☢ test - Í

Strange v. State , 244 Ga.App. 635, 535 S.E.2d 315 (May 31, 2000). Convictions for aggravated assault affirmed; sentence of fifty years, forty to serve, wasn’t excessive for four counts of aggravated assault. “‘“A determinate sentence which falls within statutorily mandated parameters is not subject to attack on Eighth Amendment grounds. [Cits.]”’ Inglett v. State, 239 Ga.App. 524, 529(9), 521 S.E.2d 241 (1999), citing Pollard v. State, 230 Ga.App. 159, 161(5), 495 S.E.2d 629 (1998).” Rabern v. State , 242 Ga.App. 804, 531 S.E.2d 373 (March 16, 2000). Trial court’s order forfeiting defendant’s house and 5.2 acres of land “violated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause” where evidence didn’t show that the entire property was involved in marijuana grow operation. Based on Thorp v. State , 264 Ga. 712, 450 S.E.2d 416 (1994). “ Thorp, supra, 264 Ga. at 714-718(3), 450 S.E.2d 416, adopted the three-factor analysis proposed in United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F.Supp. 725 (C.D.Cal., 1994) as the minimal inquiry for analyzing a claim under the excessive fines provision of the Eighth Amendment. Thorp, supra, 264 Ga. at 717-718(3), 450 S.E.2d 416. The factors are: (1) the inherent gravity of the offense, as compared with the harshness of the penalty; (2) whether the property seized was close enough to the offense to render it ‘guilty’; and (3) whether the criminal activity involving the property seized was extensive in terms of time and space. Id. Proper application of these factors requires the trial court to make certain mixed findings of law and fact. State v. Evans, 225 Ga.App. 402, 403, 484 S.E.2d 70 (1997). Normally a trial court's findings of fact as to these matters must be accepted by an appellate court unless clearly erroneous. Id.” First factor : Penalty here – forfeiture of defendant’s home over 450 three-inch tall marijuana plants – was excessive. Value of plants wasn’t established by evidence. As to the house, “[c]onsideration must be given not only to the monetary value of the property forfeited, but also to the intangible value of the type of property, particularly in the case of a home. Thorp, supra, 264 Ga. at 717(3), 450 S.E.2d 416. At stake here are the security and privacy of Rabern's home and of those who take shelter within it. Id. The trial court determined that Rabern's property was worth $70,000 and then ruled that ‘[i]f the property is sold and the money the property brings exceeds $57,000 then any overage shall be paid to the condemnees.’ Essentially, that order provided only that the State would receive up to $57,000 in proceeds but failed to give due consideration to Rabern's remaining interest in the property. Thus the forfeiture was done without sufficient regard for the proportionality inquiry specifically adopted in and required by Thorp. See id. at 713-718(2), 450 S.E.2d 416 (the court notes particular importance in applying the proportionality analysis in forfeiture cases because the government stands to benefit from the revenue raised, and the court expressly refuses to adopt the ‘instrumentality test’ as the only appropriate criterion for determining whether a civil forfeiture is excessive).” Second factor: “ The second factor, which focuses on the relationship between the property and the offense, evaluates whether the property was close enough to the offense to render the property guilty. Id . at 713-714(2), 717(3), 450 S.E.2d 416. The evidence shows that the shed housed the marijuana plants, but there is no other link between the property and illegal activity. There is no evidence that Rabern used any money derived from illegal sources to purchase the property. There is no evidence that the marijuana had produced revenue which enabled Rabern to conduct an illegal enterprise on the property. And there is no evidence that Rabern used the living area of the family home or the surrounding acres for illegal activities.” Third factor: “The third factor considers whether the criminal activity involving the property was extensive in terms of time and/or spatial use.” No evidence here showed greater use of the property for criminal purposes than the plants discovered on this one occasion. Byrd v. State, 236 Ga.App. 485, 512 S.E.2d 372 (February 16, 1999). “Byrd contends OCGA § 17-10-6.1, which dictates the punishment for serious violent offenders, in conjunction with OCGA § 17-10-7, the sentencing statute applicable to recidivist armed robbers, violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII of the Georgia Constitution. This issue has already been decided adversely to Byrd in Ortiz v. State, 266 Ga. 752, 753(2), 470 S.E.2d 874 (1996). Thus, this enumeration lacks merit.” I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1. ADMINISTRATIVE/OTHER PENALTIES/CONSEQUENCES Wilbros, LLC v. State, 294 Ga. 514, 755 S.E.2d 145 (February 24, 2014). Trial court properly denied LLC’s various constitutional challenges to prosecution under county nuisance ordinance. Defendant here operated a landfill in Stephens County, and was charged with violations of both county ordinance and State EPD regulations for solid waste disposal violations. 1. Trial court erred by holding that a corporation couldn’t raise a double jeopardy defense. “Both the United States Constitution [cit.] and the Georgia Constitution of 1983 [cit.] include protections against double jeopardy. The issue of whether the double jeopardy provision of the Georgia Constitution extends to a corporation appears to be one of first impression. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, has long been applied to corporate entities. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564(II) (97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642) (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629) (1962). Because the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth