for its admission are unavailing. See Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797(2), 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998). Given that OCGA § 24-3-52 applies to ’joint offenders,’ we find no merit in the State's argument that the statute was inapplicable because neither sibling was charged with conspiracy nor was [co- offender] Brooks indicted with appellant.” G. COUNSEL, RIGHT TO See ATTORNEYS – RIGHT TO COUNSEL, above H. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT/EXCESSIVE FINES See also SENTENCING – DEATH PENALTY – CONSTITUTIONALITY, below Montgomery v. Louisiana, 14-280, ___ U.S. ____, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (January 25, 2016). Reversing Louisiana Supreme Court; juvenile murder defendant was entitled to hearing on his sentence of life without parole, although the sentence was final prior to the decision in Miller v. Alabama (June 25, 2012), below. Contrary to state court’s ruling, Miller was “a new substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review.” “ Miller is retroactive because it ‘“necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant”’ —here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders— ‘“faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”’ Schriro [ v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004)] (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998)).” Scalia, joined by Alito and Thomas, dissents, noting among other things that Miller didn’t make life without parole categorically unconstitutional as to minors; it simply requires a hearing first. Accord (but criticized), Veal v. State , S15A1721, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085360 (March 21, 2016). Richardson v. State, 334 Ga.App. 344, 779 S.E.2d 406 (November 6, 2015). Sentence for aggravated child molestation affirmed; twenty year sentence for juvenile convicted of aggravated child molestation wasn’t cruel and unusual, distinguishing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010); and Miller v. Alabama, 10-9646, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). “In those cases, the Supreme Court was concerned with the imposition upon juvenile offenders of the ‘most severe punishments’ available under the law, namely, the death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Richardson, however, was not subject to one of the ‘most severe punishments’ allowed by law, but rather to a sentence of a definite term of years. Richardson’s constitutional challenge to his sentence predicated on Roper, Graham, and Miller thus is misplaced. See Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 701(4), 707 S.E.2d 359 (2011); In re: T.D.J., 325 Ga.App. 786, 789(2)(a), 755 S.E.2d 29 (2014); Middleton v. State, 313 Ga.App. 193, 194–195, 721 S.E.2d 111 (2011).” Thompson v. State, 332 Ga.App. 204, 770 S.E.2d 364 (March 30, 2015). No cruel and unusual punishment in defendant’s 30-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine, though “the General Assembly subsequently amended OCGA § 16–13–30 to reduce the sentence to one-to-three years for the amount of methamphetamine he