☢ test - Í

question. Swain, 251 Ga.App. at 113, 552 S.E.2d 880. Compare Allen v. Santana, 303 Ga.App. 844, 847(1), 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010) (collateral estoppel did not apply where issue deemed not essential to first judgment).” Trial court here correctly found that the State didn’t have a full opportunity to litigate the issue of fraud in defendant doctor’s Medicaid billings in prior ALJ hearing. In that hearing, defendant successfully challenged State’s withholding of Medicaid payments based on alleged fraud. “To require the State to treat the administrative hearing as an integral part of the criminal trial rather than merely as an administrative device allowing the defendant to halt the temporary suspension of reimbursements to his Medicaid provider number during the course of the investigation would frustrate the purpose of the administrative hearing. See Swain, supra at 114, 552 S.E.2d 880.” 2. Disapproves Dorsey v. State, 251 Ga.App. 640, 642, 554 S.E.2d 278 (2001) and Carter v. State, 231 Ga.App. 42, 43, fn. 2, 497 S.E.2d 812 (1998) “[t]o the extent that [they] stand for the proposition that collateral estoppel cannot be applied in a criminal proceeding.” Johnson v. State, 292 Ga. 22, 733 S.E.2d 736 (October 29, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; State wasn’t collaterally estopped from presenting evidence of defendant’s later possession of murder weapon despite defendant’s acquittal on that charge at prior trial. “[T]he party invoking collateral estoppel must introduce the pertinent portions of the record of the prior proceeding that affirmatively demonstrate that the fact at issue was actually litigated and determined in the party's favor in the earlier case. See Preston v. State, 257 Ga. 42, 45 (354 S.E.2d 135) (1987); Moore [ v. State, 254 Ga. 674, 676 (333 S.E.2d 605) (1985).] (‘While some jurisdictions have adopted a per se rule prohibiting any evidentiary use of independent offenses where an acquittal was obtained, the application of collateral estoppel requires an examination of what facts were in issue and necessarily resolved in the defendant's favor at the first trial.’ (citation omitted)). … Appellant's counsel asserted that Appellant had been acquitted of possession of the .45 caliber gun on March 5 in an earlier trial. However, trial counsel never offered into evidence or even proffered any of the record of the prior trial to support the collateral estoppel claim. Consequently, when the issue was raised at trial, the trial court had no way to ‘“examine the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, [to] conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.”’ Ashe v. Swenson, [397 U.S. 436, 444 (90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469) (1970)] (citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Appellant's collateral estoppel claim.” Coney v. State, 304 Ga.App. 346, 696 S.E.2d 73 (May 6, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking affirmed; the decision not to revoke defendant’s prior probation based on the stalking offense did not support a plea in bar to prosecution of the stalking offense. “Coney argues that collateral estoppel should apply here, because the probation revocation hearing had already determined ‘whether Coney had committed aggravated stalking’ and that question should not be relitigated. But a probation revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, and therefore the trial court's ultimate decision in that matter does not constitute res judicata or collateral estoppel. State v. Jones, 196 Ga.App. 896, 898 (397 S.E.2d 209) (1990) (‘This court has previously ruled that a ruling in favor of the accused in a probation revocation hearing does not serve as collateral estoppel to preclude a subsequent trial of the criminal charge which formed the basis of the revocation proceeding. [Cits.]’); Smith v. State, 171 Ga.App. 279, 282 (319 S.E.2d 113) (1984) (‘In summary, a probation revocation hearing is similar to a preliminary hearing, and jeopardy does not attach at a preliminary hearing.’).” Patmon v. State, 303 Ga.App. 151, 693 S.E.2d 120 (March 25, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar to his retrial for armed robbery and aggravated assault, after prior conviction was reversed for failure to prove venue. Jury’s verdict of not guilty on kidnapping with bodily injury did not necessarily determine a fact central to prosecution of the other offenses. Defendant was convicted of offenses occurring in the presence of a witness, but acquitted of those occurring outside the witness’s presence. Jamale v. State, 302 Ga.App. 140, 690 S.E.2d 420 (January 6, 2010). Charged with armed robbery, defendant was convicted of the lesser offense of robbery by intimidation. Trial court aggravated the sentence based on defendant’s possession of a firearm at the time. Defendant contends that aggravation of the sentence based on weapon possession is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict acquitting him of armed robbery. Held, sentence is affirmed. “Given the abolition of the inconsistent verdict rule, we need not reach such claim of error.” Prince v. State, 299 Ga.App. 164, 682 S.E.2d 180 (July 15, 2009). Physical precedent only. Defendant waived collateral estoppel argument by failing to file a written plea in bar. “[Defendant] contends the trial court erred in ruling on her motion to suppress because ‘further relitigation is barred by double jeopardy and collateral estoppel.’ She argues that because the first trial judge granted the motion to suppress filed in her probation revocation proceeding, the parties had a full and fair opportunity to ‘litigate’ the issue and the second trial judge, presiding over this case, is estopped to ‘overrule’