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when trying the defendant for a different crime. See id. at 350, 353. This is because the standard of proof for a criminal conviction is higher than the standard of proof for the introduction of similar transaction evidence in a criminal trial; the determination that a crime was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the crime was not proved by a preponderance of the evidence or even by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 349– 350. See also Copelan v. Copelan, 294 Ga. 840, 841, 755 S.E.2d 739 (2014) (explaining that the collateral estoppel doctrine does not apply when the first proceeding required proof of the issue by clear and convincing evidence and the second proceeding required proof by the lower preponderance standard). However, we need not decide now whether Moore remains good law, because Williams was not in fact charged with or acquitted of any crime in the prior Florida case, and even if he had been the dual sovereignty doctrine would prevent the application of collateral estoppel.” Roesser v. State, 294 Ga. 295, 751 S.E.2d 297 (November 18, 2013). Reversing 316 Ga.App. 850, 730 S.E.2d 641 (2012). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s plea in bar asserting double jeopardy based on collateral estoppel. Defendant here was acquitted of malice murder, felony murder and aggravated assault, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Because both the prosecution and defense centered on whether defendant acted in self-defense, Supreme Court finds that the acquittals show that the jury necessarily determined that defendant did act in self-defense. “Because double jeopardy bars the prosecution from relitigating any issue decided by the jury's acquittal at the previous trial, we conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits the State from retrying Roesser for voluntary manslaughter.” Based on Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 129 S.Ct. 2360, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009) and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). “When there is ‘a critical issue of ultimate fact in all of the charges against [the defendant], a jury verdict that necessarily decided that issue in his favor protects him from prosecution for any charge for which that is an essential element.’ [ Yeager ] at 123. … The Supreme Court in Ashe ‘held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury's acquittal in a prior trial.’ Yeager, 557 U.S. at 119. To determine what a jury has necessarily decided, a court should ‘examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’ Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (citation and punctuation omitted). The ‘rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality’; courts should engage in a practical inquiry based on all the circumstances of the proceeding. Id. … To conduct an issue-preclusion analysis, courts examine the verdict and trial record to determine the facts that the jury necessarily decided in returning its verdict of acquittal and then ‘determine whether the previously determined facts constituted an essential element of the second offense.’ See United States v. Ohayon, 483 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11 th Cir., 2007) (citations and punctuation omitted). The doctrine of collateral estoppel will not bar a retrial ‘[u]nless the record of the prior proceeding affirmatively demonstrates that an issue involved in the second trial was definitely determined in the former trial[;] the possibility that it may have been does not prevent the relitigation of that issue.’ Phillips v. State, 272 Ga. 840, 842, 537 S.E.2d 63 (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted). … In this case, a review of the entire record supports Roesser's argument that the jury necessarily determined that he acted in self-defense when it acquitted him of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in connection with Price's death. From the attorneys' opening statements through the jury's verdict, the issue presented to the jury was whether Roesser had acted in self-defense.” Voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand, was barely mentioned, and not advocated by either attorney in closing. “The State conceded at oral argument that no witness was questioned about whether Roesser acted with sudden, violent, and irresistible passion, and we have found nothing in the record related to voluntary manslaughter, other than the jury charge and a brief reference to it by each side during closing arguments. … [T]he record does not support the State's argument that the jury could have determined that Roesser acted under an irresistible passion in acquitting him of murder and aggravated assault.” Accord, Robinson (November 18, 2015), above. Malloy v. State, 293 Ga. 350, 744 S.E.2d 778 (June 17, 2013). Interim appeal in prosecution for Medicaid fraud. 1. Establishes and applies rule for determining when “a determination made in an administrative proceeding has preclusive effect in a subsequent criminal proceeding pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” “Administrative decisions … are not generally given collateral estoppel effect by Georgia courts in subsequent judicial proceedings unless certain requirements are met. Swain v. State, 251 Ga.App. 110, 113, 552 S.E.2d 880 (2001). See Epps Air Svc. v. Lampkin, 229 Ga. 792, 795(2), 194 S.E.2d 437 (1992); Blackwell v. Ga. Real Estate Comm., 205 Ga.App. 233, 234, 421 S.E.2d 716 (1992). Specifically, administrative decisions may have a collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent judicial proceedings where: (1) both proceedings involve the same parties or their privies; (2) the issue was actually litigated and determined in the first proceeding; (3) the determination was essential to the judgment in the first proceeding; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full opportunity to litigate the issue in