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Amendment applies to the various states through the Fourteenth Amendment (see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794(III) (89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707) (1969)), the trial court erred in finding it was not available as a potential defense in this case. In Eckles v. Atlanta Technology Group, Inc., 267 Ga. 801, 803(2) (485 S.E.2d 22) (1997), this Court declared that because a corporation is a ‘person’ pursuant to Georgia law, it is entitled to due process and equal protection from the state. It follows that a corporation is entitled to the double jeopardy protection afforded by the Georgia Constitution. The trial court improperly concluded that the plea of double jeopardy was not available to Wilbros, but since it otherwise properly denied the plea in bar of prosecution, the judgment is affirmed under the right-for-any-reason rule. See Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127, 132 (728 S.E.2d 200) (2012).” 2. No double jeopardy violation here, where corporation paid a civil penalty based on state regulatory violation, then faced criminal prosecution under local ordinance. ““Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction.... Even in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hudson [ v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450) (1997)]. In making such a determination, the Supreme Court has offered a number of factors to be used as guideposts. See Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–169 (83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644) (1963). These include: ‘[(1) w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [(2)] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [(3)] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [(4)] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [(5)] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [(6)] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [(7)] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned....” Id. In any event, ‘“only the clearest proof” will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’ Hudson, supra, 522 U.S. at 100, quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742) (1980).” None of the Kennedy factors are met here: the deterrence and retribution of a civil fine are not exclusively criminal sanctions or goals; the civil consent order expressly disavowed scienter, thus ruling out the third and fifth factors; and the civil penalty and accompanying required remedial action “appear to be reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective of waste management regulation.” “Even though the parties stipulated that both the Consent Order and the criminal action allege the same nuisance conduct and each proceeding has the same goals of restraint, deterrence, retribution, and abatement of the odor nuisance, the criminal action is not barred by the sanctions imposed in the Consent Order.” Simile v. State, 259 Ga.App. 106, 576 S.E.2d 83 (January 9, 2003). Defendant’s DUI prosecution was not barred by imposition of administrative penalties by his college for the same conduct. “An administrative sanction may constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes if the purpose of the sanction is not remedial but instead serves the goals of retribution or deterrence. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989).” “[T]he decision in Halper does not mandate that a civil sanction that incidentally serves a punishment purpose constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Halper, supra, from the defendant’s perspective ‘even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.’” School’s actions had remedial purpose of protecting others. Boone v. State, 256 Ga.App. 220, 568 S.E.2d 91 (June 20, 2002). Double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or after conviction, and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Double jeopardy concerns do not arise from suspension of a driver’s license through an administrative procedure as such procedure does not constitute punishment or prosecution and there is no harm resulting from “‘prosecutorial power of the State.’” A driver’s license is a privilege, not an absolute right, which may be revoked or suspended for cause. Locklear v. State , 244 Ga.App. 10, 534 S.E.2d 575 (May 12, 2000). In DUI prosecution, trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar based on double jeopardy. Contrary to defendant’s argument, no jeopardy attached when his driver’s license was improperly suspended due to erroneous report filed by deputy court clerk. (Plea paperwork was filed with court, but defendant chose not to enter the plea; deputy clerk sent license suspension notice to Department of Public Safety, unaware that the plea was never entered.) “Locklear suffered harm, but more importantly from the standpoint of double jeopardy, he did not suffer from the prosecutorial power of the State. The prosecutor's office was not responsible for the events leading to Locklear's license suspension. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957): ‘The underlying idea ... is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense.’ Id. at 187, 78 S.Ct. 221. The issue of misuse of State power by repeatedly prosecuting or punishing a defendant for the