☢ test - Í

would be totally frustrated if conducted openly.’ Id. at 478 U.S. 1, 8–9, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1(III). Even adopting the extravagant view that the acquisition of execution drugs is a government process subject to this test, we still conclude that Hill's claims fail to satisfy either of these elements. First, although there has been a tradition of allowing at least some public access to execution proceedings, there has also been a longstanding tradition of concealing the identities of those who carry out those executions. [Cits.] … Second, without the confidentiality offered to execution participants by the statute, as the record and our case law show, there is a significant risk that persons and entities necessary to the execution would become unwilling to participate. [Cits.] We are mindful of Hill's argument about enhancing the public debate on the death penalty in general and on the participation of specific persons and entities in executions in particular, and we recognize that disclosing the compounding pharmacy that produces lethal injection drugs might enhance the ability of Hill and the general public to more fully satisfy themselves that Georgia's method of execution is humane. However, we conclude that Georgia's execution process is likely made more timely and orderly by the execution-participant confidentiality statute and, furthermore, that significant personal interests are also protected by it. Accordingly, we also conclude that it therefore, on balance, plays a positive role in the functioning of the capital punishment process.” Benham, writing for Hunstein, dissents. “In light of my assessment of Hill's due process claim, I would grant him access to information identifying the compounding pharmacy that produces his execution drug; although, I would direct that the information be released under appropriate safeguards to minimize any harm to individuals who are simply performing their jobs. [Cit.] Likewise, because learning the source of the bulk materials used by the compounding pharmacy could lead to information supporting Hill's cruel and unusual punishment claim, I would also order that information disclosed to Hill.” Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 383, 754 S.E.2d 33 (January 21, 2014). Malice murder and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; OCGA § 16-5-1(d), which authorizes but does not mandate life with parole for a minor convicted of murder, does not violate the Eighth Amendment, citing Miller v. Alabama (June 25, 2012), below. Accord, Bun v. State , 296 Ga. 549, 769 S.E.2d 381 (February 16, 2015) ( citing Foster and Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F3d 1204, 1221–1222 (11 th Cir., 2011)); Schmidt v. State , 297 Ga. 692, 778 S.E.2d 152 (September 14, 2015). Miller v. Alabama, 10-9646, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, 2012 WL 2368659 (June 25, 2012). Reversing courts in Alabama and Arkansas, “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Two unrelated defendants here were both convicted of murder in connection with armed robberies committed at age 14. Based on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). “Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. … And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.” Doesn’t foreclose a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile in an appropriate case, “[b]ut given all we have said in Roper, Graham , and this decision about children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ Roper, 543 U.S., at 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183; Graham, 560 U.S., at ____, 130 S.Ct., at 2026–2027. Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Distinguishes Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (“a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual” does not “becom[e] so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’”): “ Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. … if (as Harmelin recognized) ‘death is different,’ children are different too.” Breyer and Sotomayor concur, commenting that, to justify a life/no parole sentence, the State must prove that the juvenile killed or intended to kill – mere intent to commit a felony would be insufficient to support such a sentence, in their view. Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito dissent. Roberts notes the majority’s failure to support its opinion with reference to ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice,’ and notes that, in fact, “[s]tatutes establishing life without parole sentences in particular became more common