☢ test - Í

possessed in this case. See OCGA § 16–13–30(c)(1) (2014),” distinguishing Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 528(3)(c), 652 S.E.2d 501 (2007). “[I]n Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 678(2)(a), 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008), our Supreme Court rejected an expansive reading of Humphrey and ‘decline[d] to engraft onto every statutory change enacted by the General Assembly an interpretation that the legislature is thus making a pronouncement of constitutional magnitude.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) … [W]hen read together, Humphrey and Bradshaw make clear that a statutory amendment by the legislature is one factor to consider as part of a court's analysis into gross disproportionality, but it is not dispositive; courts still must examine the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence to determine whether a threshold inference of gross disproportionality has been raised. … Notably, while the statute has been amended to reduce the range of punishment, the General Assembly included a savings clause making clear its intention to maintain the sentencing structure for crimes committed prior to the effective date of any amendment. See Ga. L.2012, p. 899, § 9–1(b)/ HB 1176. Therefore, the General Assembly itself has made clear that it did not intend for the changes to OCGA § 16–13–30 reducing the range of punishment to serve as ‘a pronouncement of constitutional magnitude’ or ‘to preclude or in any manner limit’ our evaluation of a defendant's sentence under the old version of the statute ‘to determine whether it comports with the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw, 284 Ga. at 678(2), 671 S.E.2d 485(a).” Pepe-Frazier v. State, 331 Ga.App. 263, 770 S.E.2d 654 (March 18, 2015). Convictions for human sex trafficking and related offenses affirmed; life sentence for aggravated child molestation wasn’t cruel and unusual where defendant lured victim into prostitution and had her engage in oral sex with him along with his girlfriend. “Under these circumstances, Pepe–Frazier's sentence does not raise a threshold inference of gross disproportionality.” Jones v. State, 296 Ga. 663, 769 S.E.2d 901 (March 2, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; sentence of two consecutive life terms plus 85 years wasn’t cruel and unusual as to 17-year old who murdered two innocent bystanders and shot others in a gang-related incident. Disapproved to the extent it holds that a claim under Miller v. Alabama, 10-9646, ___ U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), can be waived, Veal v. State , S15A1721, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085360 (March 21, 2016). Bray v. State, 330 Ga.App. 768, 768 S.E.2d 285 (February 4, 2015). Convictions for serious injury by vehicle and related offenses affirmed; sentence of life without parole as a recidivist was not so excessive and disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. “Although Bray describes his crimes in this case as ‘non-violent,’ he led the police on a dangerous car chase that culminated in his head-on collision with another vehicle, causing severe injury to its elderly occupants. Furthermore, his multiple prior convictions were all theft-related offenses, and in the present case, Bray was again in possession of a stolen vehicle. Under these circumstances, Bray's contention that his recidivist sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his crimes is without merit. See Willis v. State, 316 Ga.App. 258, 268(7) (728 S.E.2d 857) (2012).” Owens v. Hill, 295 Ga. 302, 758 S.E.2d 794 (May 19, 2014). In this civil action, trial court erred by enjoining Hill’s execution on various constitutional grounds. Hill challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 42-5-36(d)(2) which, effective July 1, 2013, designates “‘identifying information’ concerning the persons and entities that participate in executions, including those who participate in the procurement of execution drugs, to be a ‘confidential state secret.’” 1. Appeal isn’t moot , although the specific batch of drugs prepared for defendant’s execution has expired, because the situation is capable of recurring. “Thus, this case presents a classic example of a matter that is capable of repetition yet evading review. See Babies Right Start v. Ga. Dept. of Pub. Health, 293 Ga. 553, 556(2)(c), 748 S.E.2d 404 (2013) (noting the ‘well-established but narrow exception to mootness for disputes that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review”’ (quoting Fed. Election Comm. v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462(II), 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007)).” 2. Claim challenging the method of procurement of the execution drugs was properly brought as a civil action for injuctive relief, rather than a habeas petition, because “[t]he issues of what drug or drugs will be used in Hill's execution, what person or entities are involved in procuring the drug or drugs, and how information about the drug or drugs is managed do not concern the validity of Hill's death sentence; instead, they concern merely how his death sentence will be carried out.” 3. While the superior court here didn’t have direct appellate jurisdiction to supervise or obstruct Hill’s execution, “ under the right circumstances, the Superior Court of Fulton County would have the authority in protecting its own jurisdiction to enjoin state officers over which it has personal jurisdiction from using or directing the use of specific drugs in an execution. See Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. IV (‘Each court may exercise such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments....’). Such circumstances obtain here, because there would be no other means of seeking an adequate remedy in the sentencing court.” 4. Constitutional issues might be avoided in an appropriate case by providing a sample of the execution drug itself as discovery; but would not of