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in the past quarter century.” Roberts also points out that this result isn’t a logical extension of Roper ; on the contrary, “ Roper reasoned that the death penalty was not needed to deter juvenile murderers in part because ‘life imprisonment without the possibility of parole’ was available. [Cit.]” Roberts further comments that “[t]here is no clear reason that [the ‘juveniles are different’ principle relied on by the majority] would not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would receive. Unless confined, the only stopping point for the Court's analysis would be never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as adults.” Thomas, joined by Scalia, would overrule the entire Roper line of cases, as well as the line of cases that “prohibited the mandatory imposition of the death penalty,” beginning with Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). Thomas reiterates his previous comments that “the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, as originally understood, prohibits ‘torturous methods of punishment’”; “does not contain a ‘proportionality principle’”; and adds that the Clause “is not concerned with whether a particular lawful method of punishment—whether capital or noncapital—is imposed pursuant to a mandatory or discretionary sentencing regime,” quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Accord, Montgomery (January 25, 2016), above (Miller announces “a new substantive constitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review”). Holsey v. State, 316 Ga.App. 801, 729 S.E.2d 465 (June 21, 2012). Terroristic threats and related convictions affirmed; consecutive sentences thereon weren’t improper. “‘There is no constitutionally cognizable right to concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences. Under Georgia law, whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple offenses is within the trial court's discretion, so long as the sentence for each offense is within the statutory limits.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Simpson v. State, 310 Ga.App. 63, 64, n. 4, 715 S.E.2d 675 (2011).” Accord, Osborne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 339, 734 S.E.2d 59 (November 5, 2012). Jones v. State, 290 Ga. 670, 725 S.E.2d 236 (March 5, 2012). Aggravated assault and kidnapping convictions affirmed; defendant’s constitutional challenge to sentencing statute was untimely. 1. “A constitutional attack on a sentencing statute, unlike a statute under which a criminal defendant is prosecuted, may be made after the guilty verdict is returned, as the first opportunity to challenge such a statute does not occur until after that time. Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28–29(1) (608 S.E.2d 631) (2005). In Woods, however, we did not alter our longstanding general rule that even constitutional challenges to sentencing statutes, including those challenges based on the Eighth Amendment, are untimely if they are presented for the first time in a motion for new trial. Gunn v. State, 244 Ga. 51(2) (257 S.E.2d 538) (1979); Gainey v. State, 232 Ga. 334 (206 S.E.2d 474) (1974) (over Justice Gunter's dissent); Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 276(11) (134 SE 36) (1926).” 2. Mandatory 25-year prison sentence with life probation for kidnapping not excessive. 3. “ Jones … contends that the sentencing statutes for child kidnapping as applied to him violate due process because an earlier indictment charged regular kidnapping and, only after plea negotiations failed, the more severe sentence was included in a re-indictment. Contrary to Jones' argument, such circumstances do not raise a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in the absence of actual evidence thereof. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74) (1982); Brandeburg v. State, 292 Ga.App. 191, 199–200(4) (663 S.E.2d 844) (2008).” 4. “ We also reject Jones' contention that the sentencing statutes at issue violate equal protection by punishing a person differently depending on the age of the victim. That classification is not arbitrarily drawn and instead is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in protecting children. Benton v. State, 265 Ga. 648, 649(3) (461 S.E.2d 202) (1995).” Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (February 7, 2011). Child molestation and aggravated child molestation convictions affirmed; mandatory 25-years incarceration for aggravated child molestation was not cruel and unusual as applied to minor defendant. Accord, Middleton v. State , 313 Ga.App. 193, 721 S.E.2d 111 (November 14, 2011) (30 years without parole for 14-year old defendant not cruel and unusual or violative of Graham ); Richardson (November 6, 2015), above (20 years for juvenile defendant convicted of aggravated child molestation not cruel and unusual). Cuvas v. State, 306 Ga.App. 679, 703 S.E.2d 116 (November 1, 2010). Not cruel and unusual punishment where 13- year old defendant was sentenced to twenty years, ten to serve, for armed robbery. “We have previously upheld a sentence of ten years confinement imposed on a 15-year-old defendant for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Pascerella [ v. State, 294 Ga.App. 414, 417 (669 S.E.2d 216) (2008)]. In comparison, Cuvas, although only 13 years old, participated in the actual armed robbery. Having considered Cuvas's arguments, we cannot conclude that her punishment was so severe or excessive in proportion to the offense as to shock the conscience. See Gresham v. State, 303 Ga.App. 682, 689(4) (695 S.E.2d 73) (2010); McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga.App. 538, 541(2) (691 S.E.2d 352) (2010).” Bryant v. State, 304 Ga.App. 755, 697 S.E.2d 860 (July 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; imposition of two life sentences for armed robbery and kidnapping isn’t cruel and unusual. “The