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to first trial judge. ‘In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469) (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied in the guarantee against double jeopardy.’ Dorsey v. State, 251 Ga.App. 640, 641(1)(a) (554 S.E.2d 278) (2001). A defendant's failure to file a written plea in bar prior to the second proceeding, however, generally waives the right to later raise a challenge on procedural double jeopardy grounds. Alexander v. State, 279 Ga. 683, 685(2)(b) (620 S.E.2d 792) (2005). Here, Theresa first raised her double jeopardy/collateral estoppel ground in a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress. Because she did not file a plea in bar, Theresa has waived this issue for review on appeal. Id.” Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 129 S.Ct. 2145, 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (June 1, 2009). Defendant Bies received death penalty after Ohio murder conviction in 1992. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court “observed that Bies' ‘mild to borderline mental retardation merit[ed] some weight in mitigation,’ but concluded that ‘the aggravating circumstances outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.’” After Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ruled that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of mentally retarded offenders, “the Ohio trial court ordered a full hearing on the question of Bies' mental capacity.” Defendant, however, filed federal habeas petition, contending that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of the death penalty here, inasmuch as the Ohio Supreme Court has already made a determination that he is mentally retarded. The U.S. District Court and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Bies. A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reverses, holding that no double jeopardy violation has occurred because a) Bies has only been put in jeopardy once; b) “mental retardation for purposes of Atkins, and mental retardation as one mitigator to be weighed against aggravators, are discrete issues;” and c) issue preclusion does not apply because the original mental retardation determination was not “necessary to the ultimate outcome” and Bies was not a “prevailing party,” two necessary conditions to application of the doctrine. 1. Jeopardy here only attached once. “‘[T]he touchstone for double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is whether there has been an “acquittal,”’” quoting Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003). “Here, as in Sattazahn, there was no acquittal. Bies' jury voted to impose the death penalty. At issue now is Bies' ‘second run at vacating his death sentence.’” 2. Determination of mental retardation as a mitigating factor pre- Atkins doesn’t preclude litigation of the issue as a preclusive factor post- Atkins . “Mental retardation as a mitigator and mental retardation under Atkins … are discrete legal issues. The Atkins decision itself highlights one difference: ‘[R]eliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury.’ 536 U.S., at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242. This reality explains why prosecutors, pre- Atkins, had little incentive vigorously to contest evidence of retardation. … Because the change in law substantially altered the State's incentive to contest Bies' mental capacity, applying preclusion would not advance the equitable administration of the law.” 3. Issue preclusion doesn’t apply because the original mental retardation determination was not “necessary to the ultimate outcome.” “[I]t is clear that the courts' statements regarding Bies' mental capacity were not necessary to the judgments affirming his death sentence. A determination ranks as necessary or essential only when the final outcome hinges on it. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4421, p. 543 (2d ed., 2002). ‘Far from being necessary to the judgment, the Ohio courts' mental-retardation findings cut against it-making them quintessentially the kinds of rulings not eligible for issue-preclusion treatment.’” Spiller v. State, 282 Ga. 351, 647 S.E.2d 64 (June 25, 2007). While his motion for new trial was still pending, defendant filed habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The habeas court ruled against defendant on the merits of the claim. Defendant then sought to amend his still-pending motion for new trial to add the ineffective assistance claim. Held, trial court properly found that the ruling by the habeas court was res judicata. “This Court has long recognized that the doctrine of res judicata embodied in OCGA § 9-12-40 applies to final judgments rendered by habeas courts. Mitchem v. Balkcom, 219 Ga. 47, 47 (131 S.E.2d 562) (1963); Perry v. McLendon, 62 Ga. 598, 603-05, 1879 WL 2876, at 4-5 (1879).” Accord, Hollins v. State , 287 Ga. 233, 695 S.E.2d 23 (May 3, 2010) (motion for out-of- time appeal properly denied where ineffective assistance claim had already been adjudicated on habeas petition); Davis v. State , 287 Ga. 414, 696 S.E.2d 644 (June 28, 2010) (“[M]atters litigated in a habeas proceeding are collaterally estopped from being re-litigated elsewhere. Spiller v. State, 282 Ga. 351(2) (647 S.E.2d 64)(2007); Simmons v. State, 276 Ga. 525, 526-527 (579 S.E.2d 735) (2003).”). Swain v. State, 251 Ga.App. 110, 552 S.E.2d 880 (July 20, 2001). Trial court is not bound by the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, during a defendant’s license suspension hearing, that a defendant did not refuse to consent to chemical testing when the State was precluded from fully litigating the refusal issue during the summary administrative hearing. Cited with approval, Malloy v. State , 293 Ga. 350, 744 S.E.2d 778 (June 17, 2013). Vanderpool v. State, 244 Ga.App. 804, 536 S.E.2d 821 (July 6, 2000). Convictions for aggravated assault on a police