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same offense is not raised by the record before us. The trial court properly rejected Locklear's plea in bar.” McKinney v. State, 240 Ga.App. 812, 525 S.E.2d 395 (November 16, 1999). “[A]fter a negotiated plea of guilty to a burglary charge, McKinney was sentenced in 1995 under the First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60, to five years probation, with 90-120 days of that term to be served in a probation boot camp.” “In May 1998, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation Georgia Crime Information Center notified the Gwinnett County Superior Court that in accordance with OCGA § 42-8-65(b), McKinney's record had been changed from first offender treatment to a conviction on the original offense of burglary because McKinney had been arrested and convicted of another crime while on probation as a first offender.” Trial court later revoked defendant’s first offender status and sentenced him to incarceration. Held, trial court properly rejected defendant’s double jeopardy claim, as “[t]he GCIC’s action was not an adjudication. … Neither was the GCIC's action a punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. … It is apparent that the purpose of OCGA § 42-8-65(b) is not to punish the offender but to maintain an accurate statewide record of offenders for a variety of reasons, including preventing courts from inadvertently offering first offender status to those who are not first offenders within the meaning of OCGA § 42-8-60. Being listed in GCIC records as a first offender is a privilege. Like the administrative suspension of a driver's license, GCIC's modification of its records is merely ‘the revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted, a traditional attribute of a remedial action.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Nolen [ v. State, 218 Ga.App. 819, 822, 463 S.E.2d 504 (1995)].” 2. BROKEN PLEA DEAL Thomas v. State, 285 Ga.App. 792, 648 S.E.2d 111 (June 11, 2007). No violation of double jeopardy where defendant successfully moved to set aside guilty plea, and State then reindicted defendant on charges nolle prossed as a part of the plea deal. “‘It is well settled that a plea bargain agreement is a contract under Georgia law which binds both the prosecutor and defendant.’ City of Baldwin v. Barrett , 265 Ga. 489, 490 (458 S.E.2d 619) (1995). … Thomas wants to avoid performing one part of the bargain while enjoying the portion of the agreement that was beneficial to him. However, in withdrawing his guilty plea to the sole count in the accusation, Thomas breached the agreement he made with the State, and the State may rescind part of the agreement by indicting Thomas on the charges that were previously nolle prossed. [ footnote: Thomas does not suggest that the 2003 indictment was not returned within the statutes of limitation applicable to the offenses charged. See OCGA § 17-3-1. See also Kyles v. State, 254 Ga. 49, 50-51 (326 S.E.2d 216) (1985). ] See Brown v. State, 261 Ga.App. 115, 117 (582 S.E.2d 13) (2003). Contrary to his assertions, ‘[Thomas] cannot shield himself from the consequences of his breach by invoking double jeopardy principles.’ Id. at 118. See Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 11 (107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1) (1987).” Brown v. State, 261 Ga.App. 115, 582 S.E.2d 13 (May 5, 2003). No violation of double jeopardy where defendant violates a plea agreement to testify truthfully at a later proceeding and court therefore sets aside guilty plea, notwithstanding: a) “the plea agreement did not specify that it would be set aside if Brown breached the agreement,” and b) there was no express waiver of double jeopardy. Based on Ricketts v. Adamson , 483 U.S. 1, 107 S. Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Accord, Thomas (June 11, 2007), above. 3. CASH BOND PAYMENT Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga.App. 614, 624 S.E.2d 166 (November 3, 2005). Defendant was not subjected to double jeopardy when he was twice jailed pre-trial based on State’s motion to revoke bond, each time held several months before hearing on the motion to revoke bond. Held, any violation of due process in pre-trial detention should be addressed by habeas corpus, and does not trigger double jeopardy protections unless intended to punish for the underlying offense. Here, record demonstrates that bond revocations were based on violations of conditions which were reasonable in the circumstances. Simmons v. State, 263 Ga.App. 220, 587 S.E.2d 312 (September 16, 2003). Defendant’s cash bond forfeiture for speeding in recorder’s court did not bar subsequent prosecution in superior court for habitual violator because “Under OCGA § 16-1-7(b), the State must prosecute a defendant for multiple crimes arising from the same conduct in a single prosecution if the crimes ‘are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.’ Id. This code section applies ‘only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Baker v. State, 257 Ga. 567, 569, 361 S.E.2d 808 (1987). Simmons failed to show that any prosecuting officer was present during the bond forfeiture proceeding in recorder’s court. In fact, he concedes in his appellate brief that ‘there are no prosecuting attorneys assigned to DeKalb County Recorder’s Court.’” Defendant’s argument that either the police officer or the presiding judge of recorder’s court then should be considered the ‘prosecuting officer’ “is absurd,” says Court of Appeals.