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officer and related offenses affirmed. Vanderpool’s offenses started in Banks County and ended in Gwinnett County. He was tried first in Gwinnett, where he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. State wasn’t collaterally estopped from asserting defendant’s sanity in Banks County by the insanity adjudication in Gwinnett County . “At the outset, it must be noted that sanity may ebb and wane like a mental tide. A defendant who is perfectly lucid at one moment may be maniacal at the next. This fact is borne out by the Banks County jury's verdict in this case in which it was found that Vanderpool was guilty but mentally ill as to one count and guilty to the others. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court in Gwinnett County necessarily considered Vanderpool's mental state at the time he initiated the kidnapping of Patterson in Banks County in reaching his decision.” Sanchez v. State, 242 Ga.App. 686, 530 S.E.2d 775 (March 9, 2000). Cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking convictions affirmed; no collateral estoppel on re-prosecution of these charges where defendant found not guilty at first trial on possession of a firearm during commission of a crime. “The doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is embraced within the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, ‘means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). The record of the prior proceeding must ‘affirmatively demonstrate [ ] that an issue involved in the second trial was definitely determined in the former trial.... [Cit.]’ United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564, 565 (7 th Cir., 1973), cited in Preston v. State, 257 Ga. 42, 45(4), 354 S.E.2d 135 (1987). The possibility that an issue may have been determined in the former trial does not prevent the relitigation of that issue. United States v. Haines, supra at 565.” Not guilty finding on firearms charge doesn’t necessarily imply finding by the jury that the defendant didn’t commit the underlying felony; it may instead represent a finding that the defendant wasn’t in possession of a firearm. 6. FACTUALLY RELATED CHARGES, SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTIONS Jackson v. State, A15A2244, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 906354 (March 10, 2016). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for rape and related offenses. Trial court properly denied plea in bar based on double jeopardy, following separate prosecution in another (unspecified – state?) court for criminal trespass, concealed weapon and open container. The two sets of crimes arose from different conduct. “Jackson argues that the misdemeanor and felony-related offenses arise from the same conduct because they are intertwined and each offense requires proof of the others. We disagree. Although the offenses occurred on the same date and close in time, they took place in different locations (inside a particular apartment and outside a separate building in the apartment complex). Furthermore, a significant ‘break in the action’ occurred between the felony and misdemeanor offenses. [ Johns v. State, 319 Ga.App. 718, 719, 738 S.E.2d 304 (2013).] Jackson allegedly assaulted the victim, then fled the scene. Some time later, an officer saw Jackson standing in another location and discovered facts leading to the criminal trespass, open container, and concealed weapon charges. There was no continuing course of conduct here. See id. at 720, 738 S.E.2d 304 (double jeopardy did not prohibit multiple prosecutions where offenses at issue ‘were separate transactions, one of which had been completed prior to the other’); Boyette v. State, 172 Ga.App. 683, 684(1), 324 S.E.2d 540 (1984) (traffic offenses and disorderly conduct involving defendant’s actions after traffic stop did not arise out of same transaction because ‘[t]he traffic offenses were completed at a different time and at different locations’). Moreover, the State can establish each set of offenses without proving the other.” Randolph v. State, 334 Ga.App. 475, 780 S.E.2d 19 (November 13, 2015). Convictions for distributing marijuana and related offenses affirmed (but gang convictions reversed on other grounds). Trial court properly denied motion to dismiss based on procedural double jeopardy under OCGA § 16-1-7(b), as evidence showed that prosecutor didn’t know about defendant’s drug offenses until he testified about them at his prior murder trial. “To prevail upon his motion to dismiss, Randolph bore the burden of showing that the prosecutor had actual knowledge before the first prosecution of the facts supporting the charges in the second prosecution. [ Nicely v. State, 305 Ga.App. 387, 388(1), 699 S.E.2d 774 (2010)]; see also Billups v. State, 228 Ga.App. 804, 807(1)(b), 493 S.E.2d 8 (1997) (‘The prosecutor’s knowledge of all the facts determines whether a single prosecution is required.’) (emphasis in original). The trial court concluded that what the prosecutor knew before the first trial was a question of fact that should be resolved by the jury rather than by the court as a matter of law. See Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98, 103(2) (1886) (fact questions related to applicability of double jeopardy defense ‘would have to be submitted to the jury’); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 117, 17 S.E.2d 573 (1941); compare Bell v. State, 249 Ga. 644, 645(1), 292 S.E.2d 402 (1982) (‘No question of fact was at issue in this special plea in bar [asserting double jeopardy], so it was unnecessary to have a jury hear the plea.’). Randolph has failed to show that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his double jeopardy defense.” Sellers v. State, 332 Ga.App. 14, 770 S.E.2d 31 (March 26, 2015). After defendant pled guilty to following too closely in